Opinion
Civil 21-CV-00040 (MEG)
11-29-2022
Solomon Maye, Plaintiff, v. City of New Haven, Detective Carr, Detective Folch, and Detective Soto, Defendants.
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Hon. Maria E. Garcia United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Solomon Maye, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City of New Haven and New Haven Police Department Detectives Carr, Folch, and Soto. Pending is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. ## 62; 108.)Defendants oppose summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff's arguments are based on “misapplications or misunderstandings of the law and/or facts, and self-serving statements and affidavit, and there remain genuine issues of material fact as to each claim asserted.” (Doc. # 114, at 1.) For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. ## 62; 108) is DENIED.
On August 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a “Motion for Court to Give State Court Decision ‘Full Faith and Credit' on this Case”. (Doc. ## 62; 63.) On September 2, 2021, Judge Covello entered an order denying the motions “without prejudice to refiling at a later stage of this case, after all of the defendants have been properly served and after the completion of discovery.” (Doc. # 65.) On September 14, 2021, Judge Covello further stated that, “[i]n refiling a motion for summary judgment, at a later stage of this case, the plaintiff may make reference to, and the court will consider, his previously filed document.” (Doc. # 68.) Discovery closed on July 30, 2022 with dispositive motions due August 30, 2022. (Doc. # 92.) On May 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with reference to his originally filed motion, renewing the earlier filed motion for summary judgment. (Doc. # 108.) Accordingly, the Court considers the Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 30, 2021. (Doc. # 62.)
I. STANDARD OF LAW
A. Section 1983
Plaintiff brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), which permits imposing civil liability upon persons who, acting under color of state law, deprive an individual of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Patterson v. County of Oneida, New York, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983, however, “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights.'” Id. (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). Rather, § 1983 “merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Id. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish the challenged conduct “(1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997).
B. Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Rule 56 requires the movant to cite to particular materials in the record, such as depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials, showing that they do not establish a genuine dispute regarding the claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The local rules of this Court “require any party that moves for summary judgment to file a statement of undisputed material facts along with supporting evidence.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)1.
Summary judgment may be granted only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Sullivan v. Stein, 487 F.Supp.2d 52, 63 (D. Conn. 2007), affd, 319 Fed.Appx. 42 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams v. Utica College of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.2006)). The Court must “view the facts in the light most favorable to the party who opposes the motion for summary judgment and then decide if those facts would be enough-if eventually proved at trial-to allow a reasonable factfinder to decide the case in favor of the opposing party.” Cooper v. Doe, No. 3:19-CV-01794 (JAM), 2021 WL 66437, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 7, 2021). The role of the Court on summary judgment “is not to judge the credibility of witnesses or to resolve close contested issues of fact but solely to decide if there are enough facts that remain in dispute to warrant a trial.” Id. (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014) (per curiam); Pollard v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 861 F.3d 374, 378 (2d Cir. 2017)).
In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff filed a Brief in Support (Doc. # 62-1); Declaration of Solomon Maye, (Doc. # 62-2); Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. # 623); and a video (Doc. ## 62-5; 62-4 (notice of manual filing)). He also filed a “Motion for Court to Give State Court Decision ‘Full Faith and Credit' On This Case” and appended a copy of an order of the State Superior Court regarding an affidavit of noncompliance with stipulationsummary process, dated March 11, 2021. (Doc. # 63, Maye v. Canady, No. NHH-CV-20-5004733-S, (Doc. # 112.10) (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2021).)
Defendants deny all allegations and contend that Maye's Declaration is not sworn or attested to, but if it were that the statements are conclusory and contain “conjecture and supposition”; “allegations of a non-party that has not given testimony”; and/or contain “no allegations of fact regarding the conduct of any member or agent of the New Haven Police Department.” (See Doc. # 114-1, at ¶¶ 1-6.) Defendants filed two D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)2 statements (Doc. # 114-1; Doc. # 114-2); a copy of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 114-2); and at Exhibit B a document that they contend is “proof of training, both in academy and in-service.” (Doc. # 114, at 8; Doc. # 114-2 Ex. B.) Defendants offered no other evidence in opposition to summary judgment. The Court notes that Defendants' D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)2 statement does not correspond to Plaintiff's D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a) 1 statement. Compare (Doc. ## 114-1; 114-2) to (Doc. # 62-3). Rather, Defendants filed two Rule 56(a)2 statements responding to the facts asserted in Plaintiff's Declaration. See (Doc. ## 114-1; 114-2; 62-2.)
Defendants object to Plaintiff's Declaration that is “not sworn or attested to.” (Doc. # 1141, at 1.) “Section 1746 allows for the submission of an unsworn declaration to a court if it is subscribed by [the declarant], as true under penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following form: . . . ‘I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on (date). (Signature)'. 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (emphasis added).” LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P. v. Worsham, 185 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, although the declaration does not contain the exact language of Section 1746, it substantially complies with the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and may properly be considered. Accordingly, Defendants' objection is overruled.
Oral argument was held on November 7, 2022.
II. BACKGROUND
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed this action pro se, in other words, he is proceeding without an attorney. Where one party is proceeding pro se, the court reads the pro se party's papers liberally and interprets them to raise the strongest arguments suggested therein. See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). “Nonetheless, ‘ [proceeding pro se does not otherwise relieve a litigant of the usual requirements of summary judgment, and a pro se party's bald assertions unsupported by evidence, are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.'” Houston v. Teamsters Loc. 210, Affiliated Health & Ins. Fund-Vacation Fringe Ben. Fund, 27 F.Supp.3d 346, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Rodriguez v. Hahn, 209 F.Supp.2d 344, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
1. Federal Court Action
As is required on a motion for summary judgment, the Court relates the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
At all times relevant, Mr. Maye operated a business called Get'Em Boy Boxing, LLC at 746 Orchard Street, New Haven, CT. (Doc. # 1-1, Compl. Maye Decl., at 2.) He sub-let the premises from Elephant in the Room Boxing (“EIR”) that was owned and operated by Devonne Canady. (Id.) On or about August 12, 2020, a “notice to quit possession to Solomon Maye and Get'Em Boy Boxing LLC from EIR URBAN YOUTH BOXING, INC and DEVONNE CANADY for non-payment of rent and or laps[e] of time” was left at the door of Plaintiff's business. (Id., at 3.); Maye v. Canady, 214 Conn.App. 302, 457-58 (Conn. App. 2022). The Notice to Quit further stated that he had to leave the building by August 31, 2020. (Id.)
The incident at issue occurred on September 4, 2020 between Mr. Maye and Defendants New Haven Police Detectives Carr, Folch, and Soto (“Defendant Detectives”). (Doc. # 62-2, Maye Decl. ¶ 1; Doc. # 62-3, Pl. Stat. of Fact ¶ 1.) Plaintiff states that the officers were acting under color of state law, a material fact which Defendants do not dispute. (Pl. Stat. of Fact ¶ 2.) He avers that Defendant Detectives arrived at his place of business to escort him off of the premises. (Maye Decl.¶ 1; Pl. Stat. of Fact ¶ 2.) He states that Defendant Detectives were “summon[ed] to the gym location by Devonne Canady” to “order him to leave the gym” (Maye Decl ¶ 2; Pl. Stat. of Fact ¶ 2), that Ms. Canady “did not have, or show, an ‘eviction order'” to Defendant Detectives (Maye Decl. at ¶ 5), and that Defendant Detectives put him out of business, without an eviction order, as is required, in C.G.S. § 47a-42a(a). (Maye Decl. at ¶ 6; Pl. Stat. of Fact ¶ 4.)
In their papers, Defendants assert that the date Plaintiff avers that the Defendants arrived at his business “consists of a conclusory statement containing conjecture and supposition.” (Doc. # 114-1, at ¶ 1; 114-2, at ¶1.) However, at oral argument, counsel for the Defendant Detectives stipulated that the officers' interaction with Plaintiff took place on September 4, 2020.
At oral argument, counsel for the Defendant Detectives stipulated that they were acting under of color of state law on September 4, 2020 and that the video submitted by Plaintiff of the incident in question depicts the Defendant Detectives on that day.
A video recording from September 4, 2020, shows the three Defendant Detectives at Plaintiff's place of business talking to him and eventually escorting him from the building. It is not clear from the recording how Defendant Detectives were called to the business premises. The recording begins after their arrival and while they are inside the building speaking to Plaintiff. At one point in the video, one of the male officers states “Please hear me out, we spoke to Housing Court, we spoke to our boss . . . this is your chance to collect what you need and we'll all leave.” (VIDEOTS 16:42-17:02.) Plaintiff stated that he “wanted to see the paperwork” and added, “I have the eviction notice right here.” (VIDEOTS 17:13-17:18.)
The video is comprised of three clips with a total running time of 22:18. There are two video clips relating to this case. There is an undated video showing two unidentified individuals that appear to be police detectives standing in an office. The location is not identified. One officer is female and the other is male and he is wearing a mask. Plaintiff is seated in an office chair at a desk and speaking to the officers. There is a third male officer standing outside the office and outside the video frame who is briefly seen. (Id. VIDEOTS 16:11-22:18). The next video depicts Plaintiff with the same three officers, it is not clear what the gap of time is between the first video and second video, but it is presumably the same day. The identity of the parties, date and location is similarly not identified. The video is shot from a different angle that is also outside the office. The video ends with Plaintiff, the officers and the unidentified videographer leaving the premises. (Id. VIDEOTS 00:00-4:36). In his Declaration, Plaintiff states that both he and his client were videotaping the interaction with the Defendant Detectives on September 4, 2020. (Doc. # 62-2, Maye Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.)
Defendants did not respond to the video content in their Rule 56(a)2 Statement. During oral argument, counsel for the Defendant Detectives stipulated that: (1) the three officers named in the complaint are the officers seen in the video; (2) during all times relevant to this case, the officers were acting under color of state law; (3) the interaction at issue in this lawsuit took place on September 4, 2020; and (4) State Superior Court Judge Baio issued an order returning Plaintiff to his place of business.
2. State Superior Court-New Haven Housing Session Actions
The following facts and procedural history are relevant as background to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
A court may “take judicial notice of relevant matters of public record.” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 2005)).
In October 2020, EIR Urban Youth Boxing, Inc. commenced a summary process action in State Superior Court-New Haven Housing Session on three alternate grounds against Mr. Maye. EIR Urban Youth Boxing, Inc v. Maye, No. NHH-CV-20-6012892-S, (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2020). The three grounds were for “nonpayment of rent, right or privilege to occupy has terminated, and lapse of time.” Id. No. NHH-CV-20-6012892-S, (Doc. # 108.50) (Conn. Super. Ct. July 19, 2021); Maye, 214 Conn.App. at 457. On July 19, 2021, Superior Court Judge Claudia A. Baio found in favor of plaintiff EIR “for possession based on a right or privilege terminated.” Id., No. NHH-CV-20-6012892-S, (Doc. # 108.50) (Conn. Super. Ct. July 19, 2021). The Court found that the “Notice to Quit was dated and served on August 12, 2020 with a Quit date of August 31, 2020.” Id. The Court also found that Mr. Maye's challenge to the notice to quit on the basis that it violated the Governor's Executive Order 7DDD in effect at the time of the service to quit was unavailing in a commercial summary process action and that the provisions of the Executive Order did not apply. Id. Judgment entered in favor of EIR for “possession based on right or privilege terminated.” Id. The Court found “no execution may issue until after August 15, 2021.” Id.
EIR also named as defendants three non-appearing entities, “Solomon Maye D.B.A. Get Em Boy LLC,” “Solomon Maye D.B.A. G.E.B.” and “Get ‘Em Boy Boxing, LLC”. Maye v. Canady, 214 Conn.App. 302, 457 (2022).
On December 11, 2020, while the summary process action was pending, and after the events at issue in this case (September 4, 2020), Mr. Maye commenced a separate action in Connecticut Superior Court-New Haven Housing Session, to recover possession of premises and personal property following an alleged unlawful entry and detainer by defendants Devonne Canady and EIR Boxing Club since August 2020. Maye v. Canady, No. NHH-CV-20-5004733-S, (Doc. # 100.31) (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2020). On March 2, 2021, Judge Baio found that the lessee and occupant had a landlord-tenant relationship, and that the lessee violated the entry and detainer statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. §47a-43. Maye v. Canady, No. NHH-CV-20-5004733-S, 2021 WL 2775069, at *2 (Doc. # 108.50) (Conn. Super. Ct. March 2, 2021). The Court found, among other things, that defendants provided notice to quit to Mr. Maye that he was to vacate the premises and no longer conduct business there. Id. “This action stems from that notice provided to the plaintiff, admittedly, requiring him to vacate immediately and disallowing him access to the premises effective immediately upon delivery of the notice at issue.” Id. The Court found that there was a landlord-tenant relationship and defendant was “required to proceed through the proper [summary] process.” Id.
Judge Baio found in the Summary Process Action that EIR did not met its burden of proof to demonstrate nonpayment of rent as there was “much conflicting evidence presented” due to a history of a barter relationship, overlapping issues with the business relationship and the impact of COVID impacting Maye's “ability to operate and fulfill any barter obligations.” Maye v. Canady, No. NHH-CV-20-6012892-S, (Doc. # 108.50) (Conn. Super. Ct. July 19, 2021).
The lesson to be learned from this case is that where the landlord acts to dispossess a tenant without the benefit of summary proceedings and without actually knowing that the tenant has abandoned the premises, he acts imprudently. If he acts precipitously, as the defendant did in this case, he acts at his peril unless an
abandonment has in fact taken place before dispossession. . . . 47a-11b rewards prudence and importunes against such risks as the defendant took.Id. (quoting Gnandt v. DaCruz, No. CVBR-9403-02236, 1994 WL 197699, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 1994)). The Court awarded damages to Mr. Maye in the amount of $10,286.63, plus costs. Maye v. Canady, No. NHH-CV-20-5004733-S, (Doc. # 126.00) (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 2021), aff'd in part and rev'd in part; 214 Conn.App. 302, 467-68 (2022) (reversing judgment solely to the award of damages and remanding with direction to reduce the damages award with respect to moving expenses by $170.11).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff commenced this civil rights action on January 11, 2021, asserting two causes of action under § 1983. He first argues that Defendant Detectives violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the United States Constitution when they evicted/escorted him out of his commercial business without a court order as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. 47a-42a(a). Second, he asserts that the City of New Haven is liable for failing to make a policy or train its officers in lawful evictions.
A. Detectives Carr, Folch and Soto
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The second element is not in dispute.
1. Violation of a Constitutional Right
Plaintiff maintains that that Defendant Detectives violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights on September 4, 2020, when they evicted/escorted him out of his place of business without legal authority. (Doc. # 62-1, at 4 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-42a(a).) He argues that the Detectives' actions rise to the level of a Constitutional violation and summary judgment should enter as a matter of law. (Id. (citing Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois, 506 U.S. 56, 113 S.Ct. 538 (1992)).
The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits “unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. Our Court of Appeals has clarified that the proper framework for analyzing claims such as those asserted regarding the September 4, 2020 incident is the Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. Bryant v. City of New York, 404 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly held that [w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Soldal, 506 U.S. at 61, 113 S.Ct. 538 (ruling that the Fourth Amendment protects against government seizures of the home).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A predicate to any claim of a Fourth Amendment violation is that there has been either a “search” or a “seizure.” A “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment occurs when the police intrude upon a person's reasonable expectation of privacy, or if the police otherwise trespass upon a person's body, house, papers, or effects for the purpose of acquiring information. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 951 n. 5 (2012). A “seizure” of property for purposes of the Fourth Amendment occurs when the police meaningfully interfere with an individual's possessory interest in that property. See Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992).Pearce v. Miele, No. 3:13-CV-01580 JAM, 2015 WL 4546114, at *2 (D. Conn. July 28, 2015.)
The Fourth Amendment protects against “not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437 (I960)). “[T]he reasonableness determination . . . reflect[s] a careful balancing of governmental and private interests.” Sodal, 506 U.S. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the non-investigative context, a seizure of property by police is typically reasonable when done pursuant to a court order. See id. (citing Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1987); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972)). By contrast, a seizure is typically unreasonable where the officers “know[ ] that it is contrary to the law, or proceed to seize property in the absence of objectively reasonable grounds for doing so.” See id. at 72. Accordingly, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.'” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (quoting Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
“To determine whether a seizure is unreasonable, a court must ‘balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion' and determine whether ‘the totality of the circumstances justified [the] particular sort of . . . seizure.'” Newsome v. Bogan, No. 16-CV-6451 FPG, 2017 WL 11373535, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2017) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985)).
The evidence with respect to Defendant Detectives is sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether their conduct violated Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional rights.
Plaintiff principally relies on the Supreme Court decision in Soldal in support of his claim that the New Haven Detectives' actions deprived him of his interest in his business. In Soldal, a tenant sued his landlord, a mobile home park owner, the park manager, five deputy sheriffs, and a deputy lieutenant for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments caused by the removal of the tenant's mobile home from the mobile home park without a valid eviction order. The private defendants in that case called the local sheriffs to keep the peace while the mobile home was dismantled and physically removed from the park. The deputy sheriffs informed the tenant that they would prevent him from interfering with the removal. And a deputy lieutenant declined to accept a complaint of criminal trespass from the tenant because the removal was a civil matter between the tenant and the park owner. The Supreme Court held that the officers' involvement in the forcible removal of the mobile home constituted a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Soldal is distinguishable from this case in several key ways. First, Soldal had a valid tenancy and an indisputable possessory interest in his home. Second, the officers in Soldal knew that the private defendants did not have an eviction order and that their actions in removing the home were illegal, and the officers had known this for some period of time before the actual date of removal. See id. at 58-59, 113 S.Ct .538. Here, in contrast, there is no evidence regarding how or why the officers were called to Plaintiff's place of business. Although Plaintiff avers that they were called to the gym by Devonne Canady, there is no admissible evidence in the record to substantiate this claim and he has not demonstrated personal knowledge.
The evidence on summary judgment must be presented in a manner consistent with its admissibility at trial. Porter v. Qurantillo, 722 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[O]nly admissible evidence need be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); Payne v. Cornell Univ., No. 21-109-CV, 2022 WL 453441, at *2 (2d Cir. Feb. 15, 2022) (finding that the district court properly disregarded portions of a declaration that was not based on personal knowledge). The video shows that the officers and Plaintiff were aware of an eviction order and the officers advised the Plaintiff to raise his disagreement to the Housing Court, to which he responded, “I am already in court.” (VIDEOTS 18:42-18:43.) State Superior Court Judge Baio determined that Plaintiff had a valid tenancy after September 4, 2020. See Maye v. Canady, No. NHH-CV-20-5004733-S, 2021 WL 2775069, at *2 (Doc. # 108.50) (Conn. Super. Ct. March 2, 2021). Rather than showing the absence of issues of material fact, Plaintiff has presented conflicting reports showing that an issue of fact exists regarding his claims against Defendant Detectives and whether their actions were reasonable; factual disputes that are best left to a jury to determine. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants Carr, Folch, and Soto.
B. City of New Haven
Plaintiff argues that the City of New Haven is liable for the failure to train Defendant Detectives in evictions and for a lack of such a policy. (Doc. # 62-1, at 2, 6.) The City argues that Plaintiff “has submitted nothing more than a conclusory allegation as to training” (Doc. # 114, at 6), and “produced no evidence that would support these deficient claims.” (Id., at 8.) The City contends that whether it trains its police department members on issues regarding landlord-tenant disputes is, at the very least, a question for the fact-finder. (Id.) For the reasons that follow, summary judgment against the City of New Haven is denied.
The City appended materials that they contend is “proof of training, both in academy and in-service, regarding landlord-tenant disputes.” (Doc. # 114, at 8; 114-2, Ex. B.) The exhibit is an unauthenticated document which purports to be a syllabus for “recruit training (2020-2021)” for a four hour course in Landlord Tenant Law. While this course may be applicable to recruit training in 2020-2021, there is no affidavit from a person with knowledge addressing the applicability of this document to the three Defendant Detectives.
A municipality, such as the City of New Haven, “can be held liable under Section 1983 if the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage.” Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). “Absent such a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis for the tort of its employee.” Id. (citing Monell., 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011)). Moreover, isolated acts “by non-policymaking municipal employees are generally not sufficient to demonstrate a municipal custom, policy, or usage that would justify municipal liability.” Jones, 691 F.3d at 81. In “order for municipal or official capacity liability to be imposed, there must be ‘a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom, and the alleged constitutional deprivation.'” Gonzalez v. Waterbury Police Dep't, No. 3:12-CV-478 (SRU), 2016 WL 953211, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 11, 2016) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989); citing Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that plaintiff must show that municipality is actually responsible for her injury)).
In City of Canton, the Supreme Court held a city's failure to train its subordinates satisfies the policy or custom requirement only where the need to act is so obvious, and the inadequacy of current practices so likely to result in a deprivation of federal rights, that the municipality or official can be found deliberately indifferent to the need.Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007). “[T]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Deliberate indifference is a “stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”, Connick, 563 U.S. at 61, 131 S.Ct. at 1360, and the “operative inquiry is whether th[e] facts demonstrate that the policymaker's inaction was the result of ‘conscious choice' and not ‘mere negligence.'” Cash v. Cty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff proffered no evidence to permit a rational finding that the City's failure to train or a policy or custom caused a deprivation of rights to support a claim of deliberate indifference. Put another way, the evidentiary record is “silent as to any policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the” City. Wright v. Bogs Mgmt., Inc., No. 98 C 2788, 2000 WL 1774086, at *12 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 1, 2000). Plaintiff's statements related to this claim involve only allegations of harm caused by Detectives Carr, Folch, and Soto, who are “nonpolicymaking municipal employees.” Jones, 691 F.3d at 81. This evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a reasonable finding that a deprivation of right is attributable to a “custom, policy, or usage” of the City of New Haven. None of the facts proffered suggest that the Detectives' actions reflected “persistent and widespread [practices],” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, or that any “policymaking official ordered or ratified the [City] employee's actions- either expressly or tacitly.” Jones, 691 F.3d at 81. Accordingly, summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim against the City of New Haven is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
As set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. (Doc. ## 62; 108.) Plaintiff's unopposed “Motion for Court to Give State Court Decision ‘Full Faith and Credit' On This Case” is GRANTED. (Doc. # 63.)
This is not a recommended ruling. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge, who may therefore direct the entry of a judgment of the district court in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. # 120.) Appeals may be made directly to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73(c).