Summary
In Village of Greenwood v. Mountain Lake Estates, Inc., 189 AD2d 987, 592 NYS2d 846 [3rd Dept 1993], the court held that the respondent failed to file documents with the Building Inspector by May 1, 1990, required by the stipulation of settlement, and thus, violated same.
Summary of this case from 102 Elmont Realty Corp. v. Berikal, Inc.Opinion
January 7, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Orange County (Hickman, J.).
The parties entered a judgment in accordance with the terms of their stipulation of settlement and thereby "unequivocally terminated their lawsuit" (Teitelbaum Holdings v. Gold, 48 N.Y.2d 51, 56; see, Yonkers Fur Dressing Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 435, 445-446). A motion must be addressed to a pending matter. Because the proceeding in this case was terminated by the parties' stipulation, respondents' sole remedy was to bring a plenary action to set aside the stipulation of settlement (see, Urso v. Panish, 94 A.D.2d 701; Yoon Pil Kim v. Shull, 90 A.D.2d 482). Supreme Court therefore correctly determined that respondents' motion in this proceeding was improper. Respondents argue that a plenary action is required only where a party is seeking to set aside a stipulation and that what they are seeking is a determination that they have in fact complied with the terms of the stipulation. This, however, is in effect a claim to enforce what amounts to respondents' interpretation of the stipulation's requirements, and a plenary action is required to enforce a stipulation's terms as well as to set it aside (see, HCE Assocs. v. 3000 Watermill Lane Realty Corp., 131 A.D.2d 543, 545; Urso v. Panish, supra, at 702).
Even if we were to address the merits of respondents' argument, we note that a stipulation of settlement constitutes a contract (Kraft v. Vassilaros Sons, 43 A.D.2d 972) and the interpretation of an unambiguous contract provision is for the court (see, Teitelbaum Holdings v. Gold, supra, at 56). The language of the stipulation in this case is clear. Respondents had until May 1, 1990 to file the documents at issue with the Building Inspector of the Village of Greenwood Lake, which they concededly failed to do. Instead, the documents were filed with the Orange County Board of Health. As Supreme Court noted, nowhere in the stipulation was there any requirement that the documents be filed with anyone other than the Building Inspector. In addition, respondent Patricia Campbell stated at the conclusion of the stipulation that she understood and agreed to its terms. There is simply no basis for viewing the language of the stipulation as ambiguous (see, supra).
Mikoll, J.P., Yesawich Jr., Crew III, Mahoney and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.