Indeed, in Thompson v. Gaudette, 148 Me. 288, 92 A.2d 342 (1952), the Maine Supreme Judicial Court said that the rule against splitting a cause of action will be waived unless the defendant asserts it "at the earliest opportunity." 92 A.2d at 348 (quoting Mayfield v. Kovac, 41 Ohio App. 310, 181 N.E. 28, 30 (1931)). In our case, the banks at the outset pleaded claim-splitting in their answer and maintained that position throughout the case.

"* * * the rule [against splitting causes of action] * * * is primarily for the benefit of defendants, and being for their benefit they may waive it; this waiver will be presumed if a plaintiff maintains two suits against a defendant at the same time for different items of the same demand, and he [defendant] fails to interpose timely objection." To the same effect are Cassidy v. Berkovitz (1916), 169 Ky. 785, 185 S.W. 129; Mayfield v. Kovac (1932), 41 Ohio App. 310, 181 N.E. 28; Todd v. Central Petroleum Co. (1942), 155 Kan. 249, 124 P.2d 704; Glazier v. Singer (1939), 257 App. Div. 84, 12 N.Y. Supp. (2d), 245; Stapp v. Andrews (1938), 172 Tenn. 610, 113 S.W.2d 749; annotation, 62 A.L.R., 263; and 1 American Jurisprudence (2d) (1962), 647 and 651, Sections 127 and 132. In Fox v. Althorp (1883), 40 Ohio St. 322, the syllabus reads:

1 C.J.S. 1339, Sec. 105, 1 C.J. 1120, Sec. 304, Dils v. Justice, 127 S.W. (Ky.) 472; Craig et al. v. Broocks, 127 S.W. (Tex.) 572, Roby v. Eggers, 29 N.E. (Ind.) 365. The defendant, however, may waive the enforcement of the rule against splitting the cause of action and such a waiver will be presumed unless timely and proper objection is made. 1 C.J.S. 1312, Sec. 102 g. The rule relative to waiver is well stated by the court in Mayfield v. Kovac, 41 Ohio App. 310, 181 N.E. 28, 30: "However, we think that it is equally well established by the authorities that the rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of action is primarily for the benefit of the defendant, and that he may waive the same, and that, where two actions are brought when but one should have been brought, and the person against whom they are brought fails to interpose in the second action, and at the earliest opportunity, a plea in bar, or otherwise object to the trial of such action, and submits the case upon the merits, he will be held to have impliedly consented to the splitting of said single cause of action.

In Hardwicke-Etter Co. v. City of Durant, 77 Okla. 202, 187 P. 484, cited by appellants, it was held that consent to the splitting of causes will be presumed unless the former action in bar is pleaded. In Mayfield v. Kovac, 41 Ohio App. 310, 181 N.E. 28, 30, relied on by appellants, it was held that the defendant had waived his right to object to the division of causes by failure to interpose "in the second action, and at the earliest opportunity, a plea in bar, or otherwise object." In National Union Fire Insurance Company v. Denver R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, cited by the appellants, it was held that the splitting of causes could not be raised by a general demurrer and the objection was waived if no specific objection was made.

ns of the Courts of Appeals of this state support the proposition that, under Section 11241, General Code, providing that actions shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, an insurance carrier which has paid a property damage claim for injury to its assured's automobile may, as subrogee, maintain an action for reimbursement against the party who wrongfully caused the damage, independent of any claim of the owner for personal injuries growing out of the same accident. See LeBlond Schacht Truck Co. v. Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 478, 171 N.E. 414; Allamong v. Falkenhof, 39 Ohio App. 515, 177 N.E. 789, motion to certify overruled; Barnhill v. Brown, 58 Ohio App. 188, 16 N.E.2d 478; North River Ins. Co. v. Redman, supra; Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., v. State Automobile Mutual Ins. Co., 17 Ohio Law Abs., 419; Strasser v. Blain Dairies, Inc., 27 Ohio Law Abs., 108; Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society v. Stang, 18 C. C., 464, 9 C. D., 576. Contra, Mayfield v. Kovac, Jr., 41 Ohio App. 310, 181 N.E. 28. See, also, annotations in 64 A. L. R., 663, and 127 A. L. R., 1081.

J. Friedenthal, M. Kane A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 14.3 (1985). There are similar holdings in Southern Stock Fire Ins. Co. v. Raleigh, C S. Railway Co., 179 N.C. 290, 102 S.E. 504 (1920) (the defendant, having answered to the merits instead of objecting to the division of actions by plea or motion, was held to have acquiesced in such division); Hardwicke-Etter Co. v. City of Durant, 77 Okla. 202, 187 P. 484 (1920) (consent to the splitting of causes will be presumed unless the former action in bar is pleaded); Mayfield v. Kovac, 41 Ohio App. 310, 181 N.E. 28 (1932) (defendant waived his right to object to the division of causes by failure to interpose, "in the second action, and at the earliest opportunity, a plea in bar, or otherwise object"); and National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653 (1913) (defense based on splitting of causes could not be raised by general demurrer and is waived if no specific objection was raised). As noted supra, §§ 24-25 of Restatement (Second) of Judgments deal with the res judicata effect of splitting a cause of action.

It is significant in considering the judgment now before the court that a judgment rendered on the pleadings is a judgment on the merits and, when sustained, results in a final judgment. Rhoades v. McDowell, Recr., 24 Ohio App. 94, 156 N.E. 526; Mayfield v. Kovac, 41 Ohio App. 310, 181 N.E. 28; 31 Ohio Jurisprudence, 884, Pleading, Section 292. It follows from the foregoing proposition that if the pleadings and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom present an issue of fact, the judgment can not stand and must be reversed in order that such issues of fact may be determined upon a trial of the cause as required by law.

" The characteristics of such a motion and judgment are set out in Mayfield v. Kovac, Jr., 41 Ohio App. 310, 311, 181 N.E. 28, as follows: "In determining whether or not it was error for the court to render such judgment, we must keep in mind the fact that a motion for a judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer, for it raises only questions of law, and involves the substance rather than the form of the pleadings; and a court in passing upon such motion is required to liberally construe the pleadings in favor of the party against whom said motion is made and give to the party against whom the motion is made every reasonable inference deducible from the pleadings, and the court is not permitted to consider anything not shown by the pleadings.