Maxwell v. Simons

15 Citing cases

  1. Housing Authority, Newark v. West

    69 N.J. 293 (N.J. 1976)   Cited 25 times
    Noting that N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.6 permits "a judge in a possessory action of any type to stay a warrant for removal from dwelling premises, but not in excess of six months after entry of a judgment for possession, where it appears that hardship is presented because of the unavailability of other dwelling accommodations"

    N.Y. Real Prop.Actions, ยง 711 (McKinney 1973). In Maxwell v. Simons, 77 Misc.2d 184, 353 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Civil Ct. 1973), the court considered consolidated actions concerning rent arrearages covering periods ranging from eight to eleven months. In construing the summary dispossess statute, the court first observed that the law "is intended to place the landlord in a position to compel the payment of his rent or be restored to possession so that he may rent the premises to persons who will pay."

  2. Zenila Realty v. Masterandrea

    123 Misc. 2d 1 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984)   Cited 46 times

    At first blush, seemingly, this proceeding could be placed in the legal niche created by Judge Irving Younger's Gramford determination ( Gramford Realty Corp. v Valentin, 71 Misc.2d 784). That case and its progeny (see, e.g., Mt. Nebo Baptist Church v Myers, NYLJ, April 10, 1979, p 10, col 5; Dedvukaj v Madonado, 115 Misc.2d 211; 269 Assoc. v Yerkes, 113 Misc.2d 450; Maxwell v Simons, 77 Misc.2d 184; 142 Equities v Stokes, NYLJ, Sept. 12, 1973, p 20, col 1; Antillean Holding Co. v Lindley, 76 Misc.2d 1044) establish what has been called the "stale rent" cases. Under such holdings, rent sought in a summary proceeding would be considered "stale" โ€” and not result in a possessory judgment โ€” based upon passage of time and demonstration of injury or prejudice resulting therefrom (see, e.g., 177 East 90th St. v Devine, NYLJ, March 30, 1982, p 6, col 1; Thunderbird Realty Co. v Ahn, NYLJ, Nov. 19, 1981, p 11, col 1; Western Hotels Co. v Ramsay, NYLJ, Dec. 20, 1979, p 10, col 4; Glen Cove Housing Auth. v Tillman, NYLJ, May 27, 1977, p 13, col 1; Moskowitz v Simms, NYLJ, April 28, 1975, p 18, col 1; City of New York v Betancourt, 79 Misc.2d 907).

  3. 269 Assoc. v. Yerkes

    113 Misc. 2d 450 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982)   Cited 14 times
    In 269 Associates v. Yerkes, 113 Misc 2d 450, 449 NYS2d 593 (Civ Ct, NYC 1982), the court refused to invoke the doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches where the landlord made timely demands for rent on a continuous basis which "thereby renders the rent claims current despite the fact that summary proceedings were never commenced..."

    Succeeding cases have seemingly ignored this requirement and instead have focused upon defining the term "stale." In Maxwell v Simons ( 77 Misc.2d 184), which involved a welfare tenant who lived in a substandard building containing numerous housing code violations (see letter of John M. Jokl, Esq., op. cit.), the court determined that a landlord had a three-month period within which to commence a summary proceeding for nonpayment of rent. The consequence of not doing so was that the rent claimed before the three-month cutoff was deemed a stale claim and could not serve as a predicate for possession.

  4. Siegel v. Kentucky Chicken

    108 A.D.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)   Cited 93 times
    In Siegel, although the lease provided that either the landlord or its agents could exercise a forfeiture provision, the notice of termination was insufficient because the attorney who sent the notice was not named specifically in the lease nor was there any proof of authority annexed to the notice.

    The tenant cannot refuse to comply on such grounds. In creating the summary proceeding, the Legislature intended to afford a means "of obtaining a speedy determination and adjudication of disputes over the right of possession of real property" ( Cotignola v Lieber, 34 A.D.2d 700, 701; see also, Lanz v Lifrieri, 104 A.D.2d 400; Velazquez v Thompson, 451 F.2d 202; Maxwell v Simons, 77 Misc.2d 184, 186-187; People ex rel. Allen v Murray, 2 Misc. 152, affd 138 N.Y. 635). If that be the aim, a notice to quit should not be parsed in the manner that a common-law pleading would have been scrutinized in the days of the Year Books. The tenant's other objections involved disputed matters of fact, not resolvable on this record.

  5. Dolan v. Linnen

    195 Misc. 2d 298 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003)   Cited 2 times

    To provide a quicker mechanism and deter self-help dispossessions, the Legislature enacted summary proceedings in chapter 194 of the Laws of 1820 to give landlords a "simple, expeditious and inexpensive means of regaining possession of his premises in cases where the tenant refused upon demand to pay rent, or where he wrongfully held over without permission after the expiration of his term." (Reich v Cochran, 201 NY 450, 454 [1911] [discussing history of summary proceedings]; accord Tik Sun Cheung v Xaio Man Li, 148 Misc 2d 55, 57-58 [Civ Ct, NY County 1989] [discussing history of summary proceedings]; Haskell v Surita, 109 Misc 2d 409, 410 [Civ Ct, NY County 1981]; Gardens Nursery School v Columbia Univ., 94 Misc 2d 376, 377 [Civ Ct, NY County 1978]; Maxwell v Simons, 77 Misc 2d 184, 186 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1973]; 2 Robert F. Dolan, Rasch's Landlord and Tenantรขโ‚ฌโ€Summary Proceedings ร‚ยง 29:5, at 402-404 [4th ed 1998] [outlining history of summary proceedings].)

  6. Dolan v. Linnen

    195 Misc. 2d 298 (N.Y. Misc. 2003)

    To provide a quicker mechanism and deter self-help dispossessions, the Legislature enacted summary proceedings in Chapter 194 of the Laws of 1820 to give landlords a "simple, expeditious and inexpensive means of regaining possession of his premises in cases where the tenant refused upon demand to pay rent, or where he wrongfully held over without permission after the expiration of his term." ( Reich v Cochran, 201 N.Y. 450, 454 [discussing history of summary proceedings]; accord Cheung v Li, 148 Misc.2d 55, 57-58 [Civ Ct, N.Y. County1989] [discussing history of summary proceedings]; Haskell v Surita, 109 Misc.2d 409, 410 [Civ Ct, N.Y. County 1981]; Gardens Nursery Sch. v Columbia Univ., 94 Misc.2d 376, 377 [Civ Ct, N.Y. County 1978]; Maxwell v Simons, 77 Misc.2d 184, 186 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1973]; 2 Robert F. Dolan, Rasch's Landlord and Tenant, Including Summary Proceedings ยง 29:5, at 402-404 [4th ed 1998] [outlining history of summary proceedings].) Summary proceedings were originally limited to recovering possession in cases involving forcible entry, detainer, or a recognized landlord-tenant relationship.

  7. Rector v. CHUNG KING HOUSE

    193 Misc. 2d 44 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2002)

    With respect to the second cause of action for electricity charges, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to award damages on this claim. The primary purpose of a summary nonpayment proceeding pursuant to RPAPL 711 is to provide a landlord with an inexpensive, expeditious, and simple means to obtain possession of the leased premises for nonpayment of rent (New York Univ. v Farkas, 121 Misc 2d 643 [1983]; Gardens Nursery School v Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y., 94 Misc 2d 376 [1978]; Maxwell v Simons, 77 Misc 2d 184 [1973]). The purpose of the statutory three-day notice requirement, which is to permit the tenant to timely cure the default and avoid unnecessary litigation and possible eviction, underscores the possessory nature of a summary proceeding (Jendor Indus. v Harvest Year Seafood Rest., 187 Misc 2d 293 [2000]; Kulok v Riddim Co., 185 Misc 2d 195 [2000]).

  8. Rector v. Chung King House of Metal, Inc.

    193 Misc. 2d 44 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2002)

    With respect to the second cause of action for electricity charges, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to award damages on this claim. The primary purpose of a summary nonpayment proceeding pursuant to RPAPL ยง 711 is to provide a landlord with an inexpensive, expeditious, and simple means to obtain possession of the leased premises for nonpayment of rent ( New York University v. Farkas, 468 N.Y.S.2d 808, 121 Misc.2d 643 (1983); Gardens Nursery School v Columbia University in City of New York, 94 Misc.2d 376, 404 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1978); Maxwell v. Simmons, 353 N.Y.S.2d 589, 77 Misc.2d 184 (1973)). The purpose of the statutory three-day notice requirement, which is to permit the tenant to timely cure the default and avoid unnecessary litigation and possible eviction, underscores the possessory nature of a summary proceeding ( Jendor Industries Inc. v. Harvest Year Seafood Rest. Inc., 721 N.Y.S.2d 898, 187 Misc.2d 293 (2000); Kulok v. Riddim Co., 712 N.Y.S.2d 728, 185 Misc.2d 195 (2000)).

  9. Marriott v. Shaw

    151 Misc. 2d 938 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1991)   Cited 21 times

    After Gramford, many courts followed a per se rule based on mere delay. In the often-cited case of Maxwell v Simons ( 77 Misc.2d 184, 185 [Civ Ct, Kings County 1973]), the court held that a period of three months is sufficient for a landlord to sue to evict a tenant. The rationale given for this three-month rule was that greater delay is not only inconsistent with a need for summary relief but may reflect an intent on the part of the landlord to cause eviction by permitting large arrears to accrue.

  10. Tivoli Assoc v. Wing

    122 Misc. 2d 901 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984)   Cited 13 times

    A landlord may seek to recover no more than the current three months' rent. ( Maxwell v Simons, 77 Misc.2d 184.) The landlord in essence selected the forum.