Opinion
22-55274
11-15-2022
ROBERT K. MAYBERRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; ALEX VILLANUEVA, Sheriff; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendants-Appellees, and CRAWFORD; ALVARADO; JOHN DOES; JANE DOES; 20 UNKNOWN NAMED DEFENDANTS; KATHERINE BARGER; JANICE HAHN; HILDA SOLIS; SHEILA KUEHL; MARK RIDLEY-THOMAS; 50 UNKNOWN NAMED DEFENDANTS, Defendants.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted November 10, 2022 Pasadena, California
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 2:20-cv-00224-JLS-JDE
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and PARKER and LEE, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
Robert Mayberry appeals the district court's order dismissing his sixth amended complaint for failing to state a claim. Mayberry asserts various federal claims against known and unknown members of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, all in both their individual and official capacities, as well as five County Supervisors in only their official capacities. We affirm because the complaint does not adequately plead specific factual allegations to support Mayberry's claims and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mayberry leave to amend his complaint for a sixth time.
1. Mayberry has not stated a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim. "Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985)). Mayberry's complaint does not provide any individualized facts about the crime underlying the arrest, the officers' conduct, or how he responded to the arrest. The complaint, therefore, did not contain "enough facts to permit a reasonable inference" that the defendants are personally liable for the alleged Fourth Amendment excessive-force violation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
2. Mayberry's complaint likewise does not state a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful seizure, containing only the conclusory allegation that Mayberry "was arrested without reasonable suspicion, without probable cause, [and] without a warrant." See Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).
3. Mayberry has not stated an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical treatment. The conduct alleged in Mayberry's complaint occurred while he was a pretrial detainee. "[P]retrial detainees have not yet been convicted of a crime and therefore are not subject to punishment by the state. Accordingly, their rights arise under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 711 (2021).
In any event, Mayberry has not stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim for inadequate medical treatment. Mayberry's complaint provides no specific details about the identity of the allegedly liable defendants or the circumstances surrounding the requests and denials. The complaint thus does not contain sufficient facts to state a claim that a Fourteenth Amendment violation occurred.
4. Mayberry has not stated a claim that the defendants violated his First Amendment access rights. This right is "ancillary to [an] underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court." Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). Mayberry does not identify an underlying claim, and he identifies only one defendant by name, despite claiming that multiple defendants violated his access rights. The district court was correct to dismiss Mayberry's First Amendment claim.
5. Mayberry has not stated a Monell claim. "Monell claims . . . require a plaintiff to show an underlying constitutional violation." Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). Mayberry has not made that showing.
6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mayberry leave to amend his dismissed complaint. "[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, '[t]he district court's discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.'" Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Read-Rite Corp., 335 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 2003)). The district court granted Mayberry six opportunities to amend his complaint. It did not abuse its discretion in denying more. See Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 95859 (9th Cir. 2011) ("Plaintiffs had three bites at the apple, and the court acted well within its discretion in disallowing a fourth.").
AFFIRMED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.