Opinion
November 9, 2000.
Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed May 13, 1999, which, upon reconsideration, rescinded its prior decisions and ruled that claimant was eligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she had sufficient weeks of covered employment to file a valid original claim.
Bartlett, Pontiff, Stewart Rhodes P.C. (Tucker C. Stanclift of counsel), Glens Falls, for appellants.
Cynthia Feathers, New York City, for Joann A. Sorsby, respondent.
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney-General (Steven Segall of counsel), New York City, for Commissioner of Labor, respondent.
Before: Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Peters, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In October 1995, claimant entered into a lease agreement pursuant to which she agreed to rent an apartment connected to the office of the employer's seasonal motel and to provide services at the motel in exchange for payment at a specified hourly rate. At the conclusion of the 1996 season, claimant was evicted from the apartment without having been remunerated for her services and filed an original claim for unemployment insurance benefits, thereby establishing a base period from September 18, 1995 through September 15, 1996. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board initially denied the claim on the ground that no employment relationship existed. Following a decision by the Industrial Board of Appeals (hereinafter IBA) that claimant was an employee for purposes of granting her claim against the employer for back wages, the Board granted the Commissioner of Labor's application to reopen its prior decisions and remitted the matter for a further hearing. Thereafter, the Board afforded deference to the IBA's factual findings, rescinded its prior decisions and ruled that an employment relationship existed such that claimant had sufficient weeks of covered employment within the base period to file a valid original claim. The employer appeals.
We affirm. Initially, we reject the employer's contention that the Board erred in reopening its decision and remitting the matter for an additional hearing. Whether to grant an application to reopen is a discretionary Board decision which, absent an abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed (see, Matter of Sorge [Commissioner of Labor], 268 A.D.2d 668; Matter of Trincere [Sweeney], 235 A.D.2d 904). Under the circumstances presented here, the record reveals no abuse of discretion in the Board's decision to reopen in order to accept the IBA's decision into evidence (see, Matter of Farina [Ross], 83 A.D.2d 671, 672; see also, Matter of Aures [Buffalo Bd. of Educ. — Commissioner of Labor], 272 A.D.2d 664, 708 N.Y.S.2d 347; Matter of Boone [Shore Road Community Serv. — Sweeney], 245 A.D.2d 617, 620). Moreover, once the Board considered the IBA's decision it was entitled to adopt the IBA's factual findings, which were made following a full adversary hearing at which the parties were given the opportunity to litigate the same issues presented here (see generally, Matter of Foster [Board of Educ. of Carthage Cent. School Dist. — Commissioner of Labor], 262 A.D.2d 899, 900, lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 760; Matter of Foldes [Sweeney], 241 A.D.2d 742; Matter of Fox [New York City Dept. of Hous. Preservation Dev. — Sweeney], 233 A.D.2d 645), and to rescind its own prior decisions based upon the conclusion that they were erroneous (see, Matter of Boone [Shore Road Community Serv. — Sweeney],supra; Matter of Centrone [Vulcan Fuel Corp. — Roberts], 102 A.D.2d 969).
The employer's remaining contentions have been considered and rejected as lacking in merit.
ORDERED that the decision is affirmed, without costs.