Present — Dillon, P.J., Boomer, Green, Balio and Lawton, JJ. Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs, in accordance with the following memorandum: In 1985 Family Court modified a divorce decree entered in 1966 by directing respondent to pay petitioner support in the amount of $20 per week for a total of 52 weeks and providing that thereafter no alimony shall be paid. Petitioner appeals from that portion of the order which limits alimony to a definite period of 52 weeks. Under the circumstances here present, whether alimony should have been eliminated at a future date should not have been decided by Family Court (see, Tumolillo v Tumolillo, 71 A.D.2d 625, affd 51 N.Y.2d 790; Sterlace v Sterlace, 52 A.D.2d 743, 744; Matter of Stolls v Cabot, 45 A.D.2d 1014). The provision terminating petitioner's alimony after 52 weeks constitutes an in futuro modification not based on changed circumstances and must be deleted (see, McClusky v McClusky, 87 A.D.2d 973; see also, Scheinkman, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law C236A:8, at 168-169).
The preequitable distribution decisions in this State, which control here ( see, Pollack v Pollack, 56 N.Y.2d 968; Scheinkman, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law C236B:3, 1977-1984 Supp Pamph, p 182; cf. Lavi v Lavi, 103 A.D.2d 400), established a policy that alimony be awarded without regard to any fixed or definite duration. Such provisions were routinely excised from foreign decrees and agreements entered into by the parties themselves ( e.g., Tumolillo v Tumolillo, 71 A.D.2d 625, affd 51 N.Y.2d 790; Sterlace v Sterlace, 52 A.D.2d 743; Matter of Stolls v Cabot, 45 A.D.2d 1014; Nichols v Nichols, 11 A.D.2d 149; Santamaria v Santamaria, 74 Misc.2d 657; Spector v Spector, 49 Misc.2d 591, affd 24 A.D.2d 1082). Further, under New York law, the burden of establishing grounds for modification of support rests upon the party seeking the change (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [A] [1]; [B] [9] [b]; Lipow v Lipow, 110 A.D.2d 756 [2d Dept, Apr. 15, 1985]; Matter of Kronenberg v Kronenberg, 101 A.D.2d 951; Miklowitz v Miklowitz, 79 A.D.2d 795, lv denied 53 N.Y.2d 604; Albanese v Albanese, 75 A.D.2d 987, 988; Hickland v Hickland, 56 A.D.2d 978, 979).
There is no basis in the record for the elimination of alimony in futuro. Whether, upon a change of circumstances, alimony should be eliminated or reduced should not now be decided (see Sterlace v. Sterlace, 52 A.D.2d 743, 744; Matter of Stolls v. Cabot, 45 A.D.2d 1014). The remaining portions of the judgment appealed from here are fully supported by the record and the law.
There is no basis in the record, however, for the elimination of alimony in futuro. Whether, upon a change of circumstances, alimony should be eliminated or reduced should not now be decided (see Matter of Stolls v Cabot, 45 A.D.2d 1014). Where there is a need for support, a husband must "carry the unescapable duty which is his, not consensually but by common law and statute, to provide support for the wife" (McMains v McMains, 15 N.Y.2d 283, 288). "A wife is not entitled to a share of her husband's income as such * * * but she must have minimum support." (McMains v McMains, supra, p 288.)
(Domestic Relations Law, § 248.) While orders that attempt to provide for future contingencies are not favored (see Matter of Stolls v Cabot, 45 A.D.2d 1014), this court is not inclined to suggest a rule that would make the issue of child support automatically reviewable in every case upon remarriage of the mother. Since the only change of circumstance herein, the loss of alimony upon the remarriage of the petitioner, was provided for by the divorce decree, the court concludes that there is no substantial change of circumstance that can support a modification of child support.