sserts that she had been unaware that the lawyers assigned to represent the child and the father were, respectively, the Chenango County Public Defender and an Assistant Public Defender, and she contends that this constituted simultaneous representation in violation of former Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 5. The relevant provisions of the former Code were designed to prevent lawyers in the same law firm from engaging in simultaneous representation of two or more clients in the same matter without having first disclosed the potential conflict to those clients and obtained their consent ( see former 22 NYCRR 1200.24 [b], [c], [d]). Inasmuch as the mother's assigned lawyer was not from the Public Defender's office, however, her consent was not required. Nor is there anything in the record suggesting that the Law Guardian was beholden or biased in representing the child due to his assistant's representation of the father ( see Matter of Lovitch v Lovitch, 64 AD3d 710, 711-712; Matter of Wolfgang N., 179 AD2d 1090, lv denied 19 NY2d 756; compare Davis v Davis, 269 AD2d 82, 85-86). Given that the Public Defender and his assistants have separate office addresses, and that there is no showing that client information flowed freely among them, we will not presume that the child's representation was in any way inhibited or restrained ( see People v Wilkins, 28 NY2d 53, 56-57; compare Matter of Ruth TT., 283 AD2d 869, 870-871).
Here, the absence of the Law Guardian constituted a denial of the children's due process rights, and a new hearing is required (see, Matter of Karl S., supra). The Law Guardian's role is vital in the protection of the rights and interests of a child in a Family Court proceeding, and therefore her presence was necessary (see, Matter of Holland, 75 A.D.2d 1005, supra; Matter of Burns, 66 A.D.2d 740; cf., Matter of Wolfgang N., 179 A.D.2d 1090). Copertino, J.P., Pizzuto, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.