In re Smith, 4 Vet. App. 487, 500 (1993), vacated-in-part and remanded sub nom. In re Wick, 40 F.3d 367 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Cox then filed a motion asking the Board of Veterans' Appeals to order payment of the fee.

Id. § 7292(d)(2). Whether the Veterans Court had jurisdiction is a matter of statutory interpretation, see id. § 7252(a) (defining the Veterans Court's jurisdiction), which we review de novo, In re Wick , 40 F.3d 367, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Likewise, whether the Veterans Court applied the correct legal standard for equitable tolling is a question of law we review de novo.

This review includes questions of statutory jurisdiction. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (c) (1994); Wick v. Brown, 40 F.3d 367, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Furthermore, this court narrowly construes jurisdictional statutes.

Whether the Veterans Court properly exercised jurisdiction over Mr. Hairston's appeal "is a matter of statutory interpretation" over which we hold jurisdiction, and "which this court undertakes de novo." In re Wick, 40 F.3d 367, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Weddel v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health &Human Servs., 23 F.3d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).

The utility of obtaining a Veterans Court decision of entitlement to a fee award cannot confer jurisdiction on the Veterans Court to adjudicate these state law breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims that intervenors potentially have against their former client. See Wick v. Brown (In re Wick) , 40 F.3d 367, 370–73 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Nor does the Veterans Court have authority to render an advisory opinion on this issue.

Rather, the Veterans Court cannot entertain petitions for declaratory judgments because it "is not 'a court of the United States' within the meaning of [28 U.S.C. § 2201] and cannot derive any powers therefrom." In re Wick, 40 F.3d 367, 372 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Nagler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 297, 306 (1991)). As the court observed in Wick, the term "court of the United States" is defined by statute as any court created by Act of Congress whose judges "are entitled to hold office during good behavior."

This court reviews de novo whether the Veterans Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal. Ledford v. West, 136 F.3d 776, 778 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Wick, 40 F.3d 367, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1994). We lack jurisdiction to review factual findings of the Veterans Court relating to jurisdictional issues or to review the Veterans Court's application of its jurisdictional statutes to the facts of a particular case.

While this appeal presents nothing to this court on the merits of any claim that we are authorized to review, this court does possess jurisdiction to address the Veterans Court's lack of jurisdiction. See Wick v. Brown, 40 F.3d 367, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that where the Veterans Court lacks jurisdiction over a matter, this court has jurisdiction on appeal only for the purpose of correcting the error of jurisdiction). Accordingly, this court exercises only that jurisdiction required to correct the Veteran's Court's error of its jurisdiction and hereby vacates the portion of the Veterans Court's opinion which addresses Murton's claim for psychiatric disability.

Whether the Veterans Court has jurisdiction is a matter of statutory interpretation that this court reviews de novo. E.g., Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("We review legal issues, including whether the Veterans Court properly declined to assert jurisdiction . . . without deference."); Wick v. Brown, 40 F.3d 367, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Veterans Court's jurisdiction is to be construed, moreover, "narrowly and `with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes.'"

We have also held that the Board has jurisdiction over actions taken under subsection 5904(c). See, e.g., Scates v. Principi, 282 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing Board's power to assess reasonableness of attorney fees and order their reduction if necessary under § 5904(c)(2)); Cox, 149 F.3d at 1364 (same); In re Wick, 40 F.3d 367, 369 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (same). One of the grounds for terminating Bates' certification was an alleged violation of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1), for charging attorney fees to various claimants prior to their receipt of a final Board decision on their claims.