Matter Riley v. Aircraft Prods

22 Citing cases

  1. Allen v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.

    222 A.D.3d 1134 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)

    In this regard, claimant asserts that her treating physician's August 2, 2019 request to authorize surgery on her right ankle constituted a reopening of the case. In its decision, the Board agreed that such a request may constitute an "informal" reopening (see generallyMatter of Riley v. Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 370, 386 N.Y.S.2d 838, 353 N.E.2d 801 [1976] ; Matter of Zogaria v. Quebecor World USA Inc., 125 A.D.3d 1090, 1091–1092, 4 N.Y.S.3d 321 [3d Dept. 2015] ). Nevertheless, as the Board then noted, the record reflects that the Special Fund authorized the requested surgical procedure in November 2019, which was later performed in February 2020, and that there were thereafter no outstanding related requests or payments.

  2. Claim of Rodriguez v. Greenfield Die Casting

    53 A.D.3d 728 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 7 times

    However, it also concluded, based on the record, that this objection was only filed by the carrier after it had "paid for the claimant's medical treatment since the date of [the] accident of September 26, 1998." Contrary to the position taken by the Special Fund, such payments constitute an informal "opening" of the claim ( see Matter of Riley v Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 NY2d 366, 370; Matter of Gallahan v Papec Mach. Co., 288 NY 726, 726-727 [1942]; Matter of Loiacono v Sears, Roebuck Co., 230 AD2d 351, 353). If, after a case has been opened, it is subsequently closed, and the statutory time limits contained in Workers' Compensation Law § 25-a have passed before a new claim for compensation is made, liability may be properly transferred to the Special Fund ( see Matter of Washburn v Bob Hooey Constr. Co., 39 AD3d 956, 957; Matter of Granberry v JCCA Edenwald, Inc., 33 AD3d at 1103).

  3. Loiacono v. Sears, Roebuck

    230 A.D.2d 351 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)   Cited 18 times

    Workers' Compensation Law § 25-a (1) provides, in pertinent part, that: "when an application for compensation is made by an employee * * * and the employer has secured the payment of compensation * * * (2) after a lapse of seven years from the date of the injury * * * and also a lapse of three years from the date of the last payment of compensation * * * if an award is made it shall be against the special fund". The object of this provision is to shift the liability for paying stale claims to the Fund ( see, Matter of Riley v Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 367). While liability is imposed upon the Fund where a case is closed and subsequently reopened by fresh application, the statute does not require a "formal `opening' in the form of a filing of a formal claim to the Work[ers'] Compensation Board" ( supra, at 370). Rather, a case may be "opened" by voluntary advance payments of compensation which, in effect, constitute an informal award ( see, supra).

  4. Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. State

    2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 7385 (N.Y. 2017)   Cited 68 times   2 Legal Analyses

    Before the Fund's closure in 2014, benefits on a reopened case would be paid by the Fund under the following conditions. First, the case must have been previously "closed" either formally or informally, i.e., "no further proceedings were foreseen" (Matter of Casey v. Hinkle Iron Works, 299 N.Y. 382, 385, 87 N.E.2d 419 [1949] ; see Matter of Riley v. Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 370, 386 N.Y.S.2d 838, 353 N.E.2d 801 [1976] ). Second, the case must have reopened, which often occurred due to an unanticipated change in the claimant's medical condition.

  5. Matter of Collins v. Aluminum Company of America

    44 N.Y.2d 692 (N.Y. 1978)   Cited 5 times

    The October 18, 1965 entry in a hospital record, relied on by the employer, does not reveal the source of the information or that knowledge was imparted to or possessed by Collins. The testimony and report of an expert consultant on dust diseases furnished substantial evidence in support of the board's determination as to the cause of death (see Matter of Ernest v Boggs Lake Estates, 12 N.Y.2d 414, 416). It having been determined that the employee's claim was filed in compliance with section 44-a and thus was not "stale", since a time lapse as specified in subdivision 1 of section 25-a of the Workmen's Compensation Law did not ensue, and it being conceded that there was no advance payment of compensation, there is no predicate to shift liability to the Fund for Reopened Cases under section 25-a (Workmen's Compensation Law, § 25-a, subd 1; see Matter of Riley v Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 369-370; Matter of Casey v Hinkle Iron Works, 299 N.Y. 382). Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur in memorandum.

  6. Zogaria v. Quebecor World USA Inc.

    2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 1224 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)

    Here, the Board concluded that the case was closed following the schedule use award in 2006 . In response to the Special Fund's argument that the request by claimant's physician for authorization of surgery constituted an "informal reopening" of the case (see generally Matter of Riley v Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 NY2d 366, 370-371 [1976]), the Board determined that the case was informally closed again when the carrier authorized surgery in February 2012. As in Rathbun, claimant remained medically cleared for full-duty work at the time of the February 2012 authorization of surgery, and did not seek compensation for lost time. Inasmuch as there is no evidence that other issues remained outstanding after surgery was authorized, and "all that remained to be resolved was whether claimant herself would decide to undergo this surgical procedure" (Matter of Rathbun v D'Ella Pontiac Buick GMC, Inc., 61 AD3d at 1295), substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that the case was truly closed in February 2012 (see id. at 1294-1295; see also Matter of Porter v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 113 AD3d at 988-989; Matter of Palermo v Primo Coat Corp., 88 AD3d at 1042-1043).

  7. Zogaria v. Quebecor World U.S. Inc.

    125 A.D.3d 1090 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)   Cited 3 times

    Here, the Board concluded that the case was closed following the schedule use award in 2006. In response to the Special Fund's argument that the request by claimant's physician for authorization of surgery constituted an “informal reopening” of the case ( see generally Matter of Riley v. Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 370–371, 386 N.Y.S.2d 838, 353 N.E.2d 801 [1976] ), the Board determined that the case was informally closed again when the carrier authorized surgery in February 2012. As in Rathbun, claimant remained medically cleared for full-duty work at the time of the February 2012 authorization of surgery, and did not seek compensation for lost time. Inasmuch as there is no evidence that other issues remained outstanding after surgery was authorized, and “all that remained to be resolved was whether claimant herself would decide to undergo this surgical procedure” ( Matter of Rathbun v. D'Ella Pontiac Buick GMC, Inc., 61 A.D.3d at 1295, 878 N.Y.S.2d 480), substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that the case was truly closed in February 2012 ( see id. at 1294–1295, 878 N.Y.S.2d 480; see also Matter of Porter v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 113 A.D.3d at 988–989, 979 N.Y.S.2d 199; Matter of Palermo v. Primo Coat Corp., 88 A.D.3d at 1042–1043, 930 N.Y.S.2d 109).

  8. Wetterau v. Canada Dry

    2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)

    Workers' Compensation Law § 25-a (1) provides, in relevant part, that "when an application for compensation is made by an employee . . . after a lapse of seven years from the date of the injury . . . and also a lapse of three years from the date of the last payment of compensation, . . . if an award is made it shall be against the special fund" (see Matter of Ercole v New York State Police, 118 AD3d 1211, 1211-1212 [2014]; Matter of Thurston v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 115 AD3d 1143, 1144 [2014]). "The purpose of [the statute] is to save employers and insurance carriers from liability . . . for stale claims of injured employees" (Matter of Riley v Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 NY2d 366, 369 [1976] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Here, the 1999 claim was reopened in 2012, approximately 13 years after the December 3, 1999 injury and 12 years after the September 27, 2000 closing of the case.

  9. Wetterau v. Canada Dry

    124 A.D.3d 1165 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    --------Workers' Compensation Law § 25–a (1) provides, in relevant part, that “when an application for compensation is made by an employee ... after a lapse of seven years from the date of the injury ... and also a lapse of three years from the date of the last payment of compensation, ... if an award is made it shall be against the special fund” (see Matter of Ercole v. New York State Police, 118 A.D.3d 1211, 1211–1212, 988 N.Y.S.2d 288 [2014] ; Matter of Thurston v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 115 A.D.3d 1143, 1144, 983 N.Y.S.2d 134 [2014] ). “The purpose of [the statute] is to save employers and insurance carriers from liability ... for stale claims of injured employees” (Matter of Riley v. Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 369, 386 N.Y.S.2d 838, 353 N.E.2d 801 [1976] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). Here, the 1999 claim was reopened in 2012, approximately 13 years after the December 3, 1999 injury and 12 years after the September 27, 2000 closing of the case.

  10. Ercole v. N.Y. State Police

    118 A.D.3d 1211 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 4 times

    We nevertheless agree with the Board's present interpretation thereof. “The purpose of [Workers' Compensation Law § ] 25–a is to save employers and insurance carriers from liability ... for stale claims of injured employees” (Matter of Riley v. Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 369, 386 N.Y.S.2d 838, 353 N.E.2d 801 [1976] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Fitzgerald v. Berkshire Farm Ctr. & Servs. for Youth, 87 A.D.3d at 354–355, 927 N.Y.S.2d 176).Workers' Compensation Law § 25–a (1) furthers that purpose by requiring that any award “ shall be [made] against the [S]pecial [F]und” if the requisite time periods have elapsed (emphasis added). As both the language and purpose of the statute demonstrate, the carrier “has no further interest in [the] payment of the claim” once liability has shifted to the Special Fund (Matter of De Mayo v. Rensselaer Polytech Inst., 74 N.Y.2d 459, 462, 548 N.Y.S.2d 630, 547 N.E.2d 1157 [1989];accord Matter of Fitzgerald v. Berkshire Farm Ctr. & Servs. for Youth, 87 A.D.3d at 355, 927 N.Y.S.2d 176;see Matter of Castro v. New York City Tr. Auth., 50 A.D.3d 1272, 1273, 855 N.Y.S.2d 711 [2008] ), and “the Board ha[s] no power to direct that the award be paid by the [carrier] instead of out of the [S]pecial [F]und” under those circumstances (Ma