eral hours and reviewed her extensive medical history opined that she is presently and for the foreseeable future unable to provide adequate care for the children due to mental illness (see Social Services Law ยง 384โb[4][c] ; [6][a]; seeMatter of Jeremiah M. [Sabrina Ann M.], 109 A.D.3d 736, 971 N.Y.S.2d 524 [1st Dept. 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 856, 2013 WL 6097219 [2013] ). His uncontroverted testimony established that the mother's prognosis was "quite poor" because she lacks insight into her mental illness, refuses counseling and psychotropic medication, and did not continue her therapy once her therapist stopped working at the facility she was attending. The psychologist also noted that there was a possibility that the mother would require future hospitalizations, which could leave the children without someone to care for them (seeMatter of Sharon Crystal F. [Nicole Valerie D.], 89 A.D.3d 639, 640, 934 N.Y.S.2d 377 [1st Dept. 2011], lv denied 18 N.Y.3d 808, 2012 WL 539356 [2012] ; Matter of Susan F., 106 A.D.2d 282, 283, 482 N.Y.S.2d 489 [1st Dept. 1984] ). Although the mother is correct that hearsay statements made by the father in the expert's report were inadmissible and should have been stricken, any error was harmless.
As there is no doubt that respondent suffers from a mental illness (Social Services Law ยง 384-b [c]), the question before the court is whether "the child would be in danger of becoming a neglected child" if returned to respondent's care (Social Services Law ยง 384-b [a]). The psychiatrists who evaluated respondent expressed reservations about her ability to provide proper and adequate care for the child within the contemplation of the statute (Matter of Susan F., 106 A.D.2d 282, 283). Even Paulos Kymissis, M.D., called as a witness for respondent, when pressed by the court, was reluctant to state that respondent would be able to adequately care for the child in the foreseeable future, stating only, "It's a possibility", and "this is something that has to be evaluated as time goes by."
This determination was apparently predicated upon an erroneous application of the standard for termination of parental rights set forth in Social Services Law ยง 384-b (4) (c), which requires that the mentally ill parent must be unable to provide proper and adequate care for the child or children "presently and for the foreseeable future". (Matter of Susan F., 106 A.D.2d 282, 283.) Before parental rights may be terminated on such grounds, the court must hear testimony from a psychiatrist.
Memorandum: We find that petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent father abandoned his children and that respondent mother permanently neglected her children. The record reveals that since the children have been in foster care, the father has never visited or communicated with them (see, Matter of Susan F., 106 A.D.2d 282, 283-284). The fact that the father, a Canadian citizen, resided in Canada and allegedly was unable to enter the United States due to his criminal record does not preclude a finding of abandonment based on the father's failure to contact the children (see, Matter of Charlene D., 121 Misc.2d 168, 173).
of progress on the mother's part in planning for the child's future is directly attributable to her failure to avail herself of the many services offered to her (see, Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136; Matter of Orlando F., 40 N.Y.2d 103; Matter of Lisa L., 117 A.D.2d 931). Hence, the Family Court did not err in concluding that the mother was guilty of permanent neglect. Moreover, in light of the expert psychiatric testimony establishing that the mother suffers from chronic residual schizophrenia and is "somewhat a paranoid volitional", that she refused to accept professional therapy to improve her condition, and that the child would be in imminent danger of becoming neglected if returned to her custody, there is clear and convincing evidence to support the Family Court's conclusion that her parental rights should be terminated on the additional ground of mental illness (see, Social Services Law ยง 384-b [c]; [6] [a]; Matter of Kevin R., 112 A.D.2d 462, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 602; Matter of Susan F., 106 A.D.2d 282; Matter of Diana McC., 106 A.D.2d 577; Matter of Vera T., 80 A.D.2d 511, affd 55 N.Y.2d 1028). Brown, J.P., Weinstein, Rubin and Spatt, JJ., concur.
cedural and substantive scheme provided for in section 384-b has been repeatedly upheld by the Court of Appeals as being constitutionally sound (see, Matter of Joyce T., 65 N.Y.2d 39; Matter of Nereida S., 57 N.Y.2d 636). We further find that the petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that the mother, by reason of her mental illness, was unable to care for the child presently and for the foreseeable future (see, Santosky v Kramer, 455 U.S. 745). The unequivocal testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist that the mother should not be the primary caretaker, the medical records reflecting the mother's frequent and extensive hospitalizations and institutionalizations for chronic schizophrenia dating back to 1968, and her own demeanor and testimony at the hearing which demonstrated disorientation as to time, paranoia and a lack of understanding of her condition, amply supported the Family Court's determination (see, Matter ofVera T., 80 A.D.2d 511, affd 55 N.Y.2d 1028; Matter of Susan F., 106 A.D.2d 282, 283). Thompson, J.P., Weinstein, Lawrence and Eiber, JJ., concur.