"A property settlement agreement between a husband and wife is `within the category of contracts and is to be looked upon and enforced as an agreement, and is to be construed as other contracts as respects its interpretation, its meaning and effect." Bruce v. Bruce, 801 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1990) (quoting Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn. App. 580, 593, 148 S.W.2d 3, 11-12 (1940)). Where the MDA or property settlement is incorporated into the decree of the court, the agreement with regard to division of property does not lose its contractual nature.
We have previously held that a marital dissolution agreement "is a contract and as such generally is subject to the rules governing construction of contracts." Johnson, 37 S.W.3d at 896; see also Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn.App. 580, 148 S.W.2d 3, 11 (1940) (holding that the separation agreement was a valid and enforceable contract absent a showing of fraud or coercion). This is consistent with the Court's treatment of other agreements made respective to marriage, in which we seek to determine the rights of each spouse in the marital property and to resolve other issues, such as spousal support.
And absent a legal defense, it must be enforced as a contract. See Matthews v. Matthews, 148 S.W.2d 3, 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940) (holding that, given "the entire absence of any legal grounds upon which to base a decree annulling said contract," a settlement agreement entered into as a part of a divorce must be "enforced as an agreement"). Mr. Shannon contends that Ms. Shannon "did not present any evidence at trial to show that the [MDA] that she signed [wa]s not a legally enforceable contract."
Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn. App. 580, 593, 148 S.W.2d 3, 11-12 (1940) (citations omitted).Courts are not "at liberty to annul or change or amend a contract entered into by and between parties capable of contracting simply upon the ground that the judges may be of opinion that a better agreement would or should have been arrived at."
"A property settlement agreement between a husband and wife is `within the category of contracts and is to be looked upon and enforced as an agreement, and is to be construed as other contracts as respects its interpretation, its meaning and effect.'" Bruce v. Bruce, 801 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn.App. 1990) (quoting Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn.App. 580, 593 148 S.W.2d 3, 11-12 (1940)).Rowan v. Rowan, No. M2003-01668-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 195117, at *5 (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan. 27, 2005).
Being such the courts are restrained from disregarding it and annulling it. And when such contract is submitted to a court of equity for interpretation and enforcement, it must be construed by the rules of interpretation and remedies to be applied as any other contract.Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn. App. 580, 593, 148 S.W.2d 3, 11-12 (1940) (citations omitted). Courts are not "at liberty to annul or change or amend a contract entered into by and between parties capable of contracting simply upon the ground that the judges may be of opinion that a better agreement would or should have been arrived at."
The trust agreement, under Minnesota law, was presumptively valid and under that law the burden of proving invalidity for fraud, duress, or coercion was upon Mrs. Warner. See Berg et al. v. Berg, 201 Minn. 179, 275 N.W. 836; Bentson v. Ellenstein, 215 Minn. 376, 10 N.W.2d 282; Cf. Daniels v. Benedict, 8 Cir., 97 F. 367; Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn. App. 580, 148 S.W.2d 3. As a general rule the law of the place of contracting determines whether the contract is void or voidable for fraud or duress. If that law makes the contract binding, it is still open to the law of the place of performance to prohibit performance or to excuse nonperformance on account of illegality of performance by its laws. The act of creating a living trust โ and a trust created inter vivos is called a living trust โ is the transaction of changing the title of the trust res from the settlor to the trustee.
See Bruce v. Bruce, 801 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) ("A property settlement agreement between a husband and wife is `within the category of contracts and is to be looked upon and enforced as an agreement, and is to be construed as other contracts as respects its interpretation, its meaning and effect.'") (quoting Matthews v. Matthews, 148 S.W.2d 3, 11-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940)). The requirements set forth in paragraph 3 of the Marital Dissolution Agreement and Divorce Decree are clear that the Defendant's obligation to the Plaintiff was to "be responsible for the debt owing on the home [at 935 Jennings Creek Road, Greeneville, Tennessee] to Andrew Johnson Bank that was undertaken to buy and or operate Shilo Market, specifically . . . to pay the monthly payment of $593.25 each month that is owed to Andrew Johnson Bank to purchase/operate Shilo Market."
When the wife employs an attorney and, through him, deals with her husband as an adversary, the confidential relationship between husband and wife no longer exists, 17A Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation 898 (1957); 42 C.J.S., Husband and Wife 593b (1944); and no presumption arises that the husband has exercised a dominant influence over the wife during such negotiations. The presence of able counsel for the wife at the conferences resulting in a separation agreement, and at the time she executes and acknowledges a deed of separation, "negatives the inference or contention that she was incompetent to understand the arrangement, and was ignorant of its terms and did not know what she was doing," Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn. App. 580, 592, 148 S.W.2d 3, 11; accord, Rendlen v. Rendlen, Mo., 367 S.W.2d 596; See Hughes v. Leonard, 66 Colo. 500, 181 P. 200; Sande v. Sande, 83 Idaho 233, 360 P.2d 998; 1 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment 13.21 (2d Ed., 1945). "The courts will subject the wife's claim of fraud, duress, or undue influence to a far more searching scrutiny where she was represented by counsel in the making of the agreement and throughout the negotiations leading up to its execution." Lindey, Separation Agreements 28.IX (1937 Ed.).
They appear to be based on the early common law conception that a wife was so completely under the dominance of her husband that it was impossible for her to freely and voluntarily contract with him. More recent cases hold that there is no presumption that separation agreements are fraudulent, and that one who asserts the invalidity of such agreement has the burden of proving that it is tainted by fraud, duress or overreaching. Matthews v. Matthews, 24 Tenn. App. 580, 148 S.W.2d 3; In re Bubb's Estate, 53 Wn.2d 131, 331 P.2d 859; Rinehart v. Rinehart, 52 Wyo. 363, 75 P.2d 390. Kearley v. Hunter, 154 Fla. 81, 16 So.2d 728, 152 A.L.R. 185; Hughes v. Leonard, 66 Colo. 500, 181 P. 200, 5 A.L.R. 817; Hoch v. Hoch, 187 Kan. 730, 359 P.2d 839.