Opinion
No. 1929 C.D. 2013
05-20-2014
Trevor Mattis, Appellant v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, P. Burns, E. Tice, E. Heberling, M. Overmyer, W. Cole, P. Ennis, Case, D. Sauers
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
Trevor Mattis (Mattis), representing himself, appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th Judicial District of Pennsylvania (Forest County Branch) (trial court) that sustained the preliminary objections in the nature of demurrers filed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) on behalf of the named appellees (collectively, Corrections Defendants) and dismissed Mattis' amended complaint. Mattis contends the trial court erred in determining he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon review, we affirm.
The Honorable Maureen A. Skerda, President Judge, presided.
In addition to DOC, the other named appellees, who hold or held positions at SCI-Forest, are: P. Burns, E. Tice, E. Heberling, M. Overmyer, W. Cole, P. Ennis, Case, D. Sauers, B. Simmons, and Schnieder. Although B. Simmons and Schnieder do not appear in the caption, Mattis added them as defendants in his amended complaint. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶7, 9.
I. Background
Mattis is an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution-Forest (SCI-Forest). Mattis initiated this action by filing a complaint, which he amended, against Corrections Defendants in their individual and official capacities, challenging his transfer from a single-occupant cell to a double-occupant cell. The essence of Mattis' claim is that he wants to be housed in a single-occupant cell. Mattis alleged he suffers from long-term post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and the proposed transfer to a shared cell will exacerbate his condition and will endanger his wellbeing or the wellbeing of his cellmate. According to the complaint, because Mattis refused to take a cellmate, DOC issued a misconduct citation and placed Mattis in the restricted housing unit (RHU).
Mattis requested injunctive relief in the form of an order reinstating his "Z-code" or single-cell status, releasing him from the RHU, and removing certain prison misconduct citations from his institutional record. Mattis also requested declaratory relief in the form of a court order declaring Corrections Defendants' alleged conduct amounted to violations of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act). Mattis also asserted a negligence claim and requested monetary relief in the form of both compensatory and punitive damages.
In response, Corrections Defendants filed preliminary objections in the nature of demurrers to the amended complaint, asserting Mattis does not have the right to a single cell, Corrections Defendants are immune from suit, and Mattis did not establish a cause of action under the constitutions or statutes. The trial court heard arguments on the preliminary objections and agreed with Corrections Defendants. Thus, the trial court sustained Corrections Defendants' preliminary objections and dismissed Mattis' amended complaint with prejudice. Mattis now appeals.
In Pennsylvania, the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity may be raised by preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer where that defense is "apparent on the face of the pleading." Wurth by Wurth v. City of Phila., 584 A.2d 403, 407 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990); accord Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
Following argument, but before the trial court disposed of the preliminary objections, Mattis filed a notice of removal to federal court. However, Mattis subsequently discontinued his action in federal court and requested the trial court to reclaim jurisdiction and decide the preliminary objections.
II. Issues
On appeal, Mattis contends the trial court erred in sustaining the preliminary objections where his amended complaint established multiple causes of action upon which relief may be granted. First, Mattis claims he asserted a constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment to be housed in a safe and secure manner that affords him the minimal basic necessities of life, such as sleep and the ability to think and concentrate. Corrections Defendants violated this right by forcing Mattis to have a cellmate despite knowing his PTSD poses a substantial risk of serious harm to Mattis and his cellmate. Second, Mattis asserts he stated a claim for relief under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by establishing Corrections Defendants interfered with his rights under those acts. Finally, he contends he stated a viable claim for negligence against Corrections Defendants Simmons and Case, who are prison healthcare employees and not immune from suit, for failing to properly diagnose and treat Mattis' mental condition.
When reviewing a trial court's order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of demurrer, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Balletta v. Spadoni, 47 A.3d 183 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). To sustain preliminary objections, it must appear with certainty the law will not allow recovery; any doubt must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). All well-pled facts in the complaint, and reasonable inferences arising from those facts, are accepted as true. Id. However, unwarranted inferences, conclusions of law, argumentative allegations or expressions of opinion need not be accepted. Id.
III. Discussion
Under state law, an inmate does not have a right to be confined in a housing unit of his choosing. 37 Pa. Code §93.11(a); see Yount v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 966 A.2d 1115, 1117 n.1 (Pa. 2009). Prison officials have discretion to transfer a prisoner for any reason or for no reason at all. Yount; see Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (providing capital case inmates are not entitled to be transferred from capital case housing units to the general population, even when their death sentences were vacated). Moreover, "prison officials must be accorded wide ranging deference on the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are necessary to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security." Robson v. Biester, 420 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980); accord Bronson v. Cent. Office Review Comm., 721 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1998).
Likewise, under federal law, an inmate does not have a liberty interest in being transferred to a particular institution or housing unit. Olin v. Wakineakona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). The placement of prisoners within the prison system is among the "wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than the federal courts." Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225.
With regard to declaratory relief, such relief requires a real controversy. Pa. State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police v. Dep't of Conservation & Natural Res., 909 A.2d 413 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Specifically, the requirements include the presence of antagonistic claims indicating imminent and inevitable litigation coupled with a clear manifestation that the declaration will be of practical help in ending the controversy. Id. Relief is not a matter of right, "but a matter of the court's discretion." Id. at 419. A declaratory judgment is not appropriate for an advisory opinion that may prove academic. Mazur v. Washington Cnty. Redev. Auth., 954 A.2d 50 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).
As for injunctive relief, such relief is only proper when the petitioner's right to relief is clear, the injunction is needed to avoid an injury that cannot be compensated for in damages, and greater injury will result from refusing injunctive relief than granting it. Harding v. Stickman, 823 A.2d 1110 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). A trial court may grant an injunction only if the petitioner establishes a clear right to relief. Id.
With this framework in mind, we examine Mattis' claims.
A. Eighth Amendment Claim
First, Mattis contends he has a constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to be housed in a safe and secure manner that affords him the minimal basic necessities of life, such as sleep and the ability to think and concentrate. Mattis maintains the only way this can be accomplished is to house him in a single-occupant cell. Mattis asserts Corrections Defendants showed a deliberate indifference to his alleged disability by refusing to house him in a single cell, causing him to suffer significant emotional and psychological distress.
Pennsylvania's constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is coextensive with the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and affords no broader protection. Jackson v. Hendrick, 503 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1986).
Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the government may not inflict "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Cruel and unusual punishment is any punishment which violates civilized standards and concepts of humanity and decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). "Prison officials must ensure that inmates are not deprived of the 'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' including food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety." Tindell v. Dep't of Corr., ___ A.3d ___, ___ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 551 M.D. 2012, filed March 24, 2014), slip op. at 15, 2014 WL 1153042 *7 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
In Rhodes, the United States Supreme Court held double celling "did not lead to deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation" or "increase violence among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for prison confinement." Id. at 348. The Supreme Court implicitly rejected any notion that the housing of more than one inmate in a prison cell is a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
To state a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to protect, an inmate must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence a deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement that constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Tindell (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)). A court must determine whether prison conditions, taken as a whole, either inflict unnecessary or wanton pain or amount to grossly disproportionate punishment for the crime for which the prisoner has been incarcerated. Jackson v. Hendrick, 503 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1986) (citing Rhodes).
The inquiry into whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent is a subjective one, requiring the demonstration of a state of mind akin to criminal recklessness. Tindell. A prisoner must allege: "(i) the prison official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; (ii) the prison official was aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and (iii) the prison official drew the inference." Id. at ___, slip op. at 11, WL 1153042 *5 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
A "prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; accord Kretchmar v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 831 A.2d 793 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). In other words, "an official who is not aware of a substantial risk cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment." Arocho v. Cnty. of Lehigh, 922 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). "[I]t is not sufficient that the official should have known of the risk." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3rd Cir. 2012) (citing Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120 (3rd Cir. 2001)).
Moreover, as we explained in Kretchmar:
The deliberate indifference test affords considerable latitude to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients. Courts will disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment ... (which) remains a question of sound professional judgment. Complaints about medical care which merely reflect a disagreement with the doctors over the proper means of treating the prisoner's medical condition do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Absent a showing that [prison] officials have engaged in constitutionally impermissible conduct, it is not in the public's interest for the court to usurp the Bureau of Prisons' authority and micro-manage the medical needs of a particular inmate.831 A.2d at 799 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Applying these principles here, Mattis fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. In his complaint, Mattis claims that he suffers from PTSD and that the lack of a single cell aggravates his mental health issues and poses a serious risk of harm to himself and a potential cellmate. Even accepting the truth of his alleged PTSD condition, Mattis' averments regarding the likelihood of harm if he is double celled is purely speculative. It is not a reasonable inference, without additional factual averments, to assume his health and safety (as well as safety of a cell mate) will be compromised if he is celled with another inmate.
Moreover, Mattis did not sufficiently allege that Corrections Defendants were aware of any threat of serious harm to Mattis by being double celled or that they acted with "deliberate indifference" to his health and safety. Mattis alleged he informed some of the Corrections Defendants that he needed Z-code status for his psychological and emotional wellbeing. However, he did not allege Corrections Defendants knew of any "excessive risk to inmate health or safety" by removing Mattis' Z-code status. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Although Mattis described incidents of violence that occurred while incarcerated in federal penitentiaries and other state correctional institutions, none of the alleged incidents occurred while incarcerated at SCI-Forest since 2007. See Am. Compl. at ¶¶13, 16, 18, 20, 23, 28. According to one defendant, the alleged events could not be verified. Id. at ¶64.
Z-code status is reviewed annually based on current level of functioning; a recommendation for or against such status is made by the unit team with input from psychology and medical staff. See id., Ex. 3 (final decision of inmate grievance). While at SCI-Forest, Mattis alleged he "attained a relative psychological steady-state." Id. at ¶40. In August 2012, Corrections Defendants recommended the removal of Mattis' Z Code/single-cell status based on his positive institutional record while at SCI-Forest.
We agree with the trial court's assessment that, even viewing the facts in the most favorable light, Mattis does not allege a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment. Mattis' factual allegations are legally insufficient to support his claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not err in sustaining the preliminary objections to Mattis' Eighth Amendment claim.
B. ADA & Rehabilitation Act Claims
Next, Mattis contends he suffers from PTSD; therefore, he is a qualified individual with a mental disability under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Mattis claims Corrections Defendants discriminated against him by refusing to make reasonable accommodations for his mental disability to allow him to remain in a single cell.
The ADA prohibits discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. Specifically, the ADA prohibits the exclusion of otherwise qualified participants from any program or benefits of a public entity on account of their disability. 42 U.S.C. §12132. A disability is defined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment ...." 42 U.S.C. §12102(1). A "public entity" is "any State or local government ...." 42 U.S.C. §12131(1)(A).
In order to prevail on a claim for a violation of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he is either excluded from or otherwise denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and, (3) he was excluded from the program based solely on his disability. Kenneth S. Hantman, Inc., v. Office of Unemployment Comp. Tax Servs., 928 A.2d 448 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
Similarly, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...." 29 U.S.C. §794(a).
Under the ADA, individuals have no liability because they are not "public entities." Watson v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 990 A.2d 164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing Taylor v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 513 F.Supp.2d 540 (W.D. Pa. 2007)). Likewise, under the Rehabilitation Act, individuals have no liability because they do not receive federal assistance. Id. Although there is no dispute that DOC is a public entity within the meaning of the ADA, the individual Corrections Defendants are not. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Mattis' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the individual Corrections Defendants.
As for Mattis' claims against DOC, Mattis did not allege facts sufficient to create a violation of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. First, Mattis did not sufficiently allege he has a qualifying disability. Although Mattis alleged he suffers from PTSD, he did not allege he was medically diagnosed with this disorder or that his impairment qualifies him for disability status under the ADA. See Sherback v. Wright Autom. Grp., 987 F.Supp. 433 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (providing PTSD is a psychiatric impairment which may qualify for disability status under the ADA if the impairment substantially limits a person's major life activities). Second, Mattis did not allege he was qualified for any services or programs. In fact, prisoners have no "right to be housed in a particular facility or in a particular area within a facility." 37 Pa. Code §93.11. Third, Mattis did not aver DOC discriminated against him or denied him any services or programs based on his alleged disability, nor did he allege any facts from which it may be inferred that he was subject to discrimination by reason of his PTSD. Consequently, he cannot maintain a cause of action against DOC under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Mattis' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.
C. Negligence Claim
Finally, Mattis contends a negligence claim can be readily discerned from his amended complaint. To the extent Corrections Defendants maintain they are immune from a negligence suit, Mattis asserts Corrections Defendants Simmons and Case are healthcare professionals and fall within the medical-professional exception to sovereign immunity. According to Mattis, these defendants had a contractual duty to care for and protect his mental, emotional, and psychological wellbeing. They breached this duty by failing to properly diagnose him or to recommend reasonable accommodations of a single cell.
On appeal, Mattis does not challenge the trial court's determination that the other individual Corrections Defendants are immune from suit.
"[T]he Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall ... enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity." 1 Pa. C.S. §2310. Sovereign immunity is waived in certain limited circumstances. 42 Pa. C.S. §8522. In essence, sovereign immunity may be overcome where the party can establish: (1) a common law or statutory cause of action under which damages could be recoverable if not for the immunity defense, and (2) the alleged negligent act falls within one of the specifically enumerated exceptions provided by the General Assembly. Id.; LaChance v. Michael Baker Corp., 869 A.2d 1054 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
To recover under a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove the following elements:
[T]he defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, the breach resulted in injury to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff suffered an actual loss or damage. Negligence is the absence of ordinary care that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the same or similar circumstances. The mere occurrence of an accident does not establish negligent conduct. Rather, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant engaged in conduct that deviated from the general standard of care expected under the circumstances, and that this deviation proximately caused actual harm.Martin v. Evans, 711 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 1998) (citations omitted).
In addition, the alleged negligent act must fall within one of the specifically enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in 42 Pa. C.S. §8522. The administrative decision to place an inmate in a double cell is not one of the enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity. See 42 Pa. C.S. §8522.
Nevertheless, Mattis argues the medical-professional exception applies to Corrections Defendants Simmons and Case. That exception provides that the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by the "[a]cts of health care employees of Commonwealth agency medical facilities or institutions or by a Commonwealth party who is a doctor, dentist, nurse or related health care personnel." 42 Pa. C.S. §8522(b)(2).
In the amended complaint, Mattis alleged Simmons and Case are healthcare professionals. However, Mattis did not specifically plead a medical negligence claim against either of these defendants. With regard to Simmons, Mattis alleged "Chief Psychologist Dr. Simmons" evaluated him in September 2012. Am. Compl. at ¶56. Dr. Simmons recommended the reinstatement of his Z-code status to accommodate his PTSD symptoms and submitted this recommendation to Personal Review Committee (PRC), which is responsible for removing his Z-code. Id. at ¶¶57, 58, 64(e). According to Mattis, Dr. Simmons said, "sometimes they follow the recommendation and sometimes they don't." Id. at ¶58. In his claims for relief, Mattis asserted a negligence claim against Simmons for "improperly and/or misdiagnos[ing]" his PTSD. Id. at ¶73. However, he does not allege any facts that could arguably support this claim. Indeed, he makes no allegation regarding any diagnosis given or how Simmons deviated from an acceptable professional standard. According to Mattis' own averments, Simmons recommended single-cell housing.
Corrections Defendants argue none of the individual defendants are healthcare professionals. Appellees' Br. at 11. However, in their preliminary objections to Mattis' amended complaint, they identify Simmons as a "Licensed Psychologist Manager." Prelim. Obj. to Am. Compl. at ¶3. To the extent Mattis' amended complaint involved a professional negligence claim against Simmons, Mattis filed a certificate of merit, as required by Pa. R.C.P. No. 1042.3, certifying expert testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is unnecessary for prosecution of the claim against Simmons. See Certified Record, Item No. 42, Certificate of Merit. However, he did not file a certificate of merit for his alleged claim against Case. --------
As for Case, Mattis alleged Case is a psychologist assigned to the housing unit. Id. at ¶¶8, 49. In his claims for relief, Mattis did not assert a claim of negligence against Case. See id. at ¶¶69-74. Even if he did, Mattis did not plead any facts that would arguably support such a claim. Mattis merely alleged he met with Case in August 2012, and Mattis advised him he suffers from PTSD and prefers a single-occupant cell to accommodate his symptoms. Id. at ¶¶49, 50. Mattis did not allege how Case breached any duty owed. We conclude the trial court properly dismissed Mattis' negligence claims.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, we conclude the trial court properly sustained Corrections Defendants' demurrers. Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of May, 2014, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th Judicial District of Pennsylvania (Forest County Branch) is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge