. “In order for the words to be actionable, they must refer to the plaintiff and to be understood by others as referring to the plaintiff.” May v. Greater Kansas City Dental Soc., 863 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Mo.Ct.App.1993); Castle Rock Remodeling, LLC v. Better Business Bureau of Greater St. Louis, Inc., 354 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Mo.Ct.App.2011) (citing Sterling v. Rust Communications, 113 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (“In order to be defamatory, a statement must be clear as to the person addressed.”))
Under Missouri defamation law, for challenged statements "to be actionable, they must refer to the plaintiff and to be understood by others as referring to the plaintiff." May v. Greater Kan. City Dental Soc'y, 863 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). This doctrine is known as the "of and concerning" requirement.
Conduct rises to the level of extreme and outrageous when it is "so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency" and is "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." May v. Greater Kansas City Dental Soc., 863 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Mo. App. 1993). The Eighth Circuit has found that "Missouri case law reveals very few factual scenarios sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress," and "[r]arely is a defendant's conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous to warrant recovery."
"In order for the words to be actionable, they must refer to the plaintiff and to [sic] be understood by others as referring to the plaintiff." May v. Greater Kansas City Dental Soc., 863 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Mo.App. 1993). However, "[i]t is sufficient to allege generally the words were published concerning the plaintiff[s]."
The elements of a claim for interference with economic advantage are: (1) a contract or valid business relationship or expectancy; (2) knowledge by the defendant of the contract or relationship; (3) intentional interference by the defendant which induces the breach of contract or relationship; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) resulting damage. May v. Greater Kansas City Dental Soc'y, 863 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Mo.Ct.App. 1993). The court will consider these elements in light of the evidence presented.
Offending language is not libelous simply because a person finds it unpleasant or annoying, and subjects him to jests or banter so as to affect his feelings. May v. Greater Kansas Dental Society, 863 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Mo.App.W.D. 1993). To determine if a statement is defamatory, the words themselves must first "be stripped of any pleaded innuendo" and construed in their most innocent sense.
Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency" and is "atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." May v. Greater Kan. City Dental Soc'y, 863 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Mo.Ct.App. 1993) (internal quotation omitted). As a federal district court in Missouri noted, "Missouri case law reveals very few factual scenarios sufficient to support a claim for" intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Rather, “it must be shown that the reader reasonably understood the defamatory words to have been directed to the plaintiff.” May v. Greater Kansas City Dental Soc., 863 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Mo.Ct.App. 1993). Here, the notice of foreclosure sale's identification of the property is sufficient to show that a reader would understand the publication to refer to Radford's title to the property.
“It is for the trial court to determine in the first instance whether the alleged wrongful conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery.” May v. Greater Kansas City Dental Soc., 863 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Mo.Ct.App. 1993). Given the history and import of the racial epithet allegedly directed at Mr. Haynes and the associated conduct, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that no reasonable factfinder could find the alleged conduct so outrageous as to be intolerable in a civilized community.
In the articles, there is no reference to Parker or Jones by name, only Bumbales is identified by name. Although it is it not necessary that defamatory statements refer specifically to the plaintiffs by name, it must be shown that the reader reasonably understood the defamatory words to have been directed to Plaintiffs. May v. Greater Kansas City Dental Soc., 863 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). The undersigned must determine whether a person reading the article would reasonably understand the allegedly offending words refer to Plaintiffs.