Knowledge on a defendant's part to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property may be shown in one of two ways. It will suffice if the state proves: (1) that the defendant had knowledge that the property was stolen at the time he dealt with it or (2) that the circumstances of the transaction were sufficiently suspicious to put a person of ordinary intelligence and caution on inquiry. State v. Graham, Fla. 1970, 238 So.2d 618; Schuster v. State, Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 30. Proof of constructive notice as to the stolen nature of goods will suffice. Mayer v. State, Fla.App. 1970, 231 So.2d 540. For the foregoing reasons, the adjudications of delinquency of A.S. and J.H. as to breaking and entering, and of B.S. as to both charges are reversed and remanded with directions that B.S. be discharged.
This "explanation" was such as to permit, perhaps impel, the jury to have concluded that McQueen either knew, or should have known, that the calculator had in fact been stolen — an indispensable element of the crime with which he was charged. E.g., Williams v. State, 106 Fla. 225, 143 So. 157 (1932); Lampley v. State, Fla.App. 1968, 214 So.2d 515; Mayer v. State, Fla.App. 1970, 231 So.2d 540. Thus, there is no difficulty in concluding that all the evidence, including the confession, see Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897), amply supports the conviction. The insurmountable difficulty which does arise, however, is that Holmes did not testify at the trial, and there is no other evidence apart from his own statement (the $30.00 figure seems to have been a reasonable one for a pawn of the machine) concerning McQueen's guilty knowledge.