Opinion
5:24-CV-00008-MTT-TQL
04-04-2024
GLEN SPEARING MATTHEWS, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT R LONG, et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS Q. LANGSTAFF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Presently pending before the Court are the claims of pro se Plaintiff Glen Spearing Matthews, an inmate currently incarcerated in the Victorville Medium II Federal Correctional Institution in Adelanto, California. Plaintiff appears to seek relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1971).In accordance with the Court's prior orders requiring the same, Plaintiff has also paid the required initial partial filing fee. His motion for an extension of time to pay this fee (ECF No. 12) is thus found to be moot.
Plaintiff names a probation officer, prosecutor, and defense counsel associated with his federal criminal case as Defendants in this lawsuit, and he also sues Bibb County, Georgia. As noted below, § 1983 provides a cause of action against a state actor who has violated a person's federally-protected rights. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). A Bivens claim, on the other hand, is the judicially-created counterpart to a § 1983 action which provides a cause of action for monetary damages against a federal actor for the violation of federally-protected rights. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006) (“[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
Plaintiff's claims are now ripe for preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1915(e). Having conducted such review, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff's pending motion for appointed counsel (ECF No. 13) is DENIED.
PRELIMINARY SCREENING
I. Standard of Review
In accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the district courts are obligated to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding IFP. Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. When conducting preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) abrogated in part on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are “held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot “merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
II. Factual Allegations and Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff's claims arise from his present incarceration. Compl. 6, ECF No. 1. As will be discussed in more detail below, the crux of Plaintiff's claims appears to be his contention that he has “been incarcerated for well over 20 years which is beyond the spectrum of [his] crime.” Compl. 6, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff believes his excessive sentence is the result of Defendants' fraud, negligence, discrimination, and “hate crimes,” and he thus contends Defendants violated his constitutional rights regarding his sentencing. Id. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and attorney fees, vacatur of his sentence, and appointed counsel as a result of these alleged violations. Id. at 8.
A. Motion for Appointed Counsel
Plaintiff has moved for appointment of counsel in this action (ECF No. 13). As this is Plaintiff's first request for counsel, the Court advises Plaintiff that “[a]ppointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right.” Wahl v McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1986). Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances. Id. In deciding whether legal counsel should be provided, the Court considers, among other factors, the merits of Plaintiff's claim and the complexity of the issues presented. Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 853 (11th Cir. 1989).But “[t]he key” in determining whether appointed counsel is warranted “is whether the pro se litigant needs help in presenting the essential merits of his position to the court.” Nelson v. McLaughlin, 608 Fed.Appx. 904, 905 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)
The federal in forma pauperis statute authorizes courts to “request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The statute does not, however, provide any funding to pay attorneys for their representation or authorize courts to compel attorneys to represent an indigent party in a civil case. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
In accordance with Holt, and upon a review of the record in this case, the Court notes that Plaintiff has set forth the essential merits of his claims, and the applicable legal doctrines are readily apparent. As such, Plaintiff's motion for appointed counsel in this civil action is DENIED.
B. Claims Related to Plaintiff's Sentencing
The allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint are sparse; as such, the Court has reviewed the Complaint, its attachments, and this Court's records to piece together the procedural history of this case. Plaintiff was convicted in 2001 of three counts of armed bank robbery, three counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Judgment 1, United States v. Matthews, ECF No. 49 in Case No. 5:01-cr-00018-MTT-CHW (hereinafter, “Matthews I”) (M.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2001). Plaintiff was sentenced to serve 1047 months total imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his state parole revocation. Id. at 2. The length of Plaintiff's sentence was enhanced due to the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act to his convictions. See Attach. 1 to Compl. 1, ECF No. 1-1.
In 2017, Plaintiff moved to vacate his 1047-month sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his enhanced sentence was no longer valid due to the new rule of constitutional law announced in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). See Order Granting Mot. to Vacate 1, ECF No. 191 in Matthews I (M.D. Ga. Mar, 8, 2017). The Court granted Plaintiff's motion and ordered that Plaintiff be resentenced without the armed career criminal enhancement. Id. Although Plaintiff contends “all they gave [him] was 120 months” on resentencing, Attach. 1 to Compl. 1, ECF No. 1-1, it is clear that his current unenhanced sentence is 840 months, see Attach. 2 to Compl. 5, ECF No. 1-2 (minute sheet from sentencing hearing showing 840-month sentence); Am. Judgment 2, ECF No. 196 in Matthews I (M.D. Ga. June 14, 2017) (setting forth sentence as “120 months on counts 1, 3, 5 and 7 each to be served concurrently with each other. 120 months on count 2 to be served consecutively. 300 months on counts 4 and 6 each to be served consecutively to each other and to all other counts” for a total of “840 months to be served consecutively to the state parole revocation”). Plaintiff appears to contend this sentence was improperly calculated or disproportionately long, and he has submitted a number of news articles describing sentences for other bank robberies that are shorter than the one he received. See generally Attach. 4 to Compl., ECF No. 1-4. Plaintiff also suggests that Defendants must have fraudulently entered this sentence or that they did so in a negligent or discriminatory manner. See id.
Plaintiff's claims implicate the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487. If a successful judgment on the prisoner's behalf would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner's conviction or sentence, then the prisoner's claims must be dismissed unless he “can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id.
Plaintiff's claims, which exclusively challenge the length of his confinement, necessarily imply the invalidity of his 840-month sentence. Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (successful challenge to prisoner's sentence based on his understanding that his state and federal sentences should have run concurrently “would imply the invalidity of his sentence because he is challenging the duration of his confinement”). Plaintiff's claims are therefore Heck-barred unless he can show that his conviction or sentence was previously invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Plaintiff has failed to make such a showing. Plaintiff's claims are therefore subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that prisoner's “§ 1983 damages action predicated on the sentence calculation issue is barred by Heck because success on that claim would necessarily invalidate the duration of his incarceration”); Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 208 (6th Cir. 2017) (“The Heck doctrine instructs that no matter how a § 1983 claim is couched, if its success would necessarily affect the length of a sentence, the litigant must rely on habeas relief.”); White v. U.S. Probation Office, 148 F.3d 1124, 1125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (noting that “[t]he rationale of Heck has been applied to damage claims against federal officials” in Bivens actions and holding that prisoner's claims challenging inaccuracies in presentence report that caused him to be ineligible for parole were Heck-barred because they “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his sentence”); Clemente, 120 F.3d at 705 (holding that Bivens claim based on alleged sentence miscalculation was Heck-barred until prisoner “eventually succeeds in his habeas petition challenging the computation and duration of his sentence”).
The Federal Defenders of the Middle District of Georgia, Inc., recently filed a motion to be appointed as counsel in Plaintiff's criminal case for the purpose of pursuing a motion for sentence reduction due to Plaintiff's age, medical condition, and “unusually long” sentence. Mot. Appoint Counsel 3, ECF No. 291 in Matthews I (M.D. Ga. Dec. 27, 2023). The Court granted this motion. Text-Only Order, ECF No. 292 in Matthews I (M.D. Ga. Dec. 28, 2023).
III. Conclusion
In sum, Plaintiff's allegations, as currently pleaded, are Heck-barred and thus fail to state a claim upon which relief may granted. As such, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to pay the initial partial filing fee (ECF No. 12) is found to be moot, and his motion for appointed counsel (ECF No. 13) is DENIED.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Marc T. Treadwell, Chief United States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.