We hold that Initiative #29 contains three subjects in violation of the single subject provision of article V, section 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution: (1) qualifications for judges, (2) qualifications for members of the judicial discipline commission, and (3) jurisdiction of Denver county judges. Our decision in this regard is controlled by In re Ballot Title "1997-1998 #64", 960 P.2d 1192 (Colo. 1998), and In re Ballot Title "1997-1998 #95", 960 P.2d 1204 (Colo. 1998).

Accordingly, where an initiative advances separate and distinct purposes, "the fact that [both purposes] relate to a broad concept or subject is insufficient to satisfy the single subject requirement." In re Title, Ballot Title Submission Clause, Summary for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Colo. 1998). Implementing provisions directly tied to the initiative's central focus are not separate subjects.

In re "Public Rights in Waters II.", 898 P.2d 1076, 1078-79 (Colo. 1995); see, e.g., In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-1998 #64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Colo. 1998); In re Amend TABOR 25, 900 P.2d 121, 125 (Colo. 1995); People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 403, 74 P. 167, 177 (1903); In re Breene, 14 Colo. at 404, 24 P. at 3 (interpreting single-subject requirement as prohibiting a legislative act from addressing "disconnected and incongruous matters"). Furthermore, a proposed initiative contains multiple subjects not only when it proposes new provisions constituting multiple subjects, but also when it proposes to repeal multiple subjects.

See, e.g., In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-1998 # 64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Colo. 1998); 960 P.2d at 1196; In re Proposed Initiative "Amend TABOR 25", 900 P.2d 121, 125 (Colo. 1995); People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 403, 74 P. 167, 177 (1903) (holding that, in order for the text of a bill to constitute more than one subject, it "must have at least two distinct and separate purposes which are not dependent upon or connected with each other"); In re Breene, 14 Colo. at 404, 24 P. at 3 (interpreting single-subject requirement as prohibiting a legislative act from addressing "disconnected and incongruous matters").

Because we conclude that #43 contains multiple subjects, we do not consider whether the titles set by the Title Board conform to the requirements of section 1-40-106(3), 1 C.R.S. (2001). In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-98 #64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Colo. 1998) ("Because we conclude that the Initiative contains multiple subjects, we do not address the argument that the titles and summary are misleading."); see also, In re Proposed Initiative for 1997-98 #84, 961 P.2d 456, 458 (Colo. 1998); In re Proposed Initiative Amend TABOR 25, 900 P.2d 121, 123 (Colo.

5(1)(e)(I), C.R.S. 2009; see also In re 2007-2008 No. 61, 184 P.3d at 750; In re Title for 2005-2006 No. 55, 138 P.3d 273, 277 (Colo. 2006); In re Title for 1997-1998 No. 6h, 960 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Colo. 1998). Second, the single subject requirement is intended to "prevent surreptitious measures . . . [so as] to prevent surprise and fraud from being practiced upon voters."

It was recently returned to Campbell at the direction of the Colorado Supreme Court, which found the Initiative encompassed multiple subjects in violation of § 1(5.5) of Article V and struck the title and summary set by the Title Board. See Aisenberg v. Campbell, 960 P.2d 1192 (Colo. 1998) (not yet released for publication). A single-subject challenge to Hayes's Initiative # 74 for the assessment of school impact fees on newly constructed housing units is presently on review by the Colorado Supreme Court (Pls.' Ex. 6), as is a challenge to Initiative # 30, proposed by Plaintiffs' Bruce and Wright, for a constitutional amendment imposing a series of tax and franchise charge cuts. (Pls.'

"[W]here an initiative advances separate and distinct purposes, ‘the fact that both purposes relate to a broad concept or subject is insufficient to satisfy the single subject requirement.’ " In re 2009-2010 #91, 235 P.3d at 1076 (alteration omitted) (quoting In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary for 1997-1998 #64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Colo. 1998) ). ¶16 Finally, given the anti-logrolling and anti-fraud purposes of the single-subject requirement, our application of the necessarily-and-properly-related test has often taken into account whether voters might favor only part of an initiative and the potential for voter surprise.

"[W]here an initiative advances separate and distinct purposes, 'the fact that both purposes relate to a broad concept or subject is insufficient to satisfy the single subject requirement.'" In re 2009-2010 #91, 235 P.3d at 1076 (alteration omitted) (quoting In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary for 1997-1998 #64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Colo. 1998)). ¶16 Finally, given the anti-logrolling and anti-fraud purposes of the single- subject requirement, our application of the necessarily-and-properly-related test has often taken into account whether voters might favor only part of an initiative and the potential for voter surprise.

In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause for 2013–2014 #90, 2014 CO 63, ¶ 11, 328 P.3d 155, 159. If an initiative advances separate and distinct purposes, the fact that they both relate to the same general concept or subject is insufficient to satisfy the single subject requirement. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary for 1997–1998 #64, 960 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Colo.1998) ; see also In re 2001–2002 #43, 46 P.3d at 442 (“[A] proponent's attempt to characterize his initiative under some overarching theme will not save an initiative containing separate and unconnected purposes.”). “Grouping the provisions of a proposed initiative under a broad concept that potentially misleads voters will not satisfy the single subject requirement.”