If so, the survivorship clause, which is contained in a parenthetical at the end of the introduction to Article EIGHTH, would apply to all of the bequests/devises to Joan in paragraph (c). And, since Joan died within 30 days of decedent, those bequests/devises would lapse and the property would be distributable as part of the residuary estate. It is important to note at the outset that ordinarily, courts read the language employed in a well-drafted will as technically correct and as an accurate reflection of the decedent's intent (see e.g. Matter of Smith, 14 Misc 2d 205, 206 [Sur Ct, Nassau County 1958] [stating "where, as here, the will is meticulously drawn by an obviously skilled draftsman, the words used must be given their usual and accepted meanings without enlargement and without restriction"]). Here, however, decedent's will is replete with ambiguous language and numerous errors.
Wills prepared by experienced attorney-drafts-persons must be more strictly construed than instruments created by laypersons. (Matter of Smith, 14 Misc.2d 205 [Sur Ct, Nassau County 1958].) As the Jefferson County Surrogate's Court noted, "In examining that language we must take into [account] the fact that it was drawn by an experienced lawyer and must give to the words used their usual and accepted meanings without enlargement and without restriction."
Proof that he knew of and approved the first adoption is proof that he generally favored adoption, i.e., that he considered bloodline irrelevant. Cases which had preceded Ward and Day had held that a child adopted after the death of the testator would not be included in a class disposition despite proof that testator favored adoption (Matter of Nicol, 3 Misc.2d 898) or had himself adopted a child (Matter of Smith, 14 Misc.2d 205). Later cases held such proof convincing.
Although there is some authority for the adopted son's position, the overwhelming weight of authority is to the contrary. The courts have, in the absence of an intent to the contrary, interpreted the word "issue" to exclude an adopted child, without regard to whether there was a "passing or limitation over" dependent upon the foster parent dying without heirs ( Matter of Ricks, 12 A.D.2d 395, affd. 10 N.Y.2d 231; Matter of Taintor, 32 Misc.2d 160; Matter of Peabody, 17 Misc.2d 656; Matter of Smith, 14 Misc.2d 205; Matter of Holt, 206 Misc. 789). Furthermore, the adopted son's basic premise that the third paragraph invests an adopted child with the same status as a natural child, and that the fourth paragraph is the only exception, is in error.
In support of petitioner's first argument, two New York cases are principally cited. One ( Matter of Smith, 14 Misc.2d 205 ) deals only with the inclusion of adopted children in the term "lawful issue". While we agree with the statement cited from that case that words used should be given their usual and accepted meaning in the absence of a showing that testator had a contrary intent, we find in the case at hand a definite expression of contrary intent in paragraph Third where this testator declared his intent "to dispose of all property which I am entitled to dispose of by will".
In Matter of Hall (127 N.Y.S.2d 445) this court discussed the Upjohn case in some detail and held that a child adopted eight years after the death of the testatrix could not take a trust remainder under the will of the foster parent's mother. Quite recently the Surrogate's Court of Nassau County reached the same conclusion in Matter of Smith ( 14 Misc.2d 205, 207), where the adoption took place 10 years after the testator's death. In the latter case the special guardian for the adopted child relied upon the fact that the testator's own son was an adopted child — a circumstance surely as cogent as any of the proof in this case to establish the testator's favorable attitude toward adopted children — yet the fact was held to be "of no significance in the construction of this will drawn twelve years before the grandchild in question was adopted."