Therefore, it requires a very strong showing of abuse of discretion to set aside the decision of the trial court.'" Maybin v. Stewart, 885 A.2d 284, 288 (D.C. 2005) (quoting Steadman v. Steadman, 514 A.2d 1196, 1200 (D.C. 1986) (alteration in Maybin)). We limit our review to prevent squabbles over attorneys' fees from blossoming into "a second major litigation."
In short, our decisions have turned on whether "counsel was necessary to protect the interests of the child." See id. at 462 (quoting Eisenberg, 357 A.2d at 401); compare Martin v. Tate, 492 A.2d 270, 273 (D.C. 1985) (upholding award of attorney’s fees after mother successfully obtained custody of children after having de facto custody for nine years), and Maybin v. Stewart, 885 A.2d 284, 288 (D.C. 2005) (upholding award of attorney’s fees where father ceased visitation attempts in 1994 and then filed motion to expand visitation in 1998, meaning mother "had to retain counsel to defend her child’s best interests"), with Kenda, 39 A.3d at 1257 (affirming trial court’s rejection of fees where parent sought fees "related to work performed after the parties reached an agreement to share custody" and where "the court found that the attorneys who contributed the most to [the child]’s best interest were the guardians ad litem, who ultimately recommended that the court award the parties joint-custody" (emphases omitted)).Kenda considered a statutory award of attorney’s fees under Section 312 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), D.C. Code § 16-4603.12, and not an award of fees under the necessaries doctrine, but still turned on whether a trial court found that "counsel was necessary to protect the interests of the child."
This court will reverse a trial court's ruling on the subject of visitation “only for a clear abuse of discretion.” Maybin v. Stewart, 885 A.2d 284, 287 (D.C.2005). We find no clear abuse of discretion in the original visitation ruling.
In Maybin v. Stewart, we reaffirmed this exception and upheld the trial court's award of attorney's fees in the child visitation context. 885 A.2d 284, 288 (D.C. 2005). The UCCJEA mandates award of attorney's fees and other expenses and costs (1) against a party who invokes the court's jurisdiction, if the court declines to exercise its jurisdiction because that party has "engaged in unjustifiable conduct," D.C. Code § 16-4602.08(c), and (2) to the prevailing party in an action to enforce a child custody order or for the return of a child in a proceeding under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, D.C. Code § 16-4603.12.
" We conclude that appellants have not made that showing here.Pellerin v. 1915 16th St., N.W., Co-op. Ass'n, Inc. , 900 A.2d 683, 690 (D.C. 2006) (alteration in original) (first quoting District of Columbia v. Hunt , 520 A.2d 300, 304 (D.C. 1987) ; and then quoting Maybin v. Stewart , 885 A.2d 284, 288 (D.C. 2005) ). Judge Epstein adhered to this court's holding in Doe v. Burke that a fee award to successful movants under § 16-5504(a) is presumptively mandatory unless special circumstances would make the award unjust.
It is true that some of our prior cases have explained the rationale for the necessaries doctrine with reference to the particular procedural context of the case before the court. E.g. , Maybin v. Stewart , 885 A.2d 284, 288 (D.C. 2005) ("[W]hen counsel is required by the party in whose custody the court has deemed to have been in the child's best interests, attorney's fees may be granted to that party in defending such grant.") (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). But Ms. Khawam has pointed to no case, and we have found no case, in which this court has explicitly limited the scope of the necessaries doctrine to particular procedural contexts.
However, we have also observed that visitation "is not an absolute right" and "must yield to the good of the child." Maybin v. Stewart , 885 A.2d 284, 287 (D.C. 2005) (citation omitted). Indeed, a "proper exercise of discretion requires that a court fashion relief to foster and safeguard the child's best interests."
See, e.g.,D.C.Code § 16–911(a)(1) (2008 Supp.) (“During the pendency of an action for divorce ... the court may ... require the spouse or domestic partner ... to pay suit money, including counsel fees, to enable such other spouse to conduct the case.”) (emphasis added); Maybin v. Stewart, 885 A.2d 284, 288 (D.C.2005) (noting that fee awards under § 16–911 of the D.C.Code are committed to the informed discretion of the trial court)..5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (Supp.
In a custody dispute, “[a] trial court ‘is authorized to grant attorney's fees where the court finds that counsel was necessary to protect the interests of the [child].’ ” Maybin v. Stewart, 885 A.2d 284, 288 (D.C.2005) (quoting Prost v. Greene, 675 A.2d 471, 474 (D.C.1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted)). “Thus, when counsel is required by the party in whose custody the court has deemed to have been in the child's best interests, attorney's fees may be granted to that party in defending such grant.”
The trial court has discretion to impose conditions in awarding custody or visitation. See DC. Code § 16-914(d)(3) (2001) ("In making its custody determination, the Court may order either or both parents to attend parenting classes"); Hutchins v. Compton, 917 A.2d 680, 683 (D.C. 2007) (permitting trial court to assign final decision making authority to one party despite ordering joint custody); Maybin v. Stewart, 885 A.2d 284, 287-88 (D.C. 2005) (upholding trial court's requirement that parties attend counseling before further visitation could take place); Galbis v. Nadal, 734 A.2d 1094, 1102 (D.C. 1999) (upholding requirement that adult with child-care experience be present during overnight visits with one parent); see also Ysla v. Lopez, 684 A.2d 775, 782 (D.C. 1996) (noting that "[t]he possibilities [for a joint custody arrangement] are many and varied; the decision must, however, be committed to the reasoned exercise of discretion by the trial court, so that the decision may be tailored to fit the needs of each case."). Based on the wording of the August 21, 2009, order, it could be argued with some force that Ms. Jordan's apparent refusal to work with a parenting coordinator should have resulted in proceedings to modify the custody order, with the possible outcome that sole custody would be granted to Mr. Jordan.