Nonetheless, “[w]hile we recognize that this may be a mere clerical error, we must ... reverse and remand to allow” the trial court “to resolve the inconsistencies.” Mayfield v. Hannifin,174 N.C.App. 386, 401, 621 S.E.2d 243, 253 (2005).We note that plaintiff contends that the financial affidavit was ambiguous and that the affidavit should be read as including the $447.
March 2, 2006. Case Below: 174 N.C. App. 386. 1. Def's Motion for Temporary Stay (COA04-1646).
December 20, 2005. Case Below: 174 N.C. App. 386. Def's Motion for Temporary Stay (COA04-1646).
To the extent that plaintiff points to excerpts of these doctors' testimony that might permit a finding of causation, that evidence is not sufficient to set aside the Commission's conclusion otherwise. See Mayfield v. Hannifin, 174 N.C. App. 386, 399, 621 S.E.2d 243, 252 (2005) ("While defendant points to portions of Dr. Roy's testimony that it believes support its position or suggest speculation, this Court has previously noted that '[c]ontradictions in the testimony go to its weight . . . .'" (quoting Harrell v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835 (1980))). III
Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir.2003) (stating that “[a] Plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence must show that she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself”); see also State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 490, 701 S.E.2d 615, 645 (2010) (holding that a prosecutor's decision to strike a particular juror did not constitute an equal protection violation where the information obtained during the jury selection process failed to establish that the two jurors were similarly situated); Grace Baptist Church v. City of Oxford, 320 N.C. 439, 447, 358 S.E.2d 372, 377 (1987) (holding that the adoption of a zoning ordinance equally applicable to all buildings constructed after a specific date did not result in an equal protection violation because pre-existing buildings and post-ordinance buildings were not similarly situated); Mayfield v. Hannifin, 174 N.C.App. 386, 397, 621 S.E.2d 243, 251 (2005) (stating that counsel for the defendant and the plaintiff are not similarly situated with respect to their obligation to maintain the confidentiality of a plaintiff's medical records); State v. Davis, 96 N.C.App. 545, 549, 386 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1989) (holding that the prosecution of a defendant who intentionally failed to pay taxes as a protest while refraining from taking such action against an individual who failed to pay taxes due to neglect did not constitute an equal protection violation since the two categories of defendants were not similarly situated); Smith v. Wilkins, 75 N.C.App. 483, 486, 331 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1985) (holding that drivers who move to North Carolina after their licenses have been revoked in another state are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes with drivers whose licenses have been revoked in North Carolina). Thus, in order to properly assert an equal protection violation, Petitioner was required to allege and demonstrate that she was treated di
im that similarly situated individuals were subjected to disparate treatment. Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that "[a] Plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence must show that she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself"); see also State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 490, 701 S.E.2d 615, 645 (2010) (holding that a prosecutor's decision to strike a particular juror did not constitute an equal protection violation where the information obtained during the jury selection process failed to establish that the two jurors were similarly situated); Grace Baptist Church v. City of Oxford, 320 N.C. 439, 447, 358 S.E.2d 372, 377 (1987) (holding that the adoption of a zoning ordinance equally applicable to all buildings constructed after a specific date did not result in an equal protection violation because pre-existing buildings and post-ordinance buildings were not similarly situated); Mayfield v. Hannifin, 174 N.C. App. 386, 397, 621 S.E.2d 243, 251 (2005) (stating that counsel for the defendant and the plaintiff are not similarly situated with respect to their obligation to maintain the confidentiality of a plaintiff's medical records); State v. Davis, 96 N.C. App. 545, 549, 386 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1989) (holding that the prosecution of a defendant who intentionally failed to pay taxes as a protest while refraining from taking such action against an individual who failed to pay taxes due to neglect did not constitute an equal protection violation since the two categories of defendants were not similarly situated); Smith v. Wilkins, 75 N.C. App. 483, 486, 331 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1985) (holding that drivers who move to North Carolina after their licenses have been revoked in another state are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes with drivers whose licenses have been revoked in North Carolina). Thus, in order to properly assert an equal protection violation, Petitioner was required to allege and demonstrate that she was treated
To the extent that plaintiff points to excerpts of these doctors' testimony that might permit a finding of causation, that evidence is not sufficient to set aside the Commission's conclusion otherwise. See Mayfield v. Hannifin, 174 N.C. App. 386, 399, 621 S.E.2d 243, 252 (2005) ("While defendant points to portions of Dr. Roy's testimony that it believes support its position or suggest speculation, this Court has previously noted that `[c]ontradictions in the testimony go to its weight. . . .'" (quoting Harrell v. J.P. Stevens Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835 (1980))). III
The actions of Angela Prenoveau in contacting Dr. Hage were in violation of the principles set out in Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990) , and Salaam v. N.C. Dept. of Transp., 122 N.C.App. 83, 468 S.E.2d 536 (1996) , disc. review improvidently allowed, 345 N.C. 494, 480 S.E.2d 51 (1997) . See Mayfield v. ParkerHannifen [Hannifin ], 174 N.C.App. 386, 621 S.E.2d 243 (2005) . The Commission's award provided that:
5. The actions of Angela Prenoveau in contacting Dr. Hage were in violation of the principles set out in Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990), and Salaam v. N.C. Dept. of Transp., 122 N.C. App. 83, 468 S.E.2d 536 (1996), disc. review improvidently allowed, 345 N.C. 494, 480 S.E.2d 51 (1997). See Mayfield v. Parker Hannifen, 174 N.C. App. 386, 621 S.E.2d 243 (2005). The Commission's award provided that:
Because competent evidence supports the Commission's findings of fact that defendant's non-consensual, ex parte communications required Dr. Davis's testimony to be stricken from the record, the Commission did not err in striking the testimony. See Mayfield v. Parker Hannifin, ___ N.C. App. ___, 621 S.E.2d 243 (2005) (upholding the exclusion of non-consensual, ex parte communication between employer and employee's treating physicians as to employee's ability to work). This assignment of error is overruled.