Opinion
Argued September 4, 1975
Decided October 21, 1975
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, DONALD H. MEAD, J.
John W. Brenizer and Eugene D. Tarolli for appellants.
William L. Allen, Jr., and Nicholas J. Pastushan for respondents.
MEMORANDUM. The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
We agree with the Appellate Division's construction of subdivision (b) of section 7 of respondent Town of Geddes' Zoning Ordinance and its conclusion that "the obvious intent of the section was to restrict development of private profit-making enterprises in a residential district". Moreover, we find the regulation constitutional and a permissible exercise of the police power conferred on respondent by the Legislature (see Town Law, § 261). As was stated in Matter of Wulfsohn v Burden ( 241 N.Y. 288, 300-301), "[t]he primary purpose of [a residential] district is safe, healthful and comfortable family life rather than the development of commercial instincts and the pursuit of pecuniary profits." Indeed, almost 40 years ago, in a case upholding the exclusion of boarding houses operated for profit in a residential district, we noted that "[p]rovisions for the exclusion of business enterprises from residential zones are now generally found in zoning ordinances" (Baddour v City of Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 174, app dsmd 308 U.S. 503; cf. McCarter v Beckwith, 247 App. Div. 289, 292, affd 272 N.Y. 488, cert den 299 U.S. 601; see, also, 1 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice [2d ed], § 9.36).
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur in memorandum.
Order affirmed.