Opinion
Cause No. IP 99-1920-C-M/S
September 18, 2000
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Capital Improvement Board's ("CIB") motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Christopher Maxieson's ("Maxieson") claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Maxieson alleges that the CIB discriminated against him due to his race and his sex and retaliated against him when it terminated his employment for sleeping on the job. Maxieson has not opposed the CIB's motion for summary judgment. The Court has fully considered the CIB's motion and, for the reasons discussed below, GRANTS its motion for summary judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Maxieson is an African-American male. Stmt. Material Facts ¶ 1. The CIB is a quasi-governmental agency which owns and operates the Indiana Convention Center and RCA Dome ("ICCRD"). Id. ¶ 2. The ICCRD is a large, publicly-financed convention and stadium facility. Id. ¶ 3.
Because Maxieson has not opposed the CIB's statement of facts, the Court will assume the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the CIB are admitted to exist without controversy. Local Rule 56.1(g).
Maxieson began working for ICCRD on October 1, 1984. Id. ¶ 4. Maxieson was a full-time service worker in the Housekeeping Department until his termination on December 11, 1998. Id. ¶ 5. Maxieson was covered by a collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters, Local Union No. 135. Id. ¶ 8. Under Schedule A of the Agreement, employees are subject to termination for a first occurrence of sleeping on duty. Id. ¶ 9.
In or around January 1997, Tom Boyle became Maxieson's supervisor in the Housekeeping Department. Id. ¶ 7. After finding Maxieson asleep on the job on December 11, 1998, Boyle terminated his employment. Id. ¶ 10-12.
II. STANDARDS A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
As stated by the Supreme Court, summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather is an integral part of the federal rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. City of Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267-68 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1317 (1991). Motions for summary judgment are governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must instead submit evidentiary materials which "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A genuine issue of material fact exists whenever "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The nonmoving party bears the burden of demonstrating that such a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Oliver v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 96 F.3d 992, 997 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997). It is not the duty of the court to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party bears the responsibility of identifying the evidence upon which he relies. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996). When the moving party has met the standard of Rule 56, summary judgment is mandatory. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court should draw all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and should view the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 257 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997). The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; JPM Inc. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 94 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Irrelevant or unnecessary facts do not deter summary judgment — even when in dispute. Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 281 (7th Cir. 1992). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115 (1997).
On certain occasions, the Seventh Circuit had suggested that a court approach a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case with a particular degree of caution. See, e.g., Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 1993); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989). The language implied that summary judgment might be less appropriate in this context based upon the presence of issues of motive and intent. Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. As the Seventh Circuit has recently emphasized, however, these cases do not establish a heightened summary judgment standard for employment-related cases. Instead, the language from the prior cases simply means "that courts should be careful in a discrimination case as in any case not to grant summary judgment if there is an issue of material fact that is genuinely contestable, which an issue of intent often though not always will be." Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1997). Even when discriminatory intent is at issue, summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmovant presents no evidence to indicate motive or intent in support of her position. See Holland, 883 F.2d at 1312. Further, the nonmovant will not defeat summary judgment merely by pointing to self-serving allegations without evidentiary support. Cliff v. Board of School Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 1994). Guided by these standards, this Court now considers the motion for summary judgment.
B. TITLE VII STANDARDS
Because Maxieson has not attempted to offer any direct evidence of sex or race discrimination, he must proceed under the indirect method of proof. Under that method, Maxieson must initially set forth, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If Maxieson makes a showing sufficient to prove a prima facie case he will enjoy a rebuttable presumption of discrimination that shifts the burden of production to the CIB to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its actions. Hughes v. Brown, 20 F.3d 745, 746 (7th Cir. 1994). The CIB may do so by producing evidence, whether or not persuasive, of a nondiscriminatory reason. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2747 (noting that the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of intentional discrimination). If the CIB succeeds in this task, the presumption dissolves and the burden of production shifts back to Maxieson to demonstrate that the proffered reason for his termination is a pretext for discrimination. Essex v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 111 F.3d 1304, 1309 (7th Cir. 1997).
To establish a prima facie case of sex or race discrimination, Maxieson must establish that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting the CIB's legitimate performance expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the CIB treated similarly situated persons not in the protected class more favorably. Simpson v. Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc., 196 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1999) (sex); Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1999) (race).
As with Maxieson's sex and race discrimination claims, the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to his retaliation claim. Miller v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Maxieson must establish that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. Id. In light of these governing standards, the Court will now address Maxieson's claims.
III. DISCUSSION A. TITLE VII SEX DISCRIMINATION
Maxieson cannot establish even a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination because there is no evidence in the record of any similarly situated employees outside the protected class that were treated more favorably. Although Maxieson did not respond to the CIB's motion for summary judgment, it appears from the CIB's brief that the only employees he believes the CIB treated more favorably were either other African-American males or Manpower temporary employees that were not members of the collective bargaining unit — and thus not subject to the same rules of conduct. With no evidence whatsoever of similarly situated employees that received favorable treatment — i.e., that were allowed to remain employed after being caught sleeping on the job — Maxieson's race and sex discrimination claims fail as a matter of law. In addition, even if Maxieson had established a prima facie case of race or sex discrimination, there is simply no evidence that the CIB's reason for terminating him was pretextual.
Accordingly, the CIB is entitled to summary judgment on those claims.
B. TITLE VII RETALIATION
Based upon the CIB's brief, it appears that Maxieson believes that Boyle terminated him in December 1998 because he had filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission approximately four months earlier. There is no evidence, however, that Boyle's decision to terminate Maxison was retaliatory. Instead, the undisputed facts show that Boyle terminated Maxieson because believed him to be sleeping on the job.
To establish the requisite causal connection for his retaliation claim Maxieson must show "that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated." Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2000). "Speculation based on suspicious timing alone, however, does not support a reasonable inference of retaliation; instead, plaintiffs must produce facts which somehow tie the adverse decision to the plaintiffs' protected actions." Id. "The mere fact that one event preceded another does nothing to prove that the first event caused the second. Rather, other circumstances must also be present which reasonably suggest that the two events are somehow related to one another." Id. In sum, the mere fact that Boyle terminated Maxieson four months after he had filed a charge of discrimination, without more, is insufficient to support a reasonable inference of retaliation. Because Maxieson cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the CIB is entitled to summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
Maxieson has failed to present sufficient evidence from which the Court could find a genuine issue of material fact on his sex discrimination, race discrimination, or retaliation claims. Accordingly, the CIB's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.