This principle was established as early as 1904, when the Court of Appeals held in Matter of Molineux v Collins ( 177 N.Y. 395) that a defendant who had been convicted and imprisoned and then later exonerated did not have any right to the return of photographs and body measurements taken of the defendant (the science of fingerprint identification not yet having been accepted), and that he should look to the Legislature for relief. This same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court, New York County, in Troilo v Valentine ( 179 Misc. 954) where the court held, "No right to the requested return [of fingerprints] exists unless it is conferred by statute".
The return was filed in accordance with the mandate of the statute (Code Crim. Pro., ยง 756). No right to have it expunged exists unless such right is conferred by statute ( Matter of Molineux v. Collins, 177 N.Y. 395; Matter of Dorgan v. Mercer, 178 Misc. 368; cf. Matter of Troilo v. Valentine, 179 Misc. 954).
Whatever relief that flowed from the dismissal were those decreed by the Legislature. (See, also, People v Casella, 90 Misc.2d 442; Matter of Troilo v Valentine, 179 Misc. 954. ) Such remedy is statutorily mandated in New York by CPL 160.50 which became effective in September of 1976 (L 1976, ch 877, as amd by L 1977, chs 835, 905).
The police commissioner rejected that demand. In the analogous case of Matter of Troilo v. Valentine ( 179 Misc. 954), the petitioner had been acquitted of violating section 1897 of the Penal Law. Then pending against him also were two criminal actions for which offenses they involved there was no authorization to fingerprint. Of both of the latter he was convicted.
The police commissioner rejected that demand. In the analogous case of Matter of Troilo v. Valentine (179 Misc. 954), the petitioner had been acquitted of violating section 1897 of the Penal Law. Then pending against him also were two criminal actions for which offenses they involved there was no authorization to fingerprint.