Opinion
November 13, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Saladino, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting a protective order proscribing the dissemination of information obtained via discovery. Pursuant to CPLR 3103 (former [a]) "[t]he court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any [other] party or witness, make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device". Its discretion in such matters is broad, and upon our review of the record we find that the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion (see, Krygier v Airweld, Inc., 176 A.D.2d 701; Kaplan v Herbstein, 175 A.D.2d 200; Fischer v Deitsch, 168 A.D.2d 599; McLaughlin v G.D. Searle, Inc., 38 A.D.2d 810).
Furthermore, the court did not err in denying the petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction. It is well settled that in order to obtain a preliminary injunction a movant must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm unless the injunction is granted, and (3) that the equities are balanced in its favor (see, Aetna Ins. Co. v Capasso, 75 N.Y.2d 860, 862; Grant Co. v Srogi, 52 N.Y.2d 496, 517; NCN Co. v Cavanagh, 215 A.D.2d 737; Fischer v Deitch, supra, at 600). "Irreparable injury, for purposes of equity, has been held to mean any injury for which money damages are insufficient" (McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel v Nolan Co., 114 A.D.2d 165, 174; see also, Jurlique, Inc. v Austral Biolab Pty., 187 A.D.2d 637; Lawrence H. Morse, Inc. v Anson, 185 A.D.2d 505; Fischer v Deitch, supra, at 600). In the case at bar, where, inter alia, sharp issues of fact are presented, and compensation is available in the form of money damages, the petitioner failed to meet his burden.
The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit. O'Brien, J.P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Krausman, JJ., concur.