Opinion
CIVIL 3:19-CV-1169
07-14-2021
LINDA MATYLEWICZ, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF LACKAWANA TRANSIT SYSTEM AUTHORITY (COLTS), Defendant.
Mariani, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal law expressly forbids age discrimination in the workplace. Oftentimes a plaintiff will endeavor to carry her burden of proof on the issue of age discrimination in the work setting by citing the fact that she was replaced by a significantly younger worker. This is a permissible means of circumstantial proof in these cases, but the informed adjudication of these claims typically requires two pieces of information: the ages of the plaintiff and the person who replaced the plaintiff at work. Only if both pieces of information are available can a court begin a fully informed analysis of an age discrimination claim. Therefore, it is both puzzling and analytically challenging that in this case we are asked to make a determination on the plaintiff's age discrimination claims when the court is not informed of the ages of all pertinent actors.
The instant case illustrates some of the pitfalls that may arise in this type of litigation. The plaintiff, Linda Matylewicz, initially brought this Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) against her former employer because she erroneously believed that she had been replaced by a much younger man. It turns out that Matylewicz was wrong on this score. Instead of being replaced by a much younger man, her position was filled by a woman candidate whose precise age remains undisclosed by all parties and unknown to the court.
The defendant insists that this ambiguity, the failure of any party to inform us of the age of Matylewicz's replacement, compels dismissal of Matylewicz's age discrimination claim. Yet, while we are puzzled by the reticence of all parties on this score, we believe that, in a summary judgment setting where all factual doubts are to be resolved in the plaintiff's favor, we cannot grant summary judgment on this age discrimination claim without the benefit of this information which must be known by someone. Therefore, we recommend that this summary judgment motion be denied, without prejudice to renewal, if appropriate, when and if the parties are able to disclose this additional information to the court.
This is a civil action brought by Linda Matylewicz against her former employer, County of Lackawana Transit System Authority (“COLTS”). Matylewicz alleges that COLTS unlawfully terminated her employment because of her age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq. Specifically, Matylewicz alleges that her employment with COLTS was terminated, and she was subsequently replaced by a younger individual.
The defendant has now moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of its motion, COLTS argues that the plaintiff has failed to prove her prima facie case in that her case is based entirely on legal conclusions which, for the purpose of deciding a motion for summary judgment, must be disregarded when there is no presumption of truth. However, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact, and thus, summary judgment would be inappropriate. Accordingly, for the following reasons, we will recommend that the defendant's motion be denied.
II. BACKGROUND
Linda Matylewicz was employed by COLTS for approximately four years, from August 11, 2014, until November 7, 2018. (Doc. 32, Ex. A, at 7, 12). Sometime in August of 2018, Matylewicz was given a memo by Bob Fiume, Executive Director, and Susanne Green, Director of Finance and Administration, that her position had been downgraded from Human Resources Director to Human Resources Manager. (Id., at 19). Matylewicz never inquired into the reason she was being demoted because she felt like the work environment did not allow it and that she was afraid for her job. (Id., at 20). Following her demotion, Matylewicz was ultimately terminated on November 7, 2018. (Id., at 7).
Fiume testified that prior to her termination, Matylewicz was never formally reprimanded; however, he had a Human Resources consultant attempt to talk to Matylewicz to try to improve her performance. (Doc. 32, Ex. C, at 31-32). He also stated that he spoke to her personally to try to fix her performance issues. (Id., at 31). Fiume stated that there were multiple reasons as to why Matylewicz was ultimately fired. First, there was an issue with two young interns being hired that Fiume felt Matylewicz handled inappropriately. (Id., at 15). Matylewicz also allegedly used surveillance methods on David Kaczmarek, the Union Vice President and a Bus Driver of COLTS, which led to a lawsuit between COLTS, Matylewicz, and Kaczmarek. (Id., at 15, 22). Further, there was also the fact that Matylewicz was behind on EEO compliance. (Id., at 35). Fiume also testified that Matylewicz was informed prior to her termination that if she didn't improve her performance, she would be terminated. (Id., at 37).
For her part, Matylewicz testified that she did not feel comfortable following up on her issues because of pending litigation between Kaczmarek and COLTS. (Doc. 32, Ex. A, at 36). Matylewicz also stated that she believed that Kaczmarek had a role in her firing, and that her termination came from the settlement between Kaczmarek and COLTS, an allegation which Fiume has explicitly denied. (Doc. 32, Ex. A, at 77; Doc. 32, Ex. C, at 50-51). Matylewicz initially believed that COLTS discriminated against her because of her age because they considered replacing her with someone named Justin, who is allegedly in his 20s and who was working part time. (Doc. 32, Ex. A, at 43-44). However, Justin was never selected for the position, and instead COLTS ultimately hired a woman named Karla Ortiz. (Id., at 46). Matylewicz knew nothing about the hiring process, or lack thereof, or what transpired between COLTS and Justin, and she also unaware that Ortiz would be selected for the position before Ortiz was officially hired. (Id., at 47). Instead, Matylewicz found out about the Ortiz hire from a newspaper article, the COLTS website, and a few individuals who were still working at COLTS. (Id., at 48).
The parties concede that Matylewicz was over the age of 40 at the time of the events set forth in the complaint, and thus fell within a protected class under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. §631(a). However, the age of Matylewicz's replacement, Karla Ortiz, is stubbornly ambiguous and shrouded in some mystery. For her part, Matylewicz estimated Ortiz to be in her 30's, but neither party has definitively identified Ortiz's actual age, a fact of critical importance at this stage of the litigation. Thus, on this crucial element of this ADEA claim we are only provided Matylewicz's somewhat speculative age estimate.
Matylewicz commenced this action against COLTS on July 9, 2019. (Doc. 1). Matylewicz subsequently filed an amended complaint on or about August 8, 2019, which is the operative pleading in this case and sets forth a single count of age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (Doc. 7). The defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff has failed to set forth a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA. (Doc. 30). In this regard, COLTS' summary judgment motion is extremely narrow. Eschewing other commonly pursued lines of attack upon this ADEA claim, which requires but-for causation and is judged against the familiar burden shifting paradigm relied upon in employment discrimination cases, COLTS argues that the failure of the plaintiff to precisely identify the age discrepancy here, coupled with her initial error regarding the identity of her replacement, compels the entry of a judgment for the defense.
This motion is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment for the defendant. Thus, this motion for summary judgment should be denied.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The defendants have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id., at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial, ” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court
cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. ADEA - The Legal Standard
Matylewicz has set forth one claim against COLTS, alleging that she was discriminated against because of her age in violation of the ADEA. The ADEA makes it unlawful for employers to “discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [their]... age” 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). A plaintiff alleging that they were subjected to adverse employment action in violation of the Act must show that her “age was the ‘but-for' cause of the employer's adverse action.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009). It is not enough for a plaintiff to show that her age was a factor that motivated the employer's action, but instead must point to evidence that could support an inference that her age had a “determinative influence” on the decision. Id. at 176.
This burden remains squarely with the plaintiff, who may prove her claims through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 177.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gross, the Third Circuit had instructed that direct evidence of age discrimination meant “evidence sufficient to allow the jury to find that the ‘decision makers placed substantial negative reliance on [the plaintiff's age] in reaching their decision to fire him.'” Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted)). Gross fundamentally changed this, and now it is clear that “ ‘substantial negative reliance' on age is not enough [to prove discrimination in violation of the ADEA]; the evidence must be a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that age was the determinative, but-for cause of the employee's termination.” Palmer v. Britton Industries, Inc., 662 Fed.Appx. 147, 151 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 2016).
Although a plaintiff may seek to prove a claim of age discrimination with direct evidence, such evidence is often unavailable, and courts permit proof of age discrimination to be made through circumstantial evidence. When a plaintiff relies on a circumstantial evidence, courts apply the familiar burden-shifting framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Third Circuit has explained the application of McDonnell Douglas in the context of ADEA discrimination claims as follows:
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof and the initial burden of production, having to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination by showing first, that the plaintiff is forty years of age or older; second, that the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; third, that the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question; and fourth, that the plaintiff was ultimately replaced by another employee who was sufficiently younger to support an inference of discriminatory animus. Once the plaintiff satisfies these elements, the burden of production shifts to the employer to identify a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer does so, the burden of production returns to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's proffered rationale was a pretext for age discrimination. At all times, however, the burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff.Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also id. at 691 (holding that this standard does not conflict with Gross). However, the Court has held that the “[p]laintiff's burden at the prima facie stage is ‘not onerous.'” Terrell v. Main Line Health, 302 F.Supp.3d 644, 655 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1998).
Once an employer has proffered a legitimate reason for the adverse action, in order to show pretext, “the employee must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a ... determinative cause of the employer's action.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). In order to “discredit the employer's proffered reason, however, the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Id. at 765. Rather,
[T]he non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence.' [Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992)], and hence infer ‘that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.' Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993).”Id.
B. There Remains an Issue of Material Fact that Precludes Summary Judgment.
COLTS does not contest the first three elements of Matylewicz's prima facie case-that she was over 40 years old, suffered adverse employment action, and was qualified for her position. Thus, the last element-whether Matylewicz was replaced by someone sufficiently younger-is the sole issue in dispute. COLTS argues that Matylewicz has failed to prove that she was replaced by an employee who was sufficiently younger than her to support an inference of age discrimination. (Doc. 30, at 3).
To be sure, the plaintiff's efforts to satisfy this element of her claim have been marked by missteps, miscues, accidents, and ambiguities. Matylewicz stated that she initially filed her complaint and based her ADEA claim on her understanding that an individual by the name of Justin, who she believed to be in his 20's, replaced or was going to replace her. However, it is undisputed that Justin was never hired for this position, and instead a woman by the name of Karla Ortiz replaced Matylewicz. Informed of this error, Matylewicz now relies upon her estimate that her replacement appears to be a person in her 30's to sustain this element of her ADEA claim.
COLTS asserts that because Matylewicz based her complaint on this factual mistake-her belief that a much younger man, Justin, replaced her-she cannot now claim discrimination based on the fact that Ortiz replaced her. On this score COLTS relies on the holding in Klikus v. Cornell Iron Works, Inc., 3:13CV468, 2014 WL 496471 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2014), in which the court held that if the plaintiff cannot identify his or her replacement, then the plaintiff fails to meet their burden in proving their prima facie case under the ADEA. Id. at *5. However, while Matylewicz initially based her complaint on the theory that Justin replaced her, she has identified, and the defendant has not disputed, that Karla Ortiz actually replaced her. Therefore, this is not a situation in which the plaintiff has utterly failed to identify her replacement. See e.g., Husick v. Allegheny County, 2010 WL 1903748, at *9 (W.D. Pa. May 10, 2010) (denying summary judgment where the plaintiff initially had no knowledge of who replaced him, but subsequent testimony revealed the name of his replacement). Moreover, it would be incongruous to dismiss this ADEA claim based upon Matylewicz's mistake regarding the identity of her replacement if Matylewicz was, in fact, replaced by a different, but much younger worker than she initially believed.
For her part, Matylewicz relies on the Supreme Court's holding in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), in which the Court held that an inference of age discrimination can be shown through allegations that the plaintiff was replaced by a person substantially younger than she in order to establish aprimafacie case of age discrimination. Id., at 313. Regarding whether someone is “sufficiently younger” than the plaintiff, the Third Circuit has stated “there is no ‘particular age difference that must be shown,' but while ‘[d]ifferent courts have held . . . that a five year difference can be sufficient, . . . a one year difference cannot.'” Showalter v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Center, 190 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729 (3d Cir. 1995)).
We agree that showing this age discrepancy is an acceptable manner of circumstantial proof in this case. Yet while the parties advance these contrasting legal positions, remarkably, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has precisely identified the age of Matylewicz's replacement, Karla Ortiz. Matylewicz has only estimated Ortiz to be in her 30's, but neither party has definitively identified Ortiz's actual age. This ambiguity leads the defendant to contend that because Ortiz's actual age is not in the record, summary judgment in its favor is required.
We disagree. To the contrary, while it is peculiar that neither party has disclosed the age of Matylewicz's actual replacement, we conclude that this crucial question is an issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment in favor of COLTS. Simply put, in order to determine as a matter of law whether Matylewicz was replaced by someone “sufficiently younger, ” we should know the age of the person who replaced her. Matylewicz provides only meager and somewhat speculative proof in this regard, estimating that her replacement, Karla Ortiz, appears to be in her 30's. The defendant, however, tenders no evidence in this regard. Accordingly, because this information is apparently not readily available, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the plaintiff has failed to set forth a prima facie case of age discrimination. Thus, we recommend that the defendant's motion for summary judgment be denied without prejudice to renewal, if appropriate, once this crucial fact is known or disclosed. In addition, since COLTS has not argued that this claim fails on any other legal grounds that may be available to it, we do not speculate regarding any other potential defenses that may exist here.
V. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 30) be DENIED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.