Opinion
January 24, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Washington County.
Petitioner commenced this proceeding as a habeas corpus proceeding to challenge the revocation of his parole. The main point in petitioner's challenge is directed at the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the chain of custody of certain urine samples which tested positive for cocaine. Supreme Court converted the matter to a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see, CPLR 103 [c]) and transferred it to this court on the basis of petitioner's evidentiary challenge (see, CPLR 7804 [g]).
The parties' initial focus in their arguments to this court concerns the question of whether habeas corpus or CPLR article 78 provides the appropriate remedy in these circumstances. Case law can be found to support both sides of the question (e.g., People ex rel. Saafir v Mantello, 163 A.D.2d 824; People ex rel. Brown v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 67 A.D.2d 1108, lv denied 47 N.Y.2d 707). We conclude, however, that irrespective of which remedy is appropriate, the petition must be dismissed.
Petitioner concedes that he commenced this proceeding instead of pursuing the available administrative appeal process (see, 9 NYCRR part 8006). The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies would clearly bar any relief under CPLR article 78 (People ex rel. Beyah v Coughlin, 101 A.D.2d 901), and we see no reason for reaching a different result even if we accept petitioner's claim that habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy (see, supra). Habeas corpus is a summary remedy; it is not an appropriate vehicle to bypass administrative remedies when there are disputed factual issues present (People ex rel. Walker v New York State Bd. of Parole, 98 A.D.2d 33, 36). As we said in People ex rel. Alan PP. v Duston ( 114 A.D.2d 678, 679), "a habeas corpus proceeding is unwarranted where full relief may be obtained in other more appropriate proceedings, and departure from traditional orderly proceedings, such as appeal, should be permitted only when dictated by reasons of practicality and necessity". The issue concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the other issues raised by petitioner in this proceeding, could have been raised in an administrative appeal (see, 9 NYCRR 8006.3) and there is nothing in this record to suggest that the claimed errors could not have been remedied in the administrative appeal process (compare, People ex rel. Alexander v LeFevre, 116 A.D.2d 869, with People ex rel. Brown v O'Keefe, 111 A.D.2d 488, lv denied 65 N.Y.2d 608). Since petitioner failed to pursue an available administrative appeal to redress the claimed errors in the parole revocation process, the petition must be dismissed.
Petition dismissed, without costs. Casey, J.P., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Harvey, JJ., concur.