Matter of Stevens

12 Citing cases

  1. Filler v. Motta

    35 Misc. 3d 1215 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2012)   Cited 2 times

    Initially, it is well settled that a client may discharge an attorney from the further performance of services at any time, with or without cause. Mtr of Cohen v. Grainger, Tesoriero & Bell, 81 N.Y.2d 655, 658, 602 N.Y.S.2d 788, 622 N.E.2d 288 (1993); In re Estate of Stevens, 252 A.D.2d 654, 675 N.Y.S.2d 182 (3rd Dept 1998); Celife v. Ellis, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op 33069(U), 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9788 (Sup.Ct., Queens Co.2008). If the attorney is discharged without cause before the completion of services, he is entitled to recover the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered under the theory of quantum meruit.

  2. D'Jamoos v. Griffith

    00-CV-1361 (ILG) (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 25, 2006)   Cited 7 times

    "It is well settled that a client may discharge an attorney from the further performance of services at any time, with or without cause." In the Matter of the Estate of Charles R. Stevens, 252 A.D.2d 654, 655 (3d Dep't 1998) (citing Matter of Cohen v. Grainger, Tesoriero Bell, 81 N.Y.2d 655, 658 (1993); Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 174 (1916)). If an attorney is discharged for cause, he is not entitled to compensation. Id.; Universal Acupuncture Pain Services, P.C. v. Quadrino Schwartz, 370 F.3d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 2004).

  3. King v. Fox

    2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 4746 (N.Y. 2006)   Cited 140 times
    Finding that even a fee agreement otherwise prohibited as unconscionable may be enforced if the parties entered into it knowingly and intentionally

    I. An attorney, guilty of professional misconduct in the representation of a client, must disgorge all fees paid; his conduct may not be ratified by the client. ( Matter of Phillips, 284 AD2d 897; Matter of Lippman, 232 AD2d 69; Teichner v W J Holsteins, 64 NY2d 977; Campagnola v Mulholland, Minion Roe, 76 NY2d 38; Orendick v Chiodo, 272 AD2d 901; Matter of Stevens, 252 AD2d 654; Schwartz v Tenenbaum, 7 AD2d 866; Universal Acupuncture Pain Servs., P.C. v Quadrino Schwartz, 370 F3d 259; In re Badger, 9 F2d 560; Hendry v Pelland, 73 F3d 397.) II. Courts have a duty to disallow unconscionable fee agreements, and such agreements may not be ratified by the client.

  4. Wiggins v. Kopko

    105 A.D.3d 1132 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)   Cited 30 times

    We find no abuse of discretion here. Whether the client's file in the malpractice action is material and necessary to plaintiff's action depends on whether plaintiff or the partnership are entitled to a share of the malpractice action fee, which in turn depends on the reason for the discharge. A client may discharge his or her attorney at any time, with or without cause, but the discharged attorney only forfeits the right to compensation for services rendered when discharged for cause ( see e.g. Teichner v. W & J Holsteins, 64 N.Y.2d 977, 979, 489 N.Y.S.2d 36, 478 N.E.2d 177 [1985];Matter of Stevens, 252 A.D.2d 654, 655, 675 N.Y.S.2d 182 [1998] ). A determination that an attorney was discharged for cause may be based on negligence or misconduct, such as substantial delay in prosecuting an action or interference with a client's attempts to settle a case; more is required than a client's “general dissatisfaction” with the attorney's performance ( De Luccia v. Village of Monroe, 180 A.D.2d 897, 899, 580 N.Y.S.2d 91 [1992];see Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 43–44, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 555 N.E.2d 611 [1990];Matter of Stevens, 252 A.D.2d at 656, 675 N.Y.S.2d 182;Dagny Mgt. Corp. v. Oppenheim & Meltzer, 199 A.D.2d 711, 712–713, 606 N.Y.S.2d 337 [1993] ).

  5. Garcia v. Teitler

    04 CV 832 (JG) (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 22, 2004)   Cited 15 times

    Id. at 465. Other examples of "cause" include: commencement of unnecessary litigation, see Shalom Toy, Inc. v. Each and Every One of the Members of the N.Y. Prop. Ins. UnderwritingAss'n., 658 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1st Dep't 1997); engaging in unnecessary motion practice, see Katsaros v. Katsaros, 543 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (2d Dep't 1989); substantial delay in prosecuting a case, see Matter of Estate of Stevens, 675 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183-84 (3d Dep't 1998); and a conflict of interest,see Sokoloff v. Sokoloff, 371 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1975). See also 31 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 125, § 7 (Aug. 2003) ("[A]n examination of the appellate decisions dealing with the question of just cause for dismissal of an attorney reveals that the courts have been fairly consistent in finding just cause to exist where one or more of the following elements is present in the factual picture: (1) the attorney's failure to perform under the employment contract; (2) his lack of diligence in so performing; (3) his lack of ordinary skill or care in so performing; (4) his making of demands on the client which violate the terms or exceed the scope of the contract; (5) his taking of actions contrary to the client's interests or objectives; (6) his indulging in some sort of unprofessional conduct while handling the client's affairs; (7) his venting of personal or economic hostility toward the client; and (8) his loss of the client's trust and confidence.").

  6. Stim & Warmuth, P.C. v. Hayes

    72 A.D.3d 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 4 times

    The plaintiff demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by contending that negligent representation is the equivalent of legal malpractice, and demonstrating that it did not commit any acts that could be construed as malpractice ( see Turner v Irving Finkelstein Meirowitz, LLP, 61 AD3d 849, 850). In opposition, the defendants failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff committed legal malpractice ( see Matter of Stevens, 252 AD2d 654, 655). Lastly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was for summary judgment on the sixth affirmative defense, which alleged that the individual defendant William Hayes made payment for legal services rendered to him.

  7. Dragutescu v. Grossman

    38 A.D.3d 709 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 2 times

    Following the settlement of the plaintiff's personal injury action against the defendant City of New York, a fee dispute arose between the plaintiffs former and current attorneys, and conflicting claims were made as to whether the former attorneys had been discharged with or without cause. The Supreme Court properly held a hearing to resolve the issue ( see Byrne v Leblond, 25 AD3d 640, 642), and determined that the former attorneys had been discharged for cause. Based on the evidence presented at that hearing, we discern no basis to disturb the Supreme Court's determination ( see Matter of Stevens, 252 AD2d 654, 655-656). In light of our determination, we do not address the appellants' remaining contention.

  8. In the Matter of Elizabeth M

    30 A.D.3d 780 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 4 times

    The record further memorialized the guardians long-standing practice of always acting in Elizabeth M.'s best interests. For all of these reasons, including the fact that her renal insufficiency would ultimately result in her death since she is not a candidate for a kidney transplant, we agree with Surrogate's Court that there was full compliance with the statutory directives, supported by a sufficient evidentiary proffer. Finding no merit to any remaining contentions that the evidentiary rulings of Surrogate's Court were an abuse of its discretion ( see Matter of Stevens, 252 AD2d 654, 656) or that there was error in its denial of MHLS's request for a physical examination of Elizabeth M., we affirm both orders. Ordered that the orders are affirmed, without costs.

  9. Matter of Rowe

    274 A.D.2d 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 13 times

    Finally, we note that neither adverse tax consequences nor any provision of the trust instrument restricted petitioner's freedom to sell the IBM stock and diversify the trust's investments. In view of the foregoing, and recognizing that "the trial court's assessment of the credibility and weight to be accorded an expert's testimony in a nonjury trial is entitled to deference by a reviewing court" (Levy v. Braley, 176 A.D.2d 1030, 1033; see, Matter of Stevens, 252 A.D.2d 654, 656), we perceive no basis for disturbing the determination of Surrogate's Court that petitioner acted imprudently in retaining the IBM stock. We also reject the contention that the surcharge imposed by Surrogate's Court was improperly calculated because it was based on an unrealized paper loss during an intermediate accounting rather than a final accounting. It is our view that, notwithstanding the 10 years that remained in the trust term, Surrogate's Court did not abuse its discretion in making an award of damages (see, Matter of Everhart, 226 A.D.2d 892, 893).

  10. Kagan Lubic Lepper Finkelstein & Gold, LLP v. 325 Fifth Ave. Condo.

    2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 31470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    Indeed, it is well-settled that an attorney who is discharged for cause, due to misconduct or being unreasonably lax in pursuing the client's case, has no right to compensation for legal services rendered. See Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38 (1990); see also Matter of Stevens, 252 A.D.2d 654 (3d Dept 1988)(finding discharge for cause where attorney delayed prosecution of case and thus was not entitled to collect attorney's fees for services rendered.) Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaims is denied.