Matter of the Marriage of Ash

9 Citing cases

  1. Porter and Porter

    786 P.2d 740 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 13 times

    In Ward, the trial court, in a modification proceeding, had reduced husband's support obligation to a nominal amount in order to keep it open. That was not a negotiated provision in a settlement agreement. The same is true in Ash and Ash, 61 Or. App. 595, 658 P.2d 540 (1983), and Koch and Koch, 58 Or. App. 252, 648 P.2d 406 (1982). We see no meaningful distinction between this case and Pope and Pope, 73 Or. App. 242, 698 P.2d 518 (1985), aff'd 301 Or. 42, 718 P.2d 735 (1986), in which a negotiated property settlement agreement provided for payments to wife of $42,000 per year commencing July 1, 1980, through June 30, 1990, and provided that payments would terminate on July 1, 1985, if wife remarried prior thereto, or upon the remarriage of wife after July 1, 1985, whichever first occurred. Wife remarried a very wealthy man in 1982, whereupon husband moved to modify the support provision that was incorporated in the judgment of dissolution.

  2. Carroll v. Nagatori-Carroll

    978 P.2d 814 (Haw. 1999)   Cited 5 times

    "In determining whether an award is a division of property or spousal support, the label given it in the decree is not conclusive." In re Marriage of Ash, 658 P.2d 540, 541 (Or.Ct.App. 1983); see also In re Marriage of Moak, 668 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Or.Ct.App. 1983) (labels used by the parties to describe "property division" or "spousal support" are not decisive). Looking at the substance of the Divorce Decree in the present case, the amounts that Carroll owed ex-wife do not easily fit within any traditional description of "property division."

  3. Carstensen v. Carstensen

    128 Haw. 310 (Haw. Ct. App. 2012)

    See Carroll v. Nagatori–Carroll, 90 Hawai‘i 376, 382, 978 P.2d 814, 820 (1999) (“Looking at the substance of the Divorce Decree in the present case, the amounts that Carroll owed ex-wife do not easily fit within any traditional description of ‘property division.’ ”); see also In re Marriage of Ash, 61 Or.App. 595, 658 P.2d 540, 541 (Or.Ct.App.1983) (“In determining whether an award is a division of property or spousal support, the label given it in the decree is not conclusive.”). The nature of such a provision dividing the future stream of income from a retirement plan weighs in favor of a liberal construction of timeliness especially when the party seeking relief seeks to modify the future payment, rather than past payments, under the provision.

  4. Carstensen v. Carstensen

    NO. 28920 (Haw. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2012)   Cited 1 times
    Concluding that the family court erred in determining that husband's HFCR Rule 60(b) motion was untimely based in part on Greene v. Greene, 8 Haw. App. 559, 815 P.2d 28

    Although the distribution of these benefits has been treated as property division, the prospective and continuing nature of these payments can be construed as maintenance and support rather than mere division of property. See Carroll v. Nagatori-Carroll, 90 Hawai'i 376, 382, 978 P.2d 814, 820 (1999) ("Looking at the substance of the Divorce Decree in the present case, the amounts that Carroll owed ex-wife do not easily fit within any traditional description of 'property division.'"); see also In re Marriage of Ash, 658 P.2d 540, 541 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) ("In determining whether an award is a division of property or spousal support, the label given it in the decree is not conclusive."). The nature of such a provision dividing the future stream of income from a retirement plan weighs in favor of a liberal construction of timeliness especially when the party seeking relief seeks to modify the future payment, rather than past payments, under the provision.

  5. In re the Marriage of Uhde

    175 P.3d 511 (Or. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 1 times

    The trial court's statement that no spousal support should be awarded " at this time" (emphasis added) is puzzling. It is axiomatic that, where the court awarded no support, wife would be unable to petition for a modification to allow support if her circumstances subsequently changed — and, particularly, if her relationship with Friesen were to end after the dissolution judgment became final. See, e.g., Ash and Ash, 61 Or App 595, 598, 658 P2d 540 (1983) (reversing award of "token spousal support for the purpose of preserving a basis for future increases" in context of modification upon recipient spouse's remarriage). Wife challenges that disposition.

  6. Niman and Niman

    206 Or. App. 259 (Or. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 13 times
    Describing parties' positions regarding wife's modification motion

    In addition, we accept wife's concession that the trial court erred in making a token award to her of spousal support. See Ash and Ash, 61 Or App 595, 598, 658 P2d 540 (1983) ("awards of token spousal support for the purpose of preserving a basis for future increases are speculative and not based on need"); Koch and Koch, 58 Or App 252, 256, 648 P2d 406 (1982) (same). Accordingly, we reverse that award.

  7. In the Matter, the Marriage, Triperinas

    185 Or. App. 283 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times
    Upholding a long-half award to a spouse who was responsible for significant marital debts under the property division

    This court has held that "awards of token spousal support for the purpose of preserving a basis for future increases are speculative and not based on need." Ash and Ash, 61 Or. App. 595, 598, 658 P.2d 540 (1983). Husband focuses on the words used by the trial court in its opinion that "in order to allow for judicial review in the future, spousal support is set at the sum of $150 per month for an indefinite period."

  8. Matter of the Marriage of Fletcher

    696 P.2d 1182 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 3 times

    Bennett v. Bennett, 208 Or. 524, 302 P.2d 1019 (1956); Schaffer and Schaffer, 57 Or. App. 43, 48, 643 P.2d 1300 (1982). In Ash and Ash, 61 Or. App. 595, 658 P.2d 540 (1983), we held that payments labelled "spousal support" were in reality a division of property. One of the main reasons that the label employed is not determinative is that payments may be labelled with income tax consequences in mind.

  9. Matter of the Marriage of Esler

    673 P.2d 1386 (Or. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 8 times
    Applying factors

    The label given to payments in a dissolution decree is not conclusive of their character. See Ash and Ash, 61 Or. App. 595, 598, 658 P.2d 540 (1983); Schaffer v. Schaffer, 57 Or. App. 43, 643 P.2d 1300 (1982). Here, the monthly payment to wife has many earmarks of spousal support: it is labeled "spousal support" in the decree; it is a monthly payment; no interest accrues on the unpaid balance, see Dealy and Dealy, 25 Or. App. 603, 549 P.2d 1285 (1976); the obligation does not survive husband's death, see Schaffer v. Schaffer, supra, 57 Or App at 47; and husband has claimed the amounts paid as deductions for income tax purposes.