Opinion
October 9, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Underwood, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The respondent Victoria C. Trapanotto was injured in an automobile accident which occurred on July 5, 1986. She subsequently settled her claim against the owner of the adverse vehicle, Richard C. Schultz. The release issued to Mr. Schultz specifically reserved Ms. Trapanotto's right to "pursue a pending claim with State Farm Insurance companies [sic] for additional damages pursuant to an underinsured motorist endorsement". In December 1988, Ms. Trapanotto demanded arbitration of her underinsured motorist claim against the appellant State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter State Farm). This appeal follows the Supreme Court's denial of State Farm's application for a permanent stay of that arbitration.
We note that Ms. Trapanotto did obtain State Farm's written consent to her settlement with Mr. Schultz. There is thus no merit to the argument that coverage was forfeited pursuant to the exclusionary clause contained in the subject insurance policy which requires written consent (cf., Matter of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 163 A.D.2d 390; Matter of State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 160 A.D.2d 882; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Taglianetti, 122 A.D.2d 40).
Second, we reject the argument that Ms. Trapanotto violated whatever obligation she may have had to preserve State Farm's right to sue Mr. Schultz in a potential subrogation action. The Court of Appeals has held that a release issued in favor of a third-party tort-feasor which specifically reserves the insured's right to pursue a claim against his insurer generally encompasses a reservation of the insurer's right to pursue a claim against the third-party tort-feasor in a subsequent subrogation action (Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Erie Ry. Co., 73 N.Y. 399; see also, Record v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 83 A.D.2d 154; 71 N.Y. Jur 2d, Insurance, § 1918, at 383). Our decision in the Lopez case (supra) is not inconsistent with this principle, since the stay of arbitration in that case was granted upon the basis of the insured's failure to obtain the insurer's consent prior to entering into the settlement. Bracken, J.P., Eiber, Balletta and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.