Opinion
Index No. 151444/2023
06-24-2024
Jeffrey Matthews, Plaintiff, v. Staten Island University Hospital and Northwell Health, Inc., Defendants.
Plaintiff is represented by: Christina Martinez Esq. Defendants Staten Island University Hospital & Northwell Health, Inc.: Jacqueline Phipps Polito Esq. Littler Mendelson, PC
Unpublished Opinion
Plaintiff is represented by:
Christina Martinez Esq.
Defendants Staten Island University Hospital & Northwell Health, Inc.:
Jacqueline Phipps Polito Esq.
Littler Mendelson, PC
Catherine M. DiDomenico, J.
Recitation as required by CPLR §2219(a) of the papers considered in the review of Motion Sequence Number 001.
Document Numbered
Plaintiff's Summons and Complaint
1
Notice of Motion to Dismiss by Defendants (001)
2
Opposition to 001 by Plaintiff
3
Defendants' Reply
4
Transcript of Oral Argument dated 1/11/23
5
Supplemental Memo of Law by Plaintiff
6
Supplemental Memo of Law by Defendant
7
Stipulation withdrawing Causes of Action
8
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision and Order is as follows:
Procedural & Factual History
Plaintiff commenced the present action with the filing of a Summons and Verified Complaint on August 3, 2023. Therein, Plaintiff asserts eight causes of action relating to the termination of his employment by Defendant Staten Island University Hospital ("SIUH") for failing to become vaccinated against the COVID-19 virus. In sum and substance, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the New York State and City Human Rights Laws by failing to provide him with a "reasonable accommodation," and for failing to engage in a "cooperative dialogue" before determining if such a reasonable accommodation existed.
Prior to commencing this lawsuit, Plaintiff filed a union grievance against Defendants and invoked his right to compel arbitration. Pursuant to his union's collective bargaining agreement, an arbitration hearing was commenced on June 14, 2022. All participants were represented by counsel, presented evidence, and offered legal argument in support of their positions. After the conclusion of the hearing both sides filed post-hearing briefs. Plaintiff elected not to testify at the hearing, but arguments were made on his behalf by his union counsel. As stated by the Arbitrator, the issue to be decided at the hearing was "did the hospital have cause to terminate the employment of Jeffrey Matthews on October 1, 2021, and if not, what shall be the remedy." On October 18, 2022, the Arbitrator issued his Opinion and Award wherein he made extensive factual findings followed by a conclusion that the hospital "had cause" to determine that Plaintiff could not remain employed while unvaccinated but should not have terminated his employment. Rather, the Arbitrator found that Defendants should have placed him on a "leave of absence" until he was vaccinated, or the issue otherwise resolved. Notably, Plaintiff was reinstated to his position on or about November 15, 2023, shortly after the Healthcare Worker Mandate that required vaccination was repealed.
On or about September 29, 2023, Defendants filed a motion (Seq. No. 001) seeking an Order dismissing the present lawsuit for the failure to state a viable cause of action pursuant to CPLR §§3211(a)(7), 3211(a)(5), and 3211(a)(1). Plaintiff filed written opposition to the motion and Defendants replied. Oral argument of the motion was held on January 11, 2023. During oral argument the Court requested supplemental memoranda of law from both parties in relation to the specific issues of collateral estoppel and "issue preclusion" raised by Defendants. The parties further agreed to prepare a written stipulation withdrawing certain causes of action. Both parties filed their supplemental memoranda on February 16, 2024. The parties also filed a Stipulation withdrawing the fourth and fifth causes of action raised in Plaintiff's Complaint and converting the sixth, seventh and eighth causes of action into requests for special damages related to causes of action one through three. The present motion was submitted for decision upon receipt of the January 11th transcript and the supplemental briefing.
Breach of Contract and "Violation of the NYS Constitution."
Request for Counsel Fees, Request for Punitive Damages and Cause of Action for Emotional Pain and Suffering.
Applicable Law
When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), the Court must generally accept the facts alleged in a complaint as true and accord the plaintiff every possible favorable inference. See Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie, 28 N.Y.3d 316 (2016); see also Leon v Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83 (1994). However, conclusory allegations or bare legal assertions without factual specificity are insufficient and will not survive a motion to dismiss. See Feldman v. Nassau Life Ins. Co., 224 A.D.3d 801 (2d Dept. 2024). Dismissal is warranted if a plaintiff fails to assert facts in support of an element of his or her claim, or if the factual allegations and inferences to be drawn from them do not allow for an enforceable right of recovery. See Pinnacle Cap., LLC v. O'Bleanis, 214 A.D.3d 913 (2d Dept. 2023); see also Connaughton v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 29 N.Y.3d 137 (2017).
A motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(1) requires a moving defendant to provide documentary evidence that "utterly refutes the plaintiff's factual allegations" or "conclusively establishes a defense as a matter of law." See Parapi v. 470 W.23 Assoc., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 03056 (2d Dept. 2024); see also 7 Mansion, LLC v. Calvano, 226 A.D.3d 730 (2d Dept. 2024). The moving defendant bears the burden of offering sufficient documentary evidence, and that evidence must be of undisputed authenticity, such as records from judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. See J.PMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Klien, 179 A.D.3d 788 (2d Dept. 2019).
Finally, a motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(5) allows a moving party to seek dismissal on the ground that a cause of action alleged in the complaint may not be maintained due to the effect of a prior arbitration proceeding, award, or release. See Huli Ma. V. Hui Chen, 221 A.D.3d 869 (2d Dept. 2023). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party is precluded from relitigating an issue which has previously been decided against him in a prior proceeding where he or she had a full and fair opportunity to litigate such issue. See Nachum v. Ezagui, 83 A.D.3d 1017 (2d Dept. 2011). Collateral estoppel is also applicable to parties in privity with those who appeared in the prior proceeding. See Bringslimark v. Clarkstown, 128 A.D.2d 663 (2d Dept. 1987). Generally, a member of a union is in privity with that union when a claim is brought on his behalf. See Weisz v. Levitt, 59 A.D.2d 1002 (3d Dept. 1977); see also Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270 (1970). Preclusive effect has been given to issues resolved in prior arbitration proceedings. See Martin v. Geico Direct Ins., 31 A.D.3d 505 (2d Dept. 2006). Preclusive effect has also been given to the factual findings made by arbitrators. See In re Claim of Guimarales, 68 N.Y.2d 989 (1986).
Decision
The underlying facts of this proceeding are mostly undisputed. Moreover, most, if not all, of the material and relevant facts in this case were previously stipulated to in the prior arbitration proceeding. The few facts that were not stipulated to were addressed by the Arbitrator who made extensive factual findings before rendering his decision. It is well established law that factual issues resolved in an arbitration proceeding are given preclusive collateral estoppel effect, and thus may not be relitigated in a subsequent proceeding. See In re Claim of Ranni, 58 N.Y.2d 715 (1982); see also Coscette v. Town of Wallkill, 18 A.D.3d 657 (2d Dept. 2005); Lee v. Jones, 230, A.D.3d 435 (3d Dept. 1997). Accordingly, the factual recitation set forth herein is based upon the factual findings made by the arbitrator in the proceeding commenced by his union, on his behalf.
Plaintiff Jefferey Matthews was an employee of Defendant Staten Island University Hospital ("SIUH") for 39 years until his employment was terminated in October 2021. Plaintiff was employed as a stationary watch engineer on the overnight shift and spent most of his time in the boiler room. While he often worked alone, he also had responsibilities that required him to interact with outside contractors, and hospital staff such as "maintenance mechanics." Those mechanics would later work in patients' rooms. Plaintiff's job description also required him to work within the hospital in the event of an emergency, and his required physical examinations were conducted in the hospital.
On August 2, 2021, Defendant SIUH informed all its employees, including Plaintiff, that they were required to be vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they had an approved exemption based upon religion or disability. However, on August 16, 2021, New York State announced a "vaccine mandate" that required all healthcare workers to receive a first dose of the COVID-19 vaccine by September 27, 2021. SIHU advised its employees that unless they had an approved exemption, they would be subject to "adverse action, up to and including termination" if they did not become vaccinated.
In compliance with the NYS mandate, SIUH informed its employees about the deadlines for getting vaccinated, and how to request an exemption through their Human Resources Department. In response, Plaintiff obtained a "religious exemption form" that had to be submitted by September 3, 2021 to be considered. The exemption form indicated that if the request was denied, the employee would have to become fully vaccinated. Plaintiff submitted the form on September 22, 2021, requesting a religious exemption. Defendant SIUH responded to his request on September 29, 2021, and informed him that his request was denied "because it would create an undue hardship for the hospital." Plaintiff was subsequently advised that he would have to become vaccinated by October 1, 2021, or he would be terminated. When Plaintiff failed to become vaccinated, his employment was terminated by email dated October 4, 2021.
After considering the facts above and applying them to the applicable law and the Union's collective bargaining agreement, the Arbitrator made additional pertinent factual findings. First, he found that Plaintiff was an employee covered by the NYS mandate because he "could potentially expose other covered personnel, patients or residents to the disease." Next, he found that Plaintiff's late submission of the exemption form initially prohibited SIUH from having a meaningful "cooperative dialogue" before the vaccination deadline, but that Plaintiff (through his union) engaged in discussions regarding possible accommodations during the grievance process. Finally, the Arbitrator found that SIUH's determination that there was no "alternative arrangement" that would allow him to continue working while unvaccinated was a "reasonable determination under the circumstances" and that the suggestions made by Plaintiff would have created an "undue burden" on the hospital. In conclusion, the Arbitrator issued an Opinion and Award finding that SIUH was correct in its determination that Plaintiff could not remain employed while unvaccinated, but that he should not have been terminated, and rather should have been placed on a leave of absence.
In support of this motion to dismiss, Defendants rely upon the factual findings detailed above and argue that Plaintiff is constrained by these facts and should be precluded from relitigating them in this proceeding. Defendants further argue that when these factual findings are applied to the elements of Plaintiff's Human Rights Law claims, those claims must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(5). In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the causes of action raised in this case are distinct from those litigated in the arbitration proceeding and therefore, there can be no preclusive effect. Plaintiff notes that the Union attempted to raise the Human Rights Law claims at arbitration but was prevented from doing so. The Arbitrator specifically found that those statutory claims were "not an issue properly before the Arbitrator but may be one that can be addressed in another venue." Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Union's collective bargaining agreement with Defendant specifically excludes discrimination issues from being arbitrated. Therefore, Plaintiff claims this Court is the only venue available for these claims.
This Court agrees that Plaintiff did not have the opportunity to litigate his Human Rights Claims during arbitration and may do so here. However, this does not end the Court's analysis. The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue of fact or law raised in a prior proceeding and decided against that party, or those in privity, regardless of whether the tribunals or causes of action are the same. See Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494 (1984); see also Broder v. Pallotta & Assoc. Dev., Inc., 186 A.D.3d 1189 (2d Dept. 2020). The doctrine is applicable to a prior arbitration award with the same effect as it would apply to a prior judgment of a court. See Matter of Enigbonjaye v. NYS Justice Ctr. For People with Special Needs, 224 A.D.3d 752 (2d Dept. 2024). Factual issues decided in a quasi-judicial proceeding are given collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent proceeding and cannot be relitigated. See Mahler v. Campagna, 60 A.D.3d 1009 (2d Dept. 2009). Collateral estoppel is a "flexible doctrine" requiring a "practical inquiry into the realities of the prior litigation" to determine if the party, or those in privity with that party, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the initial proceeding. See Lennon v. 56th and Park (NY) Owner, LLC., 199 A.D.3d 64 (2d Dept. 2021). Once a party invoking the doctrine satisfies his or her burden to show that the relevant facts or issues were resolved in the prior proceeding, the burden shifts to the party opposing the doctrine to demonstrate the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination. See Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d 295 (2001).
To successfully plead a violation of the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") a terminated plaintiff must set forth factual allegations sufficient to establish that if he or she were afforded a reasonable accommodation, which would not impose an undue hardship on the business, the employee could perform the essential functions of his or her job. See Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.P.A., 22 N.Y.3d 881 (2013); see also Brouillard v. Sunrun, Inc., 219 A.D.3d 560 (2d Dept. 2023). The New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL") provides more protection to employees as it shifts the burden to the employer to prove that the employee could not, with reasonable accommodation, satisfy the essential requisites of the job. See NYC Admin. Code §8-107(28)(a)(1); see also Goolsby v. City of New York, 207 N.Y.S. 3d 874 (Sup. Ct. NY Cty. 2024). While the New York City statute primarily applies to workers with "disabilities," it has also been applied to requests for religious accommodations. See Matter of Marsteller v. City of New York, 217 A.D.3d 543 (1st Dept. 2023). Moreover, under both the State and City Human Rights Laws, the unavailability of a reasonable accommodation cannot be found absent a "cooperative dialogue" or "interactive process" between employer and employee. See Gordon v. Consolidated Edison Inc., 190 A.D.3d 639 (1st Dept. 2021); see also Matter of Lynch v. Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of NY, 221 A.D.3d 456 (1st Dept. 2023); Jacobsen v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 97 A.D.3d 428 (1st Dept. 2012).
In his Verified Complaint, Plaintiff asserts both New York State and City Human Rights claims, arguing that he could have performed the essential functions of his job if he were afforded a reasonable accommodation. He further argues that SIHU's determination that the accommodations he suggested would have created an undue hardship was incorrectly made as he was not afforded the opportunity to engage in a cooperative dialogue regarding the issue. However, as correctly argued by Defendants, these are the exact same factual issues raised, addressed, and decided during the arbitration proceeding, and those factual findings are entitled to preclusive effect. See Bernard v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 87 A.D.3d 412 (1st Dept. 2011). So, while the specific causes of action now asserted were not resolved during arbitration, the relevant facts were determined. Specifically, the Arbitrator found that (1) there was no reasonable accommodation available to keep Plaintiff employed while unvaccinated; (2) that the suggestions proffered by Plaintiff's union were unduly burdensome to the hospital; (3) that Plaintiff precluded the ability of SIHU to engage in a cooperative dialogue by submitting his exemption application far beyond submission deadline; and (4) that a cooperative dialogue occurred in any event, and Plaintiff was afforded due process, as his suggested accommodations were negotiated during the union grievance process.
The factual findings of the Arbitrator are binding on this Court. See In re Claim of Ranni, 58 N.Y.2d 715 (1982). Plaintiff was in privity with his union, invoked his right to arbitration, appeared by counsel, offered evidence, and elected not to testify. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant facts and thereby avoid the preclusive effect of an adverse determination. See Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d 343 (1999); see also Matter of Ottavino Prop. Corp. v. Incorporated Vil. of Westbury, 203 A.D.3d 920 (2d Dept. 2022). Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to the extent that the factual findings of the Arbitrator cannot be relitigated in this proceeding. See Gregg v. Lan Zhen Chen, 220 A.D.3d 697 (2d Dept. 2023). Relying upon those factual findings and applying them to the elements of the State and City Human Rights Law causes of action, this Court finds that those claims must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR §§3211(a)(1) and (a)(5). See Burdick Assoc. Owners Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 166 A.D.2d 402 (2d Dept. 1990). Accordingly, motion sequence number 001 is hereby granted, and all claims raised in Plaintiff's Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.