Hence, it should be decided by an arbitrator"] ). Moreover, even if New York law (and not the FAA) controlled these issues, their resolution would have to be decided by the arbitrator. In Matter of Spencer-Van Etten Cent. School Dist. (A. Roy Auchinachie & Sons, Inc.) , 179 A.D.2d 855, 578 N.Y.S.2d 278 (3d Dept. 1992), lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 759, 584 N.Y.S.2d 447, 594 N.E.2d 941 (1992), the trial court granted the owner's motion to stay arbitration based on the owner's contention that respondent had failed to comply with the time limit to submit its claim to the architect. The architect's decision was a condition precedent to arbitration and, like the clause in this case, any such claim had to be presented to the architect "within 21 days after occurrence of the event giving rise to such Claim or within 21 days after the claimant first recognizes the condition giving rise to the Claim, whichever is later" ( id. at 857, 578 N.Y.S.2d 278 ).

Decided May 5, 1992 Appeal from (3d Dept: 179 A.D.2d 855) MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED OR DENIED

We affirm. Because the arbitration process is a creature of contract, the parties may choose to make any particular contract requirement a condition precedent to arbitration or a condition in arbitration ( see Matter of County of Rockland [Primiano Constr. Co.], 51 N.Y.2d 1, 8–9, 431 N.Y.S.2d 478, 409 N.E.2d 951 [1980];Matter of Spencer–Van Etten Cent. School Dist. [Auchinachie & Sons], 179 A.D.2d 855, 856, 578 N.Y.S.2d 278 [1992],lv. denied79 N.Y.2d 759, 584 N.Y.S.2d 447, 594 N.E.2d 941 [1992];Matter of Town of Queensbury [Joseph R. Wunderlich, Inc.], 175 A.D.2d 946, 947–948, 572 N.Y.S.2d 974 [1991] ). Whether a condition precedent to arbitration has been satisfied is a determination to be made by the courts in the first instance ( see Matter of Town of Ticonderoga [United Fedn. of Police Officers, Inc.], 15 A.D.3d 756, 758, 790 N.Y.S.2d 252 [2005];Matter of Town of Queensbury [Joseph R. Wunderlich, Inc.], 175 A.D.2d at 947–948, 572 N.Y.S.2d 974).

The contract is equally clear and unambiguous in requiring that the claim be submitted to mediation after the decision of the architect, and that such mediation was a further condition precedent to arbitration. There is no proof that East Area, either before or after the 21-day period noted above ( cf. Matter of Spencer-Van Etten Cent. School Dist. v. A. Roy Auchinachie Sons, Inc., 179 AD2d 855), properly referred its claim to the architect in accordance with the contract, or that it thereafter sought mediation at any time; both of these steps were expressly defined as conditions precedent to arbitration. Even assuming that the letter dated September 26, 2001, written by a representative of another party to the subject project, could be considered the equivalent of a decision of the architect, the fact remains that East Area never requested mediation, even though it could have done so on the same form that it later used to demand arbitration ( see Matter of Morris v. Signorelli, supra).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion to compel arbitration is granted, the petition is denied, and the processing is dismissed. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court erred in granting the petition to stay the arbitration ( see Matter of Liebhafsky [Comstruct Assoc.], 62 NY2d 439). Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the provision requiring submission of claims to the architect within 21 days, although termed a condition precedent, is a matter of contract interpretation for the arbitrator to resolve ( see Matter of Calvin Klein, Inc. [Winter Assoc.], 204 AD2d 149; Matter of Spencer-Van Etten Cent. School Dist. [Auchinachie Sons], 179 AD2d 855).

Inasmuch as the parties' contract contains explicit language evincing their intent that the decision of the architect is a condition precedent to arbitration, Supreme Court properly stayed arbitration of those claims which respondent did not submit to the architect for his decision (see, Matter of Board of Educ. v Hatzel Buehler, 156 A.D.2d 684, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 703; New York Tel. Co. v Schumacher Forelle, 60 A.D.2d 151; compare, Shook of W. Virginia v York City Sewer Auth., 756 F. Supp. 848, 851-854; Matter of Town of Queensbury [Joseph R. Wunderlich, Inc.], 175 A.D.2d 946). We note that Matter of Spencer-Van Etten Cent. School Dist. (Auchinachie Sons) ( 179 A.D.2d 855, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 759), relied upon by respondent, is distinguishable in that its holding relates to the issue of the timeliness of the submission of a claim to an architect rather than, as here, the failure to submit a claim. The contract provides that "[a] decision by the Architect * * * shall be required as a condition precedent to arbitration or litigation of a Claim between the Contractor and Owner as to all such matters arising prior to the date final payment is due".

Petitioner even made a partial payment at one point, which implicitly acknowledged that whatever controversy existed between the parties had clearly moved beyond the preliminary (architect ruling) phase — the area where a condition precedent existed — and into the realm of substantive controversy. The failure to file a formal notice within 21 days, and the reason for such alleged lapse, were failures of conditions inextricably bound up with questions of contract performance, and thus were issues for arbitration (Matter of Spencer-Van Etten Cent. School Dist. [Auchinachie Sons], 179 A.D.2d 855, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 759). Respondent was clearly entitled to proceed to arbitration, and we grant such relief, even in the absence of a cross appeal.

"While compliance with periods of limitation imposed by statutes is generally for the courts, compliance with contractual periods of limitation is for the arbitrator" ( County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51 NY2d 1, [1980]). "The failure to file a formal notice within 21 days, and the reason for such alleged lapse, were failures of conditions inextricably bound up with questions of contract performance, and thus were issues for arbitration" ( Calvin Klein, Inc. v G.P. Winter Assocs., 204 A.D.2d 149, 150 [1 Dept 1994]; see County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., supra; see Matter of Spencer-Van Etten Cent. School Dist. [Auchinachie Sons], 179 AD2d 855, Iv denied 79 NY2d 759 [3 Dept 1992]). Defendant Litric has not established that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action.