Matter of Tassio

3 Citing cases

  1. Matter of Benjamin

    870 F. Supp. 41 (N.D.N.Y. 1994)

    Courts have consistently found that attempts to mislead and deceive the court or opposing counsel are sufficiently serious to warrant public censure, and, as pointed out by respondent's memorandum, even disbarment. See e.g., Matter of Tassio, 174 A.D.2d 166, 579 N.Y.S.2d 105 (2d Dep't 1992) (public censure of defense attorney who pre-dated client's affidavit and used affidavit to mislead district attorney); Matter of LaFountain, 226 Mont. 296, 738 P.2d 472 (1987) (public censure of attorney who falsely represented to clerk of trial court that he had been successful on appeal in order to obtain default judgment); Matter of Hansen, 179 Ariz. 229, 877 P.2d 802 (1994) (public censure of attorney who mislead court and opposing counsel by telling court a witness was not available when the attorney had previously told the witness to leave). Consequently, in light of the Third Department's finding that respondent intentionally misled and deceived the court and opposing counsel, together with persuasive authority that this unethical conduct should result in public censure, the court finds that respondent has not sufficiently shown why imposing reciprocal discipline pursuant to Local Rule 83.4(d) would result in grave injustice.

  2. Heffernan v. Grievance Comm. for the Tenth Judicial Dist.

    183 A.D.3d 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)

    Against the extremely serious nature of the admitted misconduct, we also consider the extraordinary mitigation presented, including the respondent's decades of public service, the aberrational nature of the misconduct, his resignation from the SCDA, the lack of detriment to the investigation and prosecution of the criminal matter in question, and the absence of a prior disciplinary history as an aggravating factor. Under these circumstances, we conclude that a public censure is warranted (seeMatter of Rodeman, 65 A.D.3d 350, 883 N.Y.S.2d 835 ; Matter of Tassio, 174 A.D.2d 166, 579 N.Y.S.2d 105 ; cf.Matter of Stuart, 22 A.D.3d 131, 803 N.Y.S.2d 577 ).Based on the foregoing, we find that the motion for discipline by consent pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.8(a)(5) should be granted.

  3. In re Heffernan

    2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 1615 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)

    Against the extremely serious nature of the admitted misconduct, we also consider the extraordinary mitigation presented, including the respondent's decades of public service, the aberrational nature of the misconduct, his resignation from the SCDA, the lack of detriment to the investigation and prosecution of the criminal matter in question, and the absence of a prior disciplinary history as an aggravating factor. Under these circumstances, we conclude that a public censure is warranted (see Matter of Rodeman, 65 AD3d 350; Matter of Tassio, 174 AD2d 166; cf. Matter of Stuart, 22 AD3d 131). Based on the foregoing, we find that the motion for discipline by consent pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.8(a)(5) should be granted.