Opinion
March 23, 1987
Appeal from the Surrogate's Court, Kings County (Bloom, S.).
Ordered that the orders are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Surrogate failed to set forth essential findings of fact as required by CPLR 4213 (b) and SCPA 102 (see, Baratta v. Baratta, 102 A.D.2d 838). However, the record is sufficiently complete to permit intelligent appellate review, and thus, this court will make the requisite findings of fact in the interests of judicial economy and avoiding unnecessary future litigation (Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. v. George C., 78 A.D.2d 541; Motorola Communications Elecs. v. National Equip. Rental, 74 A.D.2d 564).
The appellant was convicted of murdering his 23-year-old pregnant wife and sentenced to a term of 25 years to life imprisonment, which judgment was affirmed by this court (People v. Drelich, 123 A.D.2d 441). At the time of the killing on April 14, 1979, their son Shraig was approximately three years old, and their son Elliot was approximately one year old. The appellant also murdered his business partner, for which he was also convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life, which sentence was consecutive to that imposed on the conviction for the murder of his wife. This judgment was also affirmed (People v. Drelich, 109 A.D.2d 1107, lv denied 65 N.Y.2d 694). As a result of the appellant's lengthy period of incarceration it will be impossible for him to ever develop a meaningful relationship with his children (see, Matter of Joseph LL., 97 A.D.2d 263, 265-266, affd 63 N.Y.2d 1014; Matter of Anonymous, 104 Misc.2d 985, 992; Matter of Ginnan, 101 Misc.2d 853, 861).
Moreover, we find that the petitioners, the maternal grandparents who have had custody of the children, continuously since May 25, 1979, shortly after their mother's murder, have provided them with a loving and caring home, and have adequate means to support them. Under the circumstances, therefore, it is apparent that adoption is in the children's best interest (see, Matter of Joseph LL., supra, at 267; Matter of Ginnan, supra, at 861). Finally, it is clear that under the facts of this case, the Surrogate's dispensing with the appellant's consent to these adoptions pursuant to former Domestic Relations Law § 111 (2) (d) (which was still in effect at the time of his ruling) did not violate the appellant's constitutional right to substantive due process (see, Matter of Joseph LL., supra, at 266-267; Matter of Eric J.B., 92 A.D.2d 917; cf., Matter of Cassandra M., 110 A.D.2d 942, 943). Brown, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Sullivan, JJ., concur.