sking, once it is shown that the contemplated use is in conformance with the conditions imposed, the special use permit must be granted unless there are reasonable grounds for its denial, supported by substantial evidence ( see, Matter of C A Carbone v. Holbrook, 188 A.D.2d 599; Matter of Texaco Ref. Mktg. v. Valente, supra; see also, Matter of J.P.M. Props. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 204 A.D.2d 722). Furthermore, where, as here, "the discretion to issue special [use] permits has been reserved by the local legislative body, rather than [having been] delegated to an administrative agency * * * `[t]he only limitation upon the exercise of this discretion is that it must not be arbitrary or capricious'" ( C.K Olivers, Inc. v. Incorporated Vil. of Williston Park, 153 A.D.2d 548, quoting Matter of Buitenkant v. Robohm, 122 A.D.2d 791). While it is true that, generally, there must be compliance with the requirements of a zoning ordinance before a special use permit may be granted ( see, e.g., Matter of Vergata v. Town Bd., 209 A.D.2d 527), the special use permit here was issued after the Zoning Board granted the application by Summit for a variance waiving the need for strict compliance with the parking requirements of the Code. Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the Town Board did not attempt to exceed its authority by waiving parking requirements, but, rather, the Town Board properly granted the special use permit after the Zoning Board rendered its decision granting the parking variance. There are no provisions within the Code which preclude the Town Board from issuing a special use permit to an otherwise deserving property owner who previously secured a parking variance; the two permissions are not mutually exclusive ( see, Matter of Point Lookout Civic Assn. v. Rose, 207 A.D.2d 454).
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs. An applicant for a special use permit must establish that the proposed use complies in all other respects with the zoning ordinance ( see, Matter of Tandem Holding Corp. v Board of Zoning Appeals, 43 NY2d 801; Matter of Vergata v Town Bd., 209 AD2d 527; Matter of CBS Realty v Noto, 139 AD2d 645). The respondent Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Grand View-on-Hudson (hereinafter the Board) does not have authority to waive or modify any conditions set forth in the ordinance, e.g., maximum square footage for home occupation, hours of operation, etc. ( see, Matter of Commco, Inc. v Amelkin, 62 NY2d 260). Failure to meet any one of the conditions set forth in the ordinance warrants a denial of the special permit application ( see, Matter of Wegmans Enters, v Lansing, 72 NY2d 1000; Matter of Catabro v Town of Oyster Bay Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 198 AD2d 274).
As is set forth therein, a board entertaining a special permit application possesses no authority to waive or modify any of the explicit conditions set forth in the village's zoning code ( See,Jewish ReconstructionistSynagogue v. Levitan, 34 NY2d 827, 359 NYS2d 55, 316 NE2d 339; Wisoff v. Amelkin, 123 AD2d 623, 506 NYS2d 778 [2nd Dept 1986]; Knadle v. ZBA of the Town of Huntington, 121 AD2d 447, 503 NYS2d 141 [2nd Dept 1986]; McMahon v. ZBA of the Townof Wappinger ZBA, 121 AD2d 451, 503 NYS2d 142 [2nd Dept 1986]; Cathedral of the Incarnation v. Glimm, 97 AD2d 409, 467 NYS2d 241 [2nd Dept 1983], affirmed 61 NY2d 826, 473 NYS2d 972, 462 NE2d 149). Since a board does not possess the authority to alter the requirements for a special permit nor grant a variance or waiver from special permit criteria, it must deny an application which fails to comply with all legislatively mandated conditions ( See,Vergata v. Town Board of the Town of OysterBay, 209 AD2d 527, 618 NYS2d 832 [2nd Dept 1994], leave to appeal denied 85 NY2d 802, 624 NYS2d 372, 648 NE2d 792; Multi-Stage Developers v. Village of Great Neck, 149 AD2d 414, 539 NYS2d 764 [2nd Dept 1989]; Cappadoro Land Development v.Amelkin, 78 AD2d 696, 432 NYS2d 513 [2nd Dept 1980]. At the very heart of the rationale for classifying a use as a special exception is the inherent potentially disruptive nature of that use, making the review process for such a special exception a necessary element for the board to probe the specific characteristics of the proposed use and, if all the criteria are satisfied, the ability to impose conditions it deems necessary to minimize the impact on surrounding areas ( Green v. LoGrande, 96 AD2d 524, 464 NYS2d 831 [2nd Dept 1983], appeal dismissed 61 NY2d 758).