1989) (referring to treble damages under § 318.9 as a penalty and penal liability); Samson Resources Co. v. Cloud, 812 P.2d 1378, 1380-1381 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991); See also Maxwell v. Samson Resources Co., 848 P.2d 1166, 1171-1173 (Okla. 1993) (statute allowing threefold the damages sustained for operator's failure to pay working interest revenues is penal); Crow v. Davidson, 186 Okla. 84, 96 P.2d 70 (1939) (statute providing for treble damages for forcible ejection or exclusion from real property is penal statute). As a penal statute § 318.9 must be strictly construed [ Maxwell v. Samson Resources Co., supra, 848 P.2d at 1172] and the situations subjecting an individual to the penalty of treble damages should not be enlarged by judicial construction.
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are intended to provide a "`punishment for the benefit of society as a restraint upon the transgressor, and a warning and example serving as a deterrent to commission of like offenses in the future.'" Maxwell v. Samson Resources Co., 848 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Okla. 1993) (quoting Oller v. Hicks, 441 P.2d 356, 360 (Okla. 1967)). Therefore, "`[w]hen a defendant's conduct is such as to amount to fraud, oppression or malice, or the act is wilfully and wantonly done with criminal indifference to the plaintiff's rights, exemplary damages are allowable.'"
For example 52 O.S. 1991 § 540 became § 570.10. Prior to 1992, the statutes only imposed affirmative obligations to pay proceeds and in 1992, Legislature substantially strengthened and expanded its scope and obligations by setting forth time restraints and penalties. Section 540 was originally enacted in 1980 for the purpose of limiting the amount of time during which royalty payments and working interest payments can be withheld by the first purchaser following the first sale of production on a new well. See, 1981 OK AG 6. It has come to be known as the “Sweetheart Gas Bill.” Maxwell v. Samson Resources Co., 1993 OK 23, ¶ 14, 848 P.2d 1166. References in this opinion are to the current statutory decennial 2011, unless an older provision is controlling, differs significantly, and is otherwise noted. Title 23 O.S. 2011 § 6 provides:
Therefore, we conclude that the 1989 amendment providing for compounded interest should be applied prospectively only, and Quinlan is only entitled to twelve percent simple interest, rather than compounded interest, prior to the amendment's effective date of July 1, 1989. Quinlan cites Maxwell v. Samson Resources Co., 848 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Okla. 1993), to support his assertion that the 1989 amendment should be applied retroactively. However, in Maxwell, the defendant oil company did not take issue with the compounding of interest pursuant to § 540, but instead, only objected to the trial court's compounding of interest monthly rather than annually as the statute required.
This Court has previously held that Section 71 also requires some degree of wrongful intent. Order (Apr. 23, 2024) at 5-6 [Doc. 408] (citing Main v. Levine, 118 P.2d 252, 255 (Okla. 1941); Maxwell v. Samson Res. Co., 848 P.2d 1166, 1173 (Okla. 1993); Crow v. Davidson, 96 P.2d 70, 72-73 (Okla. 1939)).
In the context of these cases, the use of the term "penal in nature" cannot be interpreted as limiting the applicability of the twelve percent interest provision to cases of intentional wrongdoing or willfulness. Exxon next cites Maxwell v. Samson Resources Co., 848 P.2d 1166 (Okla. 1993) for the proposition that the twelve percent interest provision should be strictly construed because it is penal in nature. In Maxwell, supra, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a statute authorizing treble damages for failure to pay working interest revenues, Title 52 Okla.Stat. § 547[ 52-547], required a showing of some form of wrongful intent or conduct.
A division order title opinion lists the ownership interests in an oil or gas well or lease to enable proper proportional distribution of royalties from oil and gas production. See generally Maxwell v. Samson Res. Co., 848 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Okla.1993). {8} Julia died in 1973, and Margaret died in 1974.
See, e.g., Southway Corp. v. Metropolitan Realty, 90 Ark.App. 51, 206 S.W.3d 250, 257 (2005); Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt, 47 Cal.4th 381, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 212 P.3d 736, 744 (2009); Goodrow v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 432 Mass. 165, 732 N.E.2d 289, 299 (2000); Cole v. Wilson, 11 Neb.App. 837, 661 N.W.2d 706, 710 (2003); Debra F. Fink v. Ricoh Corp., 365 N.J.Super. 520, 839 A.2d 942, 980 (N.J.Super. Ct. Law Div.2003); Heights Associates v. Bautista, 178 Misc.2d 669, 683 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374 (App. Term 1998); Maxwell v. Samson Resources Co., 848 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Okla.1993); Tri–Tech Corp. v. Americomp Services, 254 Wis.2d 418, 646 N.W.2d 822, 827 (2002). Appellant/cross-respondent Scott Webb purchased a home from respondent/cross-appellant Celebrate Properties, LLC.
1] — 581.10. See Maxwell v. Samson Resources Company, 848 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Okla. 1993). Our holding herein does not rely upon these Acts.
As such, the Halls were required to prove “some form of wrongful intent or motive ... to invoke the strictures of the penalty.” Id. (citing Maxwell v. Samson Res. Co., 1993 OK 23, 848 P.2d 1166). The district court concluded that the Halls had failed to do so.