Opinion
1:23-CV-510-RP
04-04-2024
LUTONYA MAYNARD, Plaintiff, v. LEADER INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MARK LANE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT PITMAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Before the court is Defendants Laurelyn Arterbury, Karie Lynn Eggeling, Bruce Gearing, Michi Ishimura, Rachel Mackey, and Sue Neidecker's (“Individual Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 25) and all related briefingAfter reviewing the pleadings and the relevant case law, and determining that a hearing is unnecessary, the undersigned submits the following Report and Recommendation to the District Court.
United States District Judge Robert Pitman referred the Motion to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation as to the merits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 1(d) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. Text Order, March 18, 2024.
I. Background
LuTonya Maynard, proceeding pro se, is suing Leander Independent School District and the Individual Defendants in a dispute that arose out of Maynard's employment by Leander ISD. Dkt. 1 at 3-6. Maynard alleges discrimination and retaliation based on her race, African American. Id. at 3. Maynard asserts claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 1.
The Individual Defendants now move to dismiss Maynard's suit against them under Rules 4(m), 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). Dkt. 25 at 1. Maynard, in a one-paragraph argument relating to agency, opposes the Individual Defendants' Motion. Dkt. 29 at 2.
Page numbers refer to the page number generated by the CM/ECF system.
II. Legal Standard
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
When evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and all facts pleaded must be taken as true. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 mandates only that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” this standard demands more than unadorned accusations, “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
The Supreme Court has made clear this plausibility standard is not simply a “probability requirement,” but imposes a standard higher than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The standard is properly guided by “[t]wo working principles.” Id. First, although “a court must ‘accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint,' that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Second, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, in considering a motion to dismiss, the court must first identify pleadings that are no more than legal conclusions not entitled to the assumption of truth, then assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations and determine whether those allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. If not, “the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
B. Rule 4(m)
A district court must dismiss a complaint without prejudice under Rule 4(m) “if a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, unless the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure.” Lewis v. Sec'y of Pub. Safety and Corr., 870 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2017); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). A district court enjoys “broad discretion in determining whether to dismiss an action for ineffective service of process.” George v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 788 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Good cause requires proof of at least “excusable neglect”- simple inadvertence, mistake of counsel, “or ignorance of the rules usually does not suffice.” Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff must provide some “showing of good faith” and “some reasonable basis for noncompliance” with the court's deadline. Ibid. (citation omitted). The plaintiff should also show due diligence in attempting to perfect service. Id. at 512.
A litigant's pro se status neither excuses his failure to effect service nor excuses him for lack of knowledge of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 512 (citing Sys. Signs Supplies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 903 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1990) & Martin v. Harrison Cty. Jail, 975 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1992)).
III. Analysis
A. Rule (12)(b)(6)
The Individual Defendants contend that Maynard may not “maintain this suit against the [I]ndividual [D]efendants in their official capacities because such a suit is duplicative of the suit against Leander ISD, which is a named defendant.” Dkt. 25 at 4.
The Fifth Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of official capacity claims on a 12(b)(6) motion because they are duplicative of claims against the governmental entity. Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001).
Official-capacity claims “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). The claim is treated as one against the entity, which is the real party-ininterest. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. When a government-official defendant is sued in her official capacity, and the governmental entity is also sued, “[t]he official-capacity claims and the claims against the governmental entity essentially merge.” Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). “Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166.
Maynard's Response, while not directly addressing the Individual Defendants' arguments, discusses (in a five-sentence paragraph) agency in the employer-employee relationship. Dkt. 29 at 2. Therefore, the undersigned infers that Maynard is suing the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. Because suing the Individual Defendants in their official capacities is duplicative of her suit against Leander ISD, the undersigned will recommend that the District Court dismiss the suit against the Individual Defendants.
B. Rule 4(m)
The Individual Defendants point out:
Plaintiff's Complaint was filed May 8, 2023. The Court granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on August 21, 2023. However, Defendants Arterbury, Eggeling, Gearing, Ishimura, Mackey, and Neidecker were not served until February 6, 2024. To accomplish service within 90 days of the filing of the Complaint, service would have been required by August 6, 2023. Service within 90 days of the granting of Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis would have
required service by November 19, 2023. In this case, service on Defendants Arterbury, Eggeling, Gearing, Ishimura, Mackey, and Neidecker was 274 days (nine months) following the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint and 170 days (approximately five and one half months) following the granting of Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. By any measure, service was so far outside the time requirement of Rule 4(m) that it was unreasonably dilatory.Dkt. 25 at 3 (internal citations omitted).
Maynard responds in a single paragraph that exclusively discusses agency in the employer-employee context as it relates to hostile work environments. Dkt. 29 at 2.
Because a district court must dismiss a case if service is not timely effected and because Maynard does not offer good cause for her failure to timely effect service the undersigned will recommend the District Court grant the Individual Defendants' Motion.
IV. Recommendations
For the reasons given above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants Laurelyn Arterbury, Karie Lynn Eggeling, Bruce Gearing, Michi Ishimura, Rachel Mackey, and Sue Neidecker's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 25) be GRANTED and the complaint against the Individual Defendants be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under Rule 12(b)(6) based on redundancy. If the District Court concludes that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not appropriate, the undersigned RECOMMENDS the complaint against the Individual Defendants be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under Rule 4(m).
The referral to the Magistrate Court should be canceled.
V. Objections
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battles v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).