In a case such as this, in which the parties offer differing, if not contradictory, accounts as to whose conduct caused the collision, the evidence is neither plain nor indisputable, and resolution of the facts properly rests with the jury. See Mayo v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. , 302 Ga. App. 19, 21, 689 S.E.2d 837 (2009) ("Questions of negligence, diligence, ... and proximate cause are peculiarly matters for the jury, and a court should not take the place of the jury in solving them, except in plain and indisputable cases.") (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, the trial court did not err by denying Reed summary judgment on Nash's negligence claim.

(Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Mayo v. Old Dominion Freight Line , 302 Ga. App. 19, 21, 689 S.E.2d 837 (2009). See also Layfield , 280 Ga. at 849 (1), 632 S.E.2d 135.

Hayes, supra, 317 Ga. App. at 79, 730 S.E.2d 26. Compare Young v. Kitchens, 228 Ga. App. 870, 872-874 (3), 492 S.E.2d 898 (1997) (reversing summary judgment to driver where there was some evidence that driver could have seen and avoided striking injured person lying in roadway). If the bull entered the highway moments before the collision, Fann would not be liable. See Mayo v. Old Dominion Freight Line, 302 Ga. App. 19, 22, 689 S.E.2d 837 (2009) (driver would not be liable in wrongful death action if jury found decedent had suddenly stepped into driver's path before being hit); Tucker v. Love, 200 Ga. App. 408, 409 (1), 408 S.E.2d 182 (1991) (plaintiff in wrongful death action not entitled to jury instruction that defendant bus driver had duty to discover decedent in roadway where evidence showed decedent entered street to the side of, and not in front of, moving bus); Lovell v. Howard, 182 Ga. App. 891 (2), 357 S.E.2d 600 (1987) (finding no evidence that driver who struck horse on road at night was not paying sufficient attention, where driver was traveling under the speed limit with operating headlights and horse came from driver's left moving perpendicular to her path); Johnson v. Ellis, 179 Ga. App. 343, 345, 346 S.E.2d 119 (1986) (affirming directed verdict to driver where evidence showed that inebriated pedestrian was walking to the side of, not in front of, driver's moving vehicle and there was no evidence that pedestr

And significantly, the issue of whether an individual performed a particular task negligently, i.e., failed to exercise ordinary care, is peculiarly a matter for jury resolution. See Mayo v. Old Dominion Freight Line, 302 Ga. App. 19, 21-22 ( 689 SE2d 837) (2009); Hillary v. Burrell, 237 Ga. App. 792, 794 (1) ( 516 SE2d 836) (1999). The evidence presented in this case does not demand a verdict contrary to that rendered by the jury.

Id. (whether there is and the proportion of comparative negligence is ordinarily a jury question). See also Mayo v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 19, 22-23 (2009)("even presuming the decedent's original negligence" in walking along the highway intoxicated, "we cannot say as a matter of law that his negligence precludes the [plaintiff's] recovery, because a question of fact remains as to whether [the defendant's] negligence was greater"). III. PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE PER SE CLAIM

Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Williams’s motion for summary judgment. See Fountain v. Thompson , 252 Ga. 256, 257, 312 S.E.2d 788 (1984) ; Mayo v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. , 302 Ga. App. 19, 21-24, 689 S.E.2d 837 (2009).