Opinion
January 29, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The rule is well established that judicial review of a zoning board determination is limited to whether the determination has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence ( see, Matter of Fuhst v Foley, 45 N.Y.2d 441; Matter of Saladino v Fernan, 204 A.D.2d 554; Matter of Smith v Board of Appeals, 202 A.D.2d 674; Matter of Clarkson Realty Holding Corp. v Scheyer, 172 A.D.2d 521). In this case, the petitioners failed to establish that their present use of the property to store raw materials, equipment, and vehicles related to their construction business was a substantial use of the property prior to enactment of the 1937 ordinance ( see, People v Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 107), as opposed to a mere incidental use associated with the property's prior use as a dairy farm ( see, Incorporated Vil. of Old Westbury v Alljay Farms, 100 A.D.2d 574, mod 64 N.Y.2d 798; Matter of Winter v Guenther, 24 Misc.2d 537; Town of Mount Pleasant v Van Tassell, 7 Misc.2d 643, affd 6 A.D.2d 880). Moreover, substantial evidence was presented that the use of the property associated with the petitioners' construction business is of more recent vintage ( see, Town of Ithaca v Hull, 174 A.D.2d 911; Matter of Eger v Levine, 153 A.D.2d 998). Thus, the respondents' determination to deny the petitioners' application to certify their nonconforming use had a rational basis and was supported by substantial evidence. Balletta, J.P., Miller, O'Brien and Sullivan, JJ., concur.