Opinion
October 19, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Wager, J.).
Ordered that the judgments are reversed, on the law, with costs, the determinations are confirmed and the proceedings are dismissed on the merits.
The board's determinations denying the petitioner's variance applications had a rational basis, and, thus, should not have been overturned (see, Matter of Fuhst v. Foley, 45 N.Y.2d 441, 444; Matter of Cowan v. Kern, 41 N.Y.2d 591, 599, rearg denied 42 N.Y.2d 910; Matter of Newman v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121 A.D.2d 543, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 610). The evidence presented supported the conclusion that the petitioner would not suffer any "`practical difficulties'" or significant economic injury as a result of the strict enforcement of the depth-of-lot requirements of the town's zoning ordinance (Matter of Fuhst v. Foley, supra, at 445; see, Matter of Bauer v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121 A.D.2d 627, 628). To the contrary, the record undisputably indicates that the petitioner could make a substantial profit from developing the subject parcels even without the requested variances.
Moreover, the record supports the conclusion that the public benefit to be gained by strict enforcement of the subject zoning restriction outweighs any private detriment which might thereby be suffered by the petitioner (see, Matter of De Sena v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 105, 108). The cumulative effect of granting the requested variances would be to create a development which would reduce open space, adversely affect the surrounding lots which are in strict conformity with the zoning ordinance's 100-foot minimum depth-of-lot requirement (see, Building Zone Ordinance of Town of Hempstead § 193 [c]), and otherwise conflict with the general purposes of the Levittown Planned Residence District (see, Building Zone Ordinance of Town of Hempstead § 171). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Lawrence and Rubin, JJ., concur.