From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Mayer v. Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Jul 29, 2008
No. D051524 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 29, 2008)

Opinion


LAURA LYNNE MAYER, Petitioner and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, Respondent. D051524 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division July 29, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. GIC878861, Steven R. Denton, Judge.

McINTYRE, J.

Laura Lynne Mayer filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking an order reversing a decision by the Department of Real Estate (the Department) revoking her real estate license. The trial court granted her petition and remanded this matter to the Department for further proceedings. Mayer appeals from the judgment granting her petition and from a subsequent order of the real estate commissioner that, purportedly, again revoked her license. The Department seeks to dismiss the appeal on the ground Mayer lacks standing to appeal from a judgment in her favor and failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to the subsequent order of the real estate commissioner. We agree and dismiss this appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mayer became a licensed real estate salesperson in 1998, but her license expired in 2002. She applied to renew her license in 2004, disclosing that she had suffered two petty theft convictions in 2003. The Department renewed her license, but later filed an accusation against her in October 2005, alleging that the two petty theft convictions were crimes of moral turpitude that justified revocation of her license. After a hearing on the accusation, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposed decision revoking Mayer's license. The ALJ concluded that Mayer's convictions were substantially related to her qualifications as a real estate licensee and that she had not demonstrated rehabilitation because she had not taken a court ordered shoplifting course. After the real estate commissioner adopted the ALJ's proposed decision, Mayer filed a petition for reconsideration, arguing, among other things, that she did complete the required shoplifting course. The real estate commissioner denied reconsideration and Mayer petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate ordering the Department to set aside its decision revoking her license.

The trial court tentatively denied the petition, finding that there was little evidence of rehabilitation and that the doctrine of laches did not bar the license revocation. The court then took the matter under submission, vacated its tentative ruling and granted the petition. The court found that the revocation decision was partially based on the erroneous conclusion that Mayer had not completed a court ordered shoplifting course and remanded the matter to the ALJ to issue a corrected decision not premised on the erroneous conclusion; however, it expressed no opinion on whether the ALJ could reach the same conclusion after excluding the erroneous evidentiary finding. Mayer timely appealed and the Department moved to dismiss the appeal. Another ALJ reportedly held a second administrative hearing and again revoked Mayer's license.

DISCUSSION

Standing to appeal is jurisdictional (Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 295) and the issue of whether a party has standing is a question of law. (IBM Personal Pension Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1299.) A party must be legally aggrieved by a challenged ruling in order to have standing to appeal it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902; Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc., supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 295.) A party is not aggrieved by a judgment or order rendered in its favor (Nevada County Office of Education v. Riles (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 767, 779); however, there is an exception to this rule where an apparently favorable judgment does not grant the exact form of relief sought. (See e.g., Liodas v. Sahadi (1977) 19 Cal.3d 278, 285 [a party who sought a new trial on all issues can appeal from an order granting only a partial new trial]; Barham v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 744, 751 [a party can appeal from a judgment rendered in his or her favor where it awards less than the amount originally demanded].)

Mayer contends the trial court erred because it should have granted the petition and dismissed the case under the doctrine of laches and that she is aggrieved by this error. The record, however, does not support this contention. Mayer sought reversal of the license revocation order in her petition and supporting points and authorities, but did not raise the laches defense or request dismissal of the accusation based on laches. She raised laches for the first time in supplemental points and authorities, but again did not seek dismissal of the accusation. Accordingly, to the extent Mayer contends she is an aggrieved party because the trial court did not rule on the merits of her laches defense, the argument fails as the trial court granted Mayer all the relief she requested.

Furthermore, the trial court addressed Mayer's laches defense in its tentative ruling and rejected it. The trial court did not restate this finding in its final ruling, but presumably again concluded that the argument lacked merit. Mayer has not shown that the court's implied finding was erroneous as she has not explained how she was prejudiced by any delay, i.e., faded memories or the loss of evidence. (Gates v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 921, 925 [administrative delay may merit dismissal of a proceeding if the delay is unreasonable and results in prejudice].) Delay alone, even if unreasonable, is insufficient to constitute a laches defense without a showing of prejudice. (Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1419.)

Mayer also argues that a second administrative hearing should never have been held and that we have jurisdiction to review the outcome of this hearing. We disagree. Matters occurring after entry of judgment are ordinarily not reviewable (9 Witkin, Cal. Proc. 4th (1997) Appeal, § 330, p. 371) and we lack jurisdiction to directly review the outcome of the second administrative hearing. In any event, the trial court's order remanding the matter followed the statutory guideline (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (f)) and Mayer has not shown that the trial court erred or that she was aggrieved by the order. (See Carlton v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1428, 1434-1435 [it is customary to remand the matter to the agency for a new hearing where an administrative decision is set aside for insufficiency of the evidence].)

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. Each party to bear its own costs of appeal.

WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., AARON, J.


Summaries of

Mayer v. Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Jul 29, 2008
No. D051524 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 29, 2008)
Case details for

Mayer v. Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings

Case Details

Full title:LAURA LYNNE MAYER, Petitioner and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Jul 29, 2008

Citations

No. D051524 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 29, 2008)