Opinion
Submitted May 4, 1978
Decided June 6, 1978
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, I. LEO GLASSER, J.
Wendy Sue Lauring, William E. Hellerstein and Charles Schinitsky for appellant.
Allen G. Schwartz, Corporation Counsel (L. Kevin Sheridan and Francis F. Caputo of counsel), for respondent.
MEMORANDUM.
The order should be reversed and the petition dismissed.
It is now settled that double jeopardy is applicable in juvenile proceedings (Breed v Jones, 421 U.S. 519). That bar precludes appellate review of factual determinations which have been resolved in the accused's favor by the original trier of facts (see United States v Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671; United States ex rel. Graham v Mancusi, 457 F.2d 463, 469; cf. United States v Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 366-367; People v Brown, 40 N.Y.2d 381, cert den 429 U.S. 975). Thus, however it might have disagreed with it, the Appellate Division was bound by the Family Court's determination that appellant was not guilty of robbery or assault. If appellant did not participate in or facilitate the robbery, there was insufficient proof on which to premise a finding that the defendant knew that the purse was stolen beyond that which had been offered in support of the unsuccessful prosecution on the robbery charge, or indeed that he had even taken possession of the purse. He could not be found guilty of acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of criminal possession of stolen property.
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur.
Order reversed, without costs, and petition dismissed in a memorandum.