Opinion
19-P-373
12-12-2019
Glenn A. MATTSON v. SUPERINTENDENT, OLD COLONY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, & others.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Glenn A. Mattson, an inmate at Old Colony Correctional Center (OCCC), filed a complaint seeking the return of or reimbursement for personal property deemed contraband and confiscated by prison officials upon his transfer from another facility. The defendants moved to dismiss. A judge of the Superior Court allowed the motion, and judgment entered dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Background. In 2017, the plaintiff, an inmate at Bridgewater State Hospital, was transferred to OCCC. Upon his arrival at OCCC, the plaintiff learned that a number of his belongings had been deemed contraband by OCCC. On April 24, 2017, the plaintiff filed a grievance with OCCC that sought the return of the confiscated items and argued the items were validly purchased from approved vendors through Department of Correction regulations and that OCCC had not provided a reason for deeming them contraband. The grievance was denied on April 26, 2017. On December 19, 2017, the plaintiff filed a second grievance that again sought return of his property and stated that he had appealed from the earlier grievance. The second grievance was denied on January 19, 2018, on the grounds that the issue in the grievance had already been addressed in the earlier grievance and that OCCC received no appeal from that grievance. On January 22, 2018, the plaintiff appealed from the second grievance to the superintendent of OCCC. The superintendent denied the appeal on February 2, 2018. On March 29, 2018, the Superior Court received the plaintiff's complaint (captioned as a petition) for declaratory judgment. The complaint, which was dated March 9, 2018, again sought the return of or reimbursement for the plaintiff's property. On motion by the defendants, a Superior Court judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a claim for declaratory relief and was not timely filed as an administrative appeal under G. L. c. 127, § 38H.
Items deemed contraband included work boots, various items of clothing, a coffee mug, a brush, a razor, a hot pot, a coax cable, and legal cassettes.
The denial of the grievance provided no explanation other than "in accordance with 103 CMR 403 the items in question[ ] have been deemed contraband here at OCCC."
The second grievance alternatively requested reimbursement for the property.
The complaint was accompanied by exhibits and an affidavit. Those documents have not been provided in the record appendix. See Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019).
Discussion. "We review de novo the judge's order allowing a motion for judgment on the pleadings under [Mass. R. Civ. P.] 12 (c) [, 365 Mass. 757 (1974)]." Wheatley v. Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 600 (2010). In Grady v. Commissioner of Correction, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 126 (2013), this court explained that under G. L. c. 127, § 38H, a final decision with respect to an inmate grievance (meaning the denial of an appeal by the superintendent) is subject to judicial review in accordance with G. L. c. 30A, § 14. Id. at 131, 135. Although relief under the declaratory judgment act, see G. L. c. 231A, is available to inmates in addition to review under G. L. c. 127, § 38H, a complaint seeking declaratory relief tests "the validity of regulations or the propriety of practices involving violations of rights, which are consistent and repeated in nature." Id. at 135, quoting Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 379, 388 n.12 (1983). Declaratory relief is not an appropriate remedy where the dispute concerns the adjudication of an individual inmate's grievance. Grady, supra at 135-136.
1. Declaratory relief. The motion judge correctly concluded that the plaintiff's complaint did not plead adequate facts to support a claim for declaratory relief. The plaintiff's complaint sought the return of or reimbursement for his confiscated personal property and made no allegations that went beyond his individual case. Thus, the plaintiff's complaint, like the complaint in Grady, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 136, may have "cloaked his claim as a request for declaratory judgment" but was "at its core ... a fact-specific challenge to the defendants' decisions denying his grievances in his particular case." As such, the plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief was properly dismissed. See id. at 135-136.
To the extent that the plaintiff filed a reply to the defendants' motion to dismiss that made passing reference to another inmate's property being labeled contraband, this did not remedy the legal inadequacy of the plaintiff's complaint. See Ridgeley Mgt. Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Gosnold, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 801 (2012) ("A motion for judgment on the pleadings limits the judge and the reviewing court to the surface of the complaint and the answer").
2. Review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1) . Having concluded that the plaintiff's complaint failed to plead a viable claim for declaratory relief, the judge proceeded to consider whether the complaint could be construed as a request for judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1). The judge determined that the court lacked jurisdiction over a G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1), action because the action was not commenced within thirty days after receipt of notice of the final decision of the agency. General Laws c. 30A, § 14 (1), requires that the complaint be "commenced in the court within thirty days" (emphasis added). The Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted this language to mean "the clerk must receive the complaint (or a document called an appeal) within thirty days of the receipt of notice of the agency decision." Harper v. Division of Water Pollution Control, 412 Mass. 464, 467 (1992). On appeal, the plaintiff argues that dismissing the G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1), action as untimely was error because the judge should have applied a "prison mail box rule" to deem his complaint timely filed. The plaintiff cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that would permit an inmate's G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1), action to be deemed "commenced in the court" for the purposes of G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (1), upon the relinquishment of control to prison authorities. Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 3, as amended, 385 Mass. 1215 (1982) ("A civil action is commenced by [1] mailing to the clerk of the proper court by certified or registered mail a complaint and an entry fee prescribed by law, or [2] filing such complaint and an entry fee with such clerk"); Commonwealth v. Hartsgrove, 407 Mass. 441, 444 (1990) (notice of appeal is deemed filed for purposes of Mass. R. A. P. 4 [b], as amended, 378 Mass. 928 [1979], upon self-represented inmate's relinquishment of control of notice of appeal to prison authorities). Even assuming, arguendo, such a rule existed, the plaintiff is still not entitled to relief. Although the plaintiff claims in his reply brief not to have received notice of the superintendent's denial of his appeal until February 9, 2018, we find nothing in the record to verify this assertion, and, more importantly, nothing in the record that demonstrates he ever presented this argument to the motion judge. See Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 617 (2015) (issues not raised or argued below may not be argued for first time on appeal).
To the extent that we have not specifically addressed other points in the plaintiff's brief, they "have not been overlooked. We find nothing in them that requires discussion." Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
Judgment affirmed.