Opinion
Case No. 00-CV-71140-DT.
June 6, 2000.
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 (b)(2). The parties have responded and replied. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. Local R. 7.1(e)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the motion be resolved on the briefs submitted. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.
II. DISCUSSION
While visiting Walt Disney World Theme Park in Florida on May 6, 1997 as a business invitee, plaintiff, a Michigan resident, was injured during a shuttle ride due to the negligent handling of the shuttle. The question presented is whether the defendant may be hailed into a Michigan court to answer for a Florida tort under current legal principles. The Court concludes it cannot and dismisses for the following reasons.
The Due Process clause permits a Court to exercise both general and limited jurisdiction. "In analyzing the due process limits of personal jurisdiction, a distinction is made between `general' jurisdiction and `specific' jurisdiction." Conti v. Pneumatic Prod. Corp., 977 F.2d 978, 981 (6th Cir. 1992). "General jurisdiction exists when a defendant has `continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state sufficient to justify the state's exercise of judicial power with respect to any and all claims.'" Aristech Chem. Int'l, Ltd. v. Acrylic Fabricators, 138 F.3d 624, 627 (6th Cir. 1998). By contrast, "[s]pecific jurisdiction . . . subjects the defendant to suit in the forum state only on claims that `arise out of or relate to' a defendant's contacts with the forum" Id.
First, it is beyond contravention that the requirements for general jurisdiction as set out in M.C.L.A. § 600.711 have not been satisfied because the tortious act was allegedly committed in Florida, causing injury to plaintiff in Florida.
Therefore, the only basis for the Court to have personal jurisdiction over defendant is under specific jurisdiction as set out in M.C.L.A. § 600.715. Plaintiff's complaint alleges jurisdiction over defendant as a foreign corporation doing business at a Disney Store located in Ann Arbor, Michigan and widely advertising to Michigan residents. Defendant's proofs demonstrate that any business conducted in Ann Arbor by way of Disney Store is conducted by another corporation, the Disney Store, Inc., a California corporation, which is a separate and distinct corporate entity from defendant, a Delaware Corporation. The Court finds that contacts of one corporation in this jurisdiction may not be imputed to another, even if it is a subsidiary of a parent. See Kurth v. Walt Disney World Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15542 (W.D. Mich. October 3, 1995).
Plaintiff also contends that limited personal jurisdiction over defendant is acquired by its sale of Magic Kingdom Club Gold cards, the use of an "800" number, and placement of promotional displays and advertising in Michigan. Plaintiff argues that the marketing efforts of Walt Disney World and the use of a phone number for placing reservations is sufficient minimum contacts.
Defendant argues that the marketing and advertising conducted in Michigan are conducted by other corporate entities, namely The Magic Kingdom, Inc., Walt Disney Attractions, L.L.C., and Vista Advertising. Defendant argues that these corporate entities are separate and distinct corporations over which defendant has no control. Further, defendant asserts that these minimum contacts are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
In Kurth v. Walt Disney World Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15542 (W.D. Mich. October 3, 1995), the district decided this same issue involving the same defendant and similar facts. There the district court found that "the defendant's alleged tortious activities are not so substantially connected with the state of Michigan that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it would be `reasonable.'" Id. See also, Oney v. Jungle Rags, Inc., docket no. 95-cv-73410 (E.D. Mich. April 22, 1996) (finding no personal jurisdiction over Walt Disney World Co. in a patent infringement action).
The Court agrees with the sound reasoning set forth in Kurth and Oney. In this case, no minimum contacts have been demonstrated or has any proofs shown some act by which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Michigan, thus invoking the benefits and protections of Michigan law. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). Finally, as defendant points out, numerous courts faced with identical tort lawsuits occurring at Walt Disney World Co. in Florida involving vacationing plaintiffs from foreign states who begin lawsuits in their home states have concluded the defendant does not have the requisite minimum state contacts to satisfy due process. Therefore, the Court does not find from plaintiff's complaint and responsive brief that Walt Disney World Co. has taken any actions in Michigan.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reason stated above, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.