Opinion
No. 346687
04-30-2020
ALLEN LEE MAY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF STATE, Respondent-Appellee.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 18-111590-AL Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and O'BRIEN and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Petitioner appeals the Genesee Circuit Court order affirming an administrative order, which affirmed the Secretary of State's "Revocation/Denial" of petitioner's operating privileges as a habitual violator under MCL 257.303(2). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
Respondent challenges petitioner's claim that he is entitled to appeal the circuit court's order as of right. To the extent respondent may be correct, we exercise our power to consider the appeal "as on leave granted in the interest of judicial economy." See Rains v Rains, 301 Mich App 313, 320 n 2; 836 NW2d 709 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
MCL 257.303(2) provides that "[u]pon receiving the appropriate records of conviction, the secretary of state shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license of a person and deny issuance of an operator's or chauffeur's license to a person having any of the following, whether under a law of this state, a local ordinance substantially corresponding to a law of this state, a law of another state substantially corresponding to a law of this state, or, beginning October 31, 2010, a law of the United States substantially corresponding to a law of this state," and MCL 257.303(2)(a)-(g) lists certain circumstances involving various types of convictions requiring the secretary of state to take the actions described in Subsection (2).
While the nature of petitioner's argument is difficult to glean from his appellate brief, it is apparent that petitioner's claims of error are primarily focused on alleged improprieties related to his underlying convictions that led to the revocation of his driving privileges, as well as his denials that he was ever actually convicted of these offenses despite the convictions being included in his driving record. We conclude that petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this appeal because his asserted grounds for seeking relief fall outside the scope of our appellate review.
We begin our analysis by discussing the procedural history of this case and the relevant legal principles governing this procedure.
MCL 257.322(1) provides that "[t]he secretary of state shall appoint a hearing officer to hear appeals from persons aggrieved by a final determination of the secretary of state denying an application for an operator's or chauffeur's license, suspending, restricting, or revoking an operator's or chauffeur's license, or other license action." "After a hearing, the hearing officer may affirm, modify, or set aside a final determination of the secretary of state denying an application for an operator's or chauffeur's license, suspending, restricting, or revoking an operator's or chauffeur's license, or any other license action." MCL 257.322(5). "The hearing officer shall include his or her findings of fact and conclusions of law in the record." Id.
In this case, petitioner received a hearing pursuant to MCL 257.322, after which the hearing officer affirmed the revocation/denial of petitioner's operator's license. The hearing officer's written decision following the hearing explained the relevant background as follows:
Petitioner's operating privileges were revoked/denied as a habitual violator under MCL 257.303(2)(a), (b), (c) or (g) based upon two or more convictions, or one or more convictions for offenses listed under MCL 257.303(2)(d), (e) or (f). According to MCL 257.303(4)(c), the Secretary of State shall not issue a license until Petitioner meets the requirements of the Department. The Department's requirements are established in promulgated administrative rules. See Mich Admin Code, R 257.313(1) [Rule 13].
Specifically, Petitioner must present clear and convincing evidence that any substance abuse/dependency is under control and likely to remain under control, that the risk of repeating past abusive behavior relative to alcohol and/or controlled substances is low or minimal, that the risk of incurring an additional driving while impaired or intoxicated offense is low or minimal, that Petitioner has the ability and motivation to drive safely and within the limits of the law, and that Petitioner has maintained a minimum period of abstinence consistent with Rule 13. [(Bracketed material in original).]
In affirming the revocation/denial of petitioner's license and denying petitioner's appeal, the hearing officer concluded that petitioner had "failed to meet the above requirements." This conclusion was based on the hearing officer's findings that petitioner's driving record contained 10 convictions for drunk driving related offenses between 1982 and 2009, that petitioner denied all of these convictions and asserted that they were the result of a conspiracy involving law enforcement and attorneys, and that petitioner had not satisfactorily proven his current abstinence from alcohol use or that his alcohol use was otherwise sufficiently under control.
Petitioner appealed the hearing officer's decision to the circuit court as permitted under MCL 257.323(1), which permits a "person aggrieved by a final determination of the secretary of state denying the person an operator's or chauffeur's license . . . or revoking, suspending, or restricting an operator's or chauffeur's license" to petition for a review of that determination in the applicable circuit court. In this context, the circuit court's manner of judicial review is defined in MCL 257.323(4). That provision provides in pertinent part that with certain exceptions not implicated under the circumstances of this case,
in reviewing a determination resulting in a denial, suspension, restriction, or revocation under this act . . . The court shall set aside the secretary of state's determination only if 1 or more of the following apply:
(a) In determining whether a petitioner is eligible for full driving privileges, the petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the determination is any of the following:
(i) In violation of the Constitution of the United States, the state constitution of 1963, or a statute.
(ii) In excess of the secretary of state's statutory authority or jurisdiction.
(iii) Made upon unlawful procedure resulting in material prejudice to the petitioner.
(iv) Not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record.
(v) Arbitrary, capricious, or clearly an abuse or unwarranted exercise of discretion.
(vi) Affected by other substantial and material error of law.
(b) In determining whether a petitioner is eligible for review of a revocation or denial under section 303, or whether a petitioner is eligible for restricted driving privileges, all of the following apply:
(i) The petitioner's substantial rights have been prejudiced as described in subdivision (a).
(ii) All of the following are satisfied:
(A) The revocation or denial occurred at least 1 year after the petitioner's license was revoked or denied, or, if the petitioner's license was previously revoked or denied within the 7 years preceding the most recent revocation or denial, at least 5 years after the most recent revocation or denial, whichever is later.
(B) The court finds that the petitioner meets the department's requirements under the rules promulgated by the department under the administrative procedures act of 1969, 1969 PA 306, MCL 24.201 to 24.238. . . .
(C) If the revocation or denial was under section 303(2)(a), (b), (c), or (g), the petitioner rebuts by clear and convincing evidence the presumption that he or she is a habitual offender, and establishes to the court's satisfaction that he or she is likely to adhere to any requirements imposed by the court. For purposes of this sub-subparagraph, the conviction that resulted in the revocation and any record of denial of reinstatement by the department are prima facie evidence that the petitioner is a habitual offender. . . . [MCL 257.323(4).]
The circuit court affirmed, concluding that the hearing officer's decision was "fully supported by the record."
Petitioner now appeals the circuit court's decision. The nature of our appellate review in this context is narrow:
[W]hen reviewing a lower court's review of agency action this Court must determine whether the lower court applied correct legal principles and whether it misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test to the agency's factual findings. This latter standard is indistinguishable from the clearly erroneous standard of review that has been widely adopted in Michigan jurisprudence. As defined in numerous other contexts, a finding is clearly erroneous when, on review of the whole record, this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. [Boyd v Civil Serv Comm, 220 Mich App 226, 234-235; 559 NW2d 342 (1996).]
"Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a decision, being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance of the evidence." Vanzandt v State Employees Retirement Sys, 266 Mich App 579, 584; 701 NW2d 214 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "If there is sufficient evidence, the circuit court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, even if the court might have reached a different result." Id.
In this case, petitioner does not explain how the circuit court failed to apply the correct legal principles relevant to a circuit court appeal conducted under MCL 257.323(1). Additionally, petitioner does not provide this Court with any argument as to how the trial court misapplied the substantial evidence test. Rather, petitioner's arguments are primarily focused on collaterally attacking his underlying convictions on which his original license revocation was based. Petitioner does not appear to contest the fact that his driving record includes the various drunk driving related convictions cited by the hearing officer but instead contends that they were "false convictions." We additionally note that petitioner does not actually claim that the hearing officer's decision was not based on substantial evidence, such as the evidence of his convictions and the lack of evidence sufficiently demonstrating petitioner's abstinence from alcohol, but instead argues that his convictions were "false." However, regardless of petitioner's assertions, a circuit court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing officer if the hearing officer's decision was supported by sufficient evidence even if the circuit court would have viewed that evidence differently and reached a different result. Id. Petitioner's arguments are therefore misplaced, and petitioner has not demonstrated that the circuit court's decision was based on a failure to apply the correct legal principles or a misapprehension or misapplication of the substantial evidence test to the hearing officer's factual findings. Boyd, 220 Mich App at 234.
Furthermore, MCL 257.323(4) only allows the circuit court to set aside the secretary of state's determination if certain requirements are met, none of which involve considering collateral attacks to the petitioner's underlying convictions that led to the revocation or denial of the petitioner's operating license. Because MCL 257.323(4) does not provide a vehicle for a petitioner to collaterally attack the underlying convictions, the circuit court was without power to entertain such arguments as a basis for setting aside the hearing officer's decision or the secretary of state's determination. See Rodriguez v Secretary of State, 215 Mich App 481, 482-484; 546 NW2d 661 (1996) (holding that under MCL 257.323, a circuit court reviewing a final determination of the secretary of state revoking the petitioner's driver's license pursuant to MCL 257.303(2) is "without power to consider" matters that are " 'outside the statute' " and can only set aside the secretary of state's determination on the grounds specified in the statute) (citation omitted).
As such, petitioner's attempt on appeal to rely on collaterally attacking his underlying convictions in order to obtain appellate relief does not demonstrate that the circuit court clearly erred. Petitioner has not offered any other cogent argument for how the circuit court committed clear error under the proper legal framework outlined above. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court.
To the extent petitioner has raised a number of other assorted grievances, none of them relate in any logical way to the issue of whether his operating license should have been revoked or denied. As a consequence, we deem petitioner's remaining issues abandoned. "[A] mere statement without authority is insufficient to bring an issue before this Court. It is not sufficient for a party simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position." Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron