We agree with the AFC that the evidence at the hearing was insufficient to establish that the father should be relieved of that obligation based upon the mother's conduct. Visitation with the father was subject to the wishes of the daughter (see generally Hiross v Hiross, 224 AD2d 662, 663 [2d Dept 1996]; Matter of Wikoff v Whitney, 179 AD2d 924, 926 [3d Dept 1992]), and the mother and daughter both testified unequivocally that the daughter refused to have anything to do with the father by her own choice and for her own reasons (see McCloskey v McCloskey, 111 AD3d 1120, 1121-1122 [3d Dept 2013]; Matter of Crouse v Crouse, 53 AD3d 750, 752 [3d Dept 2008]). While the evidence fails to establish that the mother deliberately interfered with visitation or otherwise contributed to the breakdown in the father-daughter relationship, we conclude that Family Court nevertheless properly relieved the father of his obligation to support the daughter on the ground that the daughter, by her conduct, forfeited her right to support (see Matter of Jurgielewicz v Johnston, 114 AD3d 945, 946-947 [2d Dept 2014]; Basi v Basi, 136 AD2d 945, 946 [4th Dept 1988], lv dismissed 72 NY2d 952 [1988]).
We agree with the AFC that the evidence at the hearing was insufficient to establish that the father should be relieved of that obligation based upon the mother's conduct. Visitation with the father was subject to the wishes of the daughter (see generallyHiross v. Hiross, 224 A.D.2d 662, 663, 639 N.Y.S.2d 70 [2d Dept. 1996] ; Matter of Wikoff v. Whitney, 179 A.D.2d 924, 926, 578 N.Y.S.2d 698 [3d Dept. 1992] ), and the mother and daughter both testified unequivocally that the daughter refused to have anything to do with the father by her own choice and for her own reasons (seeMcCloskey v. McCloskey, 111 A.D.3d 1120, 1121–1122, 975 N.Y.S.2d 798 [3d Dept. 2013] ; Matter of Crouse v. Crouse, 53 A.D.3d 750, 752, 862 N.Y.S.2d 615 [3d Dept. 2008] ). While the evidence fails to establish that the mother deliberately interfered with visitation or otherwise contributed to the breakdown in the father-daughter relationship, we conclude that Family Court nevertheless properly relieved the father of his obligation to support the daughter on the ground that the daughter, by her conduct, forfeited her right to support (seeMatter of Jurgielewicz v. Johnston, 114 A.D.3d 945, 946–947, 981 N.Y.S.2d 733 [2d Dept. 2014] ; Basi v. Basi, 136 A.D.2d 945, 946, 524 N.Y.S.2d 955 [4th Dept. 1988], lv dismissed 72 N.Y.2d 952, 533 N.Y.S.2d 59, 529 N.E.2d 427 [1988] ).
rt'" ( Labanowski v Labanowski, 49 AD3d at 1053, quoting Matter of Chamberlin v Chamberlin, 240 AD2d 908, 909), "where it is the parent who causes a breakdown in communication with his [or her] child, or has made no serious effort to contact the child and exercise his [or her] visitation rights, the child will not be deemed to have abandoned the parent" ( Matter of Alice C. v Bernard G.C., 193 AD2d 97, 109; see Matter of Ogborn v Hilts, 269 AD2d 679, 680). By his own admission, at no point following the parties' divorce did the father exercise his right to visitation as provided for in the stipulation of settlement by either visiting his daughter in Florida or offering to transport her to New York ( compare Matter of Chamberlin v Chamberlin, 240 AD2d at 910). Nor can the father's sporadic telephone calls and the handful of letters he wrote to the child between 2000 and 2007 be construed as serious attempts to establish contact with his daughter ( see Radin v Radin, 209 AD 2d 396, 396; Matter of Wikoff v Whitney, 179 AD2d 924, 926). Moreover, he failed to initiate a court proceeding to enforce his visitation rights ( see Matter of Juneau v Morzillo, 56 AD3d 1082, 1086; Matter of Grouse v Crouse, 53 AD3d at 752).
Family Court granted the daughter's motion to dismiss the petition in May 2006. The father appeals from the October 2005 and May 2006 orders. The father initially argues that Family Court erred in denying his application to terminate child support upon the ground that the child had abandoned him. A child's right to support until age 21 may be forfeited if the child, having reached an employable age, "actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation, without cause" ( Matter of Chamberlin v Chamberlin, 240 AD2d 908, 909; see Labanowski v Labanowski, 4 AD3d 690, 695). A parent who agrees to a visitation provision premised solely on the desires of a child faces a difficult burden in establishing abandonment when the contact thereafter is infrequent ( see Matter of Wikoff v Whitney, 179 AD2d 924, 925-926; see also Matter of Marotta v Fariello, 207 AD2d 450, 451-452). Here, the father agreed to such a provision and, while there apparently was no planned visitation thereafter, occasional unplanned contacts occurred.
There can be little doubt that "where it is the parent who causes a breakdown in communication with his child, or has made no serious effort to contact the child and exercise his visitation rights, the child will not be deemed to have abandoned the parent" (Matter of Alice C. v. Bernard G.C., 193 A.D.2d 97, 109, supra). A review of the record in this proceeding, however, plainly reveals that respondent made repeated and meaningful attempts to mend his relationship with the child (compare, Radin v. Radin, supra [infrequent telephone calls do not constitute a serious attempt to maintain a relationship with a child]; Matter of Jaffee v. Jaffee, 202 A.D.2d 264 [no indication that noncustodial parent made any serious effort to establish and maintain relationship with child]; Matter of Wikoff v. Whitney, 179 A.D.2d 924, 926 [same]), and that the child's refusal to have anything to do with respondent goes far beyond a mere reluctance to attend visitations (compare, Radin v. Radin, supra; Matter of Jaffee v Jaffee, supra). The child, who was of employable age at the time that the modification petition was filed, consistently refused all overtures by respondent, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that there was any justification, i.e., malfeasance, misconduct, neglect or abuse, for the child's actions in this regard (see, Matter of Rubino v. Morgan, 224 A.D.2d 903, 904). Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the child's persistent rejection of respondent's repeated and meaningful attempts, made over the course of a six-year period (1989 to 1995), to mend the parent/child relationship constitutes abandonment resulting in the forfeiture of his right to support (see, id.; see also, Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. [Jones] v. Labbay, 227 A.D.2d 618, 619).
Family Court Act § 413 mandates that parents support their children until they reach the age of 21. Nevertheless, a "child's right to support and the parent's right to custody and services are reciprocal" and a parent may impose reasonable regulations ( Matter of Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188, 193). Here, when all of the daughter's actions are considered together, they constitute abandonment resulting in the forfeiture of her right to support ( see, Cohen v. Schnepf, 94 A.D.2d 783). Furthermore, the record supports the conclusion that respondent endeavored to exercise his visitation rights and maintain a good relationship with his daughter (cf., Radin v. Radin, 209 A.D.2d 396; Matter of Wikoff v Whitney, 179 A.D.2d 924). Respondent's actions and requests were not arbitrary and there was no evidence of malfeasance, misconduct or neglect ( see, Matter of Bouchard v. Bouchard, 115 A.D.2d 887). Petitioner's remaining arguments have been reviewed and rejected as unpersuasive.
In the order entered December 20, 1990, upon the parties' consent, the Family Court (Berler, J.), modified the visitation provisions of the judgment of divorce to conform with the stipulation. Under these circumstances, the father cannot now claim that the child abandoned him and therefore forfeited his right to support (see, Matter of Wikoff v. Whitney, 179 A.D.2d 924). Further, although such limitations on visitation are generally disfavored (see, Pincus v. Pincus, 138 A.D.2d 687, 688; Mahler v. Mahler, 72 A.D.2d 739), since the stipulation was entered into in the presence of the child, and at the father's suggestion, the denial of the father's motion to vacate the stipulation and the order entered thereon was not an improvident exercise of discretion.
The case of Matter of Brescia v. Fitts (supra, at 141) teaches that an upward modification may, in an appropriate instance, be based upon an increase in the child's needs, or an increased cost of living, "insofar as it results in greater expenses for the child", allegations made here by petitioner. Given that these allegations must be construed liberally (see, Matter of Greenblatt v. Van Deusen, 87 A.D.2d 713, 714) and in view of the fact that the agreement, made some 15 years ago, provides for a constant, and relatively low, level of support, we find them sufficient to raise a question of fact as to whether the child's needs are being adequately met (see, Hughes v. Serviss, 168 A.D.2d 541, 542; cf., Matter of Wikoff v. Whitney, 179 A.D.2d 924, 925). Weiss, P.J., Mikoll and Crew III, JJ., concur.
He also noted that petitioner contributed some items as well. Petitioner's claims were "largely of undocumented expense claims, many of which were merely estimates" (Matter of Bouille v. Bouille, supra, at 803) and were basically speculative, reflecting her desires, the magnitude of which, coupled with the lack of documentation, casts substantial doubt upon petitioner's credibility (see, supra; see also, Matter of Wikoff v. Whitney, 179 A.D.2d 924, 925). Petitioner was not employed at the time of the hearing but was attending college and expected to graduate in July 1992 with a Bachelor's degree in accounting. She does not have a mortgage on her home.