Matter of Steingesser

21 Citing cases

  1. In re Spong

    661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981)   Cited 378 times
    Holding that a "well-established principle of bankruptcy law [is] that dischargeability must be determined by the substance of the liability rather than its form"

    Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 798. Under this provision, counsel fees that were awarded pursuant to a husband's support obligations generally were held to be non-dischargeable, regardless of whether the fees were payable directly to the attorney. See, e. g., DuBroff v. Steingesser, 602 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1979); Schiller v. Cornish, 529 F.2d 1363, 1365 (7th Cir. 1976). In 1978 Congress enacted Pub.L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, sometimes referred to as the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978", which provided that a discharge under the Act would not discharge an individual debtor from any debt β€”

  2. In re Crawford

    236 B.R. 673 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1999)   Cited 12 times
    Finding that debtor owed his former spouse nonsupport divorce debt for loan from former spouse to debtor to pay third-party debt allocated to debtor in divorce-related obligations

    In a cause of action to except nonsupport divorce debt from discharge under section 523(a)(15), the nondebtor spouse must satisfy the initial burden of proof. The nondebtor spouse must show that the debt to be excepted is one incurred in connection with a divorce and is in the nature of a property settlement rather than a debt for maintenance or support. Strayer v. Strayer (In re Strayer), 228 B.R. 211, 214 (Bankr.S.D.Ind. 1996) (citing Gantz v. Gantz (In re Gantz), 192 B.R. 932 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1996); Florio v. Florio (In re Florio), 187 B.R. 654 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1995); DuBroff v. Steingesser (In re Steingesser), 602 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979); Deems v. Schauer, 470 F. Supp. 255 (D.N.D. 1979); Silvers v. Silvers (In re Silvers), 187 B.R. 648 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1995)); Henderson v. Henderson (In re Henderson), 200 B.R. 322, 324 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1996) (citing Carroll v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 187 B.R. 197, 200 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1995)). Nonsupport divorce debt may be excepted from discharge pursuant to section 523(a)(15) despite the fact that the debt is payable to a third party, rather than the former spouse.

  3. Matter of Catlow

    663 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1981)   Cited 56 times
    Construing Section 17 of the former Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. Β§ 35 (repealed 1979)

    Federal courts have generally held a debt for attorney's fees to be nondischargeable under section 17(a)(7) when the fees are awarded to a bankrupt's spouse in a divorce action. See DuBroff v. Steingesser (In re Steingesser), 602 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1979) (New York law); Brody Brody v. Birdseye (In re Birdseye), 548 F.2d 321, 323-25 (10th Cir. 1977) (Connecticut law); Schiller v. Cornish (In re Cornish), 529 F.2d 1363, 1364-65 (7th Cir. 1976) (Illinois law); Nunnally v. Nunnally (In re Nunnally), 506 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1975) (Texas law); Damon v. Damon, 283 F.2d 571, 573-74 (1st Cir. 1960) (Maine law); In re Hargrove, 361 F. Supp. 851, 853-54 (W.D.Mo. 1973) (Missouri law) (state post-divorce proceeding); Gagnon v. Gagnon (In re Gagnon), No. BK-79-52 (Bankr.D.Me. April 29, 1980) (Maine law); Mahoney v. Smith (In re Smith), 3 B.R. 224, 231-32 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va. 1980) (District of Columbia law). But see Krings v. Moyer, 13 B.R. 436 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1981) (Missouri law). Catlow also argues that section 17(a)(7) is unconstitutional because, in failing to make alimony paid to a husband nondischargeable, it creates a gender-based distinction violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Catlow, however, did not raise this

  4. In re McLaughlin

    320 B.R. 661 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005)   Cited 5 times

    See Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Foster, 292 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003); In re Fiore, 290 B.R. 138, 139 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2003) Federal courts have generally held a debt for attorney's fees to be nondischargeable under section 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, which is the precurser to Β§ 507(a)(7) of the Code, when the fees are awarded to a debtor's spouse in a divorce action. See In re Catlow, 663 F.2d 960, 962 (9th Cir. 1981), citing, DuBroff v. Steingesser (In re Steingesser), 602 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1979) (New York law); Brody Brody v. Birdseye (In re Birdseye), 548 F.2d 321, 323-25 (10th Cir. 1977) (Connecticut law); Schiller v. Cornish (In re Cornish), 529 F.2d 1363, 1364-65 (7th Cir. 1976) (Illinois law); Nunnally v. Nunnally (In re Nunnally), 506 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1975) (Texas law); Damon v. Damon, 283 F.2d 571, 573-74 (1st Cir. 1960) (Maine law); In re Hargrove, 361 F.Supp. 851, 853-54 (W.D.Mo. 1973) (Missouri law) (state post-divorce proceeding); Gagnon v. Gagnon (In re Gagnon), No. BK-79-52 (Bankr. D. Me. April 29, 1980) (Maine law); Mahoney v. Smith (In re Smith), 3 B.R. 224, 231-32 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) (District of Columbia law). But see Krings v. Moyer, 13 B.R. 436 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (Missouri law). Similarly, those attorney fees which may be viewed as inextricably intertwined with the litigation of nondischargeable support are said themselves to qualify for nondischargeability under dischargeability actions pursuant to Β§ 523(a)(5).

  5. In re Bieluch

    219 B.R. 14 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998)   Cited 12 times
    Holding the terms imposed by the divorce court upon a portion of the award of attorney's fees were intended as punishment for the violation of a court order and thus not in the nature of support

    Decided in 1981, Spong was one of the Second Circuit's earliest decisions under the then relatively new Bankruptcy Code. Under the predecessor Bankruptcy Act's domestic relations discharge exclusion, courts usually looked to State law to determine whether a particular debt was in the nature of alimony or support. See Spong, 661 F.2d at 8 (citing, inter alia, DuBroff v. Steingesser, 602 F.2d 36, 37 (2d Cir. 1979)). By contrast, the Bankruptcy Code compels a Bankruptcy Court to look directly to the now well-developed federal bankruptcy law to resolve the question of whether an obligation is "alimony, maintenance or support" within the meaning of Section 523(a)(5).

  6. In re Smolenski

    210 B.R. 780 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997)   Cited 12 times

    John argues that his attorneys' fees incurred collecting the unpaid child support are nondischargeable even though no order awarding those fees has been entered. John relies principally on Dubroff v. Steingesser (In re Steingesser), 602 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979) in support of this argument. This case is inapposite and not applicable to the matter at bar.

  7. In re Sinewitz

    166 B.R. 786 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994)   Cited 13 times

    11 B.R. at 29. In re Steingesser, 602 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979); Deems v. Schauer, 470 F. Supp. 255 (D.N.D. 1979); In re LaFleur, 11 B.R. at 29. See e.g.

  8. In re Meehan

    46 B.R. 96 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)   Cited 21 times
    Refusing to approve individual debtor's rejection of land sale contract where: debtor's creditors to be paid 100% of their claims with or without rejection and state court directed specific performance prior to commencement of case

    Over the years, the courts have set forth the standards which must be met by debtors and trustees before the court will approve the rejection of the various types of executory contracts. See e.g. N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 1188, 1195-97, 79 L.Ed.2d 482 (1984) (somewhat stricter standard than "business judgment" standard applies to approval of rejection of collective-bargaining agreement); Control Data Corp. v. Zelman, 602 F.2d 36, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1979) ( In re Minges) (examining the evolution of the "business judgment" test from the stricter "burdensome" test); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ΒΆ 365.10 (15th ed. 1984) (courts have adhered to the stricter "burdensome" test before approving rejection of executory contracts for the sale of real property).

  9. In re Brown

    36 B.R. 103 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983)   Cited 6 times

    The following tests have been used in determining intent: 1. Whether the debt was incurred for "necessaries". Matter of Steingesser, 602 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979); Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961); 2.

  10. In re Knight

    29 B.R. 748 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1983)   Cited 6 times

    In re Birdseye, 548 F.2d 321, 325 (10th Cir. 1977) [emphasis in original]. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1903, United States courts, applying state domestic relations law, generally held counsel fees awarded in divorce and separation proceedings to be a form of alimony and not dischargeable. Matter of Catlow, 663 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1981); DuBroff v. Steingesser, 602 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Birdseye, supra, (10th Circuit); Schiller v. Cornish, 529 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Tyson, supra, (9th Circuit); Nunnally v. Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975); and Damon v. Damon, 283 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1960). Since the enactment of the 1978 Code, the majority of decisions have been consistent with those under the prior Act.