held that a lineman was "chargeable" with knowledge of defective insulation on a light wire, "which was in plain view near where he was working." Similar rulings were made in May v. Ill. Power Co., 96 N.E.2d 631 (Ill. 1951), in Murphy v. Iowa Elect. Co., 220 N.W. 360 (Iowa) ("any adult, sane man could see and would know this"), and in Hamilton v. Laclede Electric Co-op., 294 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1956); Watson v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 100 S.E.2d 774 (Va. 1957) (decedent saw or ought to have seen the wire had he exercised ordinary care). 29 C.J.S. Electricity, § 53, using almost the exact language used by Chief Judge Boyd in Fulton Building Co., supra, states the rule thus: "Also the law ordinarily charges [emphasis added] a person of unimpaired vision with seeing an object which, if he had used his senses, he, in the nature of things, must have seen."

" In May v. Illinois P. Co., 342 Ill.App. 370, 96 N.E.2d 631, 633, men were lifting a pump and pipe, 35 to 40 feet long, from a well on a farm. The wires were 7 feet 2 inches south of the pump and 20 to 25 feet high.

( Neering v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1943), 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497.) A plaintiff's failure to prove any one of these necessary elements authorizes a directed verdict for the defendant. ( May v. Illinois Power Co. (1951), 342 Ill. App. 370, 96 N.E.2d 631.) The determination of a legal duty is a question of law to be determined by the trial court.

Such an opinion might have resolved the conflicts existing in the electrical wire cases which are extensively cited in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Stambaugh and Ploense as well as in the briefs of the parties in the case at bar. Typical of the cases holding contributory negligence as a matter of law are Withey v. Illinois Power Co. (1961), 32 Ill. App.2d 163, 177 N.E.2d 254, and May v. Illinois Power Co. (1951), 342 Ill. App. 370, 96 N.E.2d 631. Contra, holding it a matter of fact, Stilfield v. Iowa-Illinois Gas Electric Co. (1960), 25 Ill. App.2d 478, 167 N.E.2d 295, and Humbert v. Lowden (1944), 385 Ill. 437, 53 N.E.2d 418 (the latter case not involving electrical lines). The most recent supreme court pronouncement on the failure-to-see questions appreared in Spring, Executor v. Toledo, Peoria Western R.R. (1977), 69 Ill.2d 290, 371 N.E.2d 621. This involved an automobile-train collision; the jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff and found the railroad guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct; it also returned a special interrogatory finding plaintiff's decedent guilty of contributory negligence.

( Neering v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497.) A plaintiff's failure to prove any one of the necessary elements authorizes a directed verdict for the defendant. May v. Illinois Power Co., 342 Ill. App. 370, 96 N.E.2d 631. Plaintiff sets forth two acts which she claims constitute negligence by the defendants. First, plaintiff alleges that defendants negligently installed an uninsulated 7200-volt line which spanned the Clintons' property; thus, defendants failed in their duty to protect plaintiff's intestate and others who might foreseeably come into contact with the high voltage wire.

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: Upon the facts of record this case is controlled by Witzig v. Illinois Power Company, 114 Ill. App.2d 139, 251 N.E.2d 902, May v. Illinois Power Company, 342 Ill. App. 370, 96 N.E.2d 631 and Withey v. Illinois Power Company, 32 Ill. App.2d 163, 177 N.E.2d 254. In each of these cases, the electric lines were clearly apparent or known to the injured party and it was determined that there was contributory negligence as a matter of law.

[4] Without further considering the question of negligence and the question of proximate cause, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed on the issue of contributory negligence of the plaintiff. When the evidence in the record before us is considered with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom and in its aspect most favorable to plaintiff, it is apparent that plaintiff has failed to prove that he was in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety prior to and at the time of his injury. May v. Illinois Power Co., 342 Ill. App. 370, 96 N.E.2d 631. The electric wire of the defendant, Illinois Power Company, had been in place and in operation some eight months prior to the time plaintiff moved his trailer into its location and erected the television tower and antenna thereon.

Upon the record here the questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause were jury questions and the jury resolved them in favor of the plaintiff. An illuminating annotation on the subject matter of this suit will be found in 69 A.L.R.2d beginning at page 93. The decisions in the cases of May v. Illinois Power Co. 342 Ill. App. 370, 3rd District, and Celner v. Central Illinois Elec. Gas Co., 343 Ill. App. 310, 2nd District, have been called to our attention, but the facts in each of these cases readily distinguish them from the factual situation in the case at bar. For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the trial court granting judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict and granting it a new trial are reversed and remanded with directions to set aside said orders and to enter judgment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

It is contended that under the law of Illinois the converse of this is true and that the plaintiff was, contrary to the instruction given, required to prove that he was free from contributory negligence. Under the law of Illinois where, as here, the action is predicated upon the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he was not guilty of negligence contributing to the injury complained of. Greenstreet v. Atchison, Topeka Santa Fe Ry. Co., 234, Ill. App. 339; May v. Illinois Power Co., 342 Ill.App. 370, 96 N.E.2d 631; West Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. Liderman, 187 Ill. 463, 58 N.E. 367, 52 L.R.A. 655. It is true that we are obliged to follow the substantive law of the state where the cause of action arose and the existence of the right to recover must be measured by the laws of that state.