We find no such legislative intent in the situation before us. Merely because Dairylea lacks the right to intervene in the underlying agency proceedings does not necessarily preclude judicial review (cf. Matter of Village of Pleasantville v Lisa's Cocktail Lounge, 33 N.Y.2d 618). The determinative factor is the specific incorporation into the statute of the objective of preventing destructive competition (Agriculture and Markets Law, § 258-c).

Fundamentally, the remedy of prohibition is available to prevent an officer from proceeding or threatening to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction (see Matter of Doe v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 484, 490; see also Matter of Rush v. Mordue, 68 N.Y.2d 348, 353), and "`will not lie absent a showing of a clear legal right to the relief requested'" (Matter of Clute v. McGill, 229 A.D.2d 70, 71, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 803, quotingMatter of Adelphi Univ. v. Board of Regents, 229 A.D.2d 36, 38) or that the officer acted in excess of his or her powers in a manner that implicated "the legality of the entire proceeding" (Matter of Rush v. Mordue, supra at 353). "Generally, allowance or denial of applications to intervene in administrative proceedings rests in the discretion of the agency" (Matter of Village of Pleasantville v. Lisa's Cocktail Lounge, 33 N.Y.2d 618, 619 [citations omitted]; see Matter of Campo Corp. v. Feinberg, 279 A.D. 302, 308, affd 303 N.Y. 995). Petitioner's observation that the holding of this Court in Matter of International Assn. of Bridge, Structural Ornamental Iron Workers, Local Union No. 6, AFL-CIO v. State of New York ( 280 A.D.2d 713) precludes intervention in administrative proceedings is incorrect. Contrary to petitioner's analysis of that case, this Court held that the union there lacked standing under Labor Law § 220(8) to obtain judicial review of a final decision by the Department of Labor because the union had not been a party to the administrative proceeding. The rules for permissive intervention in administrative proceedings are broader than those for standing to sue in judicial proceedings (see O'Brien v. Barnes Bldg. Co., 85 Misc.2d 424, 439, affd sub nom. Matter of O'Brien v. Biggane, 48 A.D.2d 1018).

Liquor Authority's approval of an application by Lisa's Cocktail Lounge, Inc., for a tavern liquor license and (b) to direct remission of the matter to the Authority for a new hearing at which petitioner will be authorized to present testimony, the Authority and the Westchester County Alcoholic Beverage Control Board appealed from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated April 25, 1972, which granted the petition to the extent of (1) remitting the matter to the Authority for a new hearing and (2) directing that petitioner shall be permitted full intervention and participation, including certain specified rights, at the new hearing. This court, by a previous decision on this appeal, affirmed the judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the proceeding to this court "to take such action as may be appropriate, in accordance with the accompanying memorandum" of that court ( Matter of Village of Pleasantville v. Lisa's Cocktail Lounge, 40 A.D.2d 679, revd. 33 N.Y.2d 618). The memorandum of the Court of Appeals stated, inter alia: "Thus, while it may have been preferable to allow the village to participate fully in the hearing, the agency had discretion to limit the village participation as it did. Ordinarily, proceedings are brought under section 123 to review whether there is insufficient basis for the Authority grant of a liquor license. The Appellate Division, in remitting the matter to the Authority for a new hearing, did not determine whether there was a proper basis for the grant of a license.