Silver v. Board of Education of West Canada Valley Central School District

19 Citing cases

  1. Lindsey v. Bd. of Educ

    72 A.D.2d 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)   Cited 17 times

    Respondents, Board of Education of Mt. Morris Central School District and the district's Supervising Principal, appeal from a judgment determining that petitioner Janet Lindsey has acquired tenure by estoppel and directing her reinstatement with back pay. Tenure by estoppel results when a school board fails to take the action required by law to grant or deny tenure and, with full knowledge and consent, permits a teacher to continue to teach beyond the expiration of her probationary term (Matter of Marcus v Board of Educ., 64 A.D.2d 475; and see Matter of Matthews v Nyquist, 67 A.D.2d 790, app dsmd 47 N.Y.2d 800; Matter of Dwyer v Board of Educ., 61 A.D.2d 859; Matter of Silver v Board of Educ., 46 A.D.2d 427; Matter of Macera, 10 Ed Dept Rep 232, 233; Matter of Downey, 72 N.Y. St Dept Rep 29). The central issue of this appeal is whether petitioner may complete her statutory probationary period, and thereby achieve tenure by estoppel, by tacking together two noncontinuous periods of service.

  2. Matter of Hannan v. Bd. of Educ

    86 Misc. 2d 299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)   Cited 2 times

    Matter of Baer v Nyquist (supra) has been construed as mandating area tenure in a wide variety of situations. In Matter Mitchell v Board of Educ. of Great Neck Public Schools ( 48 A.D.2d 835) it was relied upon by the Second Department for the proposition that the secondary school tenure area encompasses both Latin and driver education and in Matter of Silver v Board of Educ. of West Canada Val. Cent. School Dist., ( 46 A.D.2d 427) it was the authority for a similar determination by the Fourth Department relative to social studies, English and library science. Despite the commissioner's opinion that guidance counselors may be classified vertically for tenure purposes (see Matter of Glowacki, 14 Ed Dept Rep 122, affd Glowacki v Ambach, Sup Ct, Albany County, Index No. 4678/75 [GIBSON, J., April 1, 1975]), in Steele v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. (Sup Ct, Kings County, Index No. 19445/75 [Dec 22, 1975]), Baer was the foundation for Mr. Justice PINO'S holding that a school system may not establish a separate tenure area for elementary school guidance counselors.

  3. Matter of Ward v. Nyquist

    371 N.E.2d 477 (N.Y. 1977)   Cited 39 times
    Recognizing that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review is applied to decisions of the Commissioner of Education

    The rationale for insisting on strict compliance was to assure that statutory procedures for discontinuance of tenured teachers be followed. In that case, it was stated that "Certification requirements * * * may not be employed to erode the protections afforded tenured teachers, since the tenure statutes provide the exclusive method for dismissal for those teachers * * * The only two courses of action open to [the board] were to discontinue the services of the teacher having the least seniority within the tenure of the position abolished, pursuant to subdivision 2 of section 2510 of the Education Law, or to discontinue petitioner's services for legal incompetence due to lack of certification by following the procedures mandated by the tenure statutes" (Matter of Lynch v Nyquist, supra, p 365, affd 34 N.Y.2d 588; see, also, Matter of Steele v Board of Educ., 53 A.D.2d 674, affd 42 N.Y.2d 840; Matter of Silver v Board of Educ., 46 A.D.2d 427). These somewhat cumbersome procedures are necessary to assure that tenured teachers are not dismissed by virtue of abolition without the proper procedures.

  4. Steele v. Board of Educ

    40 N.Y.2d 456 (N.Y. 1976)   Cited 48 times
    In Steele, the court recognized that certain pedagogical functions have traditionally been afforded special tenure areas as a matter of custom and usage.

    In addition to those two basic areas circumscribed by grade levels — so-called "horizontal" tenure areas — there also existed a few special exceptions, notably certain administrative positions and special subjects such as art or music (see Matter of Ducey, 65 N.Y. St Dept Rep 65, supra), which were considered separate tenure areas within the grade level — so-called "vertical" tenure areas. As school systems have expanded, adding stratifications at grade level and additional fields of specialization among teachers and other support personnel, such as counselors, there has developed a concomitant tendency to refine and recast the tenure areas in keeping with that growth (see Matter of Becker v Board of Educ., 9 N.Y.2d 111 [kindergarten]; Matter of Jadick v Board of Educ., 15 N.Y.2d 652 [junior high]; Matter of Van Heusen v Board of Educ., 26 A.D.2d 721 [study hall supervision]; Matter of Silver v Board of Educ., 46 A.D.2d 427 [high school social studies]; Matter of Amos v Union Free School Dist. No. 9, 47 A.D.2d 711 [high school French]; Matter of Mitchell v Board of Educ., 48 A.D.2d 835 [driver education]). As a perusal of the cases will indicate, on the whole, bifurcations of grade level or horizontal tenure areas have been upheld, while attempts on the part of school boards to define narrower vertical tenure areas within grade level have been discouraged.

  5. Triana v. New York

    47 A.D.3d 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 23 times
    In Triana v. Board of Education, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op 607 [1st Dept. 2008], the petitioner, a former teacher, brought an Article 78 Petition challenging her termination by the New York City Board of Education on the grounds that she had become tenured by estoppel, and thus her termination was null and void as violative of Education Law §§ 2573(5) and 3020-a.

    Thus, under the rules, tenure areas are not divided into specific subject areas until seventh or eighth grade, and only then if the instruction in core academic subjects has not been "departmentalized" (8 NYCRR 30.1 [d]; 30.6). There is also case law supporting the general idea that tenure is based primarily on grade level, not subject area ( see Matter of Silver v Board of Educ. of W. Canada Val. Cent. School Dist., Newport, 46 AD2d 427, 431 [petitioner's tenure area was secondary teachers, and was not limited to social studies, for purposes of seniority credit]; Matter of Greco v Board of Educ. of Patchogue-Medford Union Free School Dist., 98 AD2d 721, 722-723, quoting Matter of Cuff, 9 Ed Dept Rep 101, 103 ["a teacher who has been transferred to a new tenure area which encompasses the same grade levels in which he taught in his former tenure area . . . does not lose any rights he had acquired before he was affected by such a transfer" (internal quotation marks omitted)]). The facts here show that petitioner had consistently taught social studies to sixth graders for approximately 17 years prior to this probationary appointment in common branches.

  6. Matter of Schimmel v. Board of Education

    111 A.D.2d 966 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)   Cited 7 times

    Nor was it improper for respondent to consider petitioner's prior performance with BOCES in its evaluation of his application. Education Law § 3014-b, on which petitioner relies for relief, parallels Education Law § 2510; both establish preferred eligible lists of excessed teachers to protect their tenure and seniority status following the abolition or consolidation of their positions ( see, e.g., Matter of Acinapuro v. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., 89 A.D.2d 329, 335-336; Matter of Silver v. Board of Educ., 46 A.D.2d 427, 430). The duly promulgated rules of the State Board of Regents expressly recognize that the mandate of Education Law § 2510 applies to a board of cooperative educational services, like BOCES, which has abolished tenure area positions (8 NYCRR 30.13).

  7. Matter of Musorofiti v. Board of Education

    108 A.D.2d 863 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)   Cited 2 times

    Contrary to Special Term's determination, we find that petitioner's rights pursuant to Education Law § 2510 (2) were violated when respondent school district denied petitioner's request that she be permitted to teach two classes in English as a second language being taught by Eva Khatana, a teacher having less seniority than petitioner within the junior high school (grades seven through nine) tenure area ( see, Matter of Lynch v Nyquist, 41 A.D.2d 363, affd 34 N.Y.2d 588 on opn at App. Div.; Matter of Silver v Board of Educ., 46 A.D.2d 427; Matter of Van Heusen v Board of Educ., 26 A.D.2d 721). We reject the school district's argument that it was not called upon to accommodate petitioner through schedule adjustments.

  8. Matter of Cole v. Bd. of Educ

    90 A.D.2d 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)   Cited 18 times

    The language of subdivision 2 of section 2510, and of subdivision 3 of section 2585 is identical. Section 2510 has been held applicable to all types of school districts, including union free and central school districts ( Matter of Dreyfuss v. Board of Educ., 72 Misc.2d 703, 706, revd on other grounds 42 A.D.2d 845; Matter of Silver v. Board of Educ., 46 A.D.2d 427, 429-430). Section 2585 applies to school districts of larger cities.

  9. Matter of Rubtchinsky v. Moriah Cent Sch. Dist

    82 A.D.2d 960 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)   Cited 3 times

    Accepting the allegations of the article 78 petition as true, and without considering the opposing affidavits submitted by respondent (see Matter of Mattioli v Casscles, 50 A.D.2d 1013), it is evident that petitioner has stated a viable cause of action insofar as he maintains his services were improperly terminated by the abolition of a business position in violation of subdivision 2 of section 2510 Educ. of the Education Law. Since factual issues may exist concerning the reasons for the abolition, the proper tenure area enjoyed by petitioner, and his seniority within that area, dismissal of the claim is not presently warranted and respondents should be given an opportunity to answer his contentions in that regard (CPLR 7804, subd [f]; see Matter of Ward v Nyquist, 43 N.Y.2d 57; Matter of Lezette v Board of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 272; Matter of Silver v Board of Educ., 46 A.D.2d 427). If petitioner ultimately succeeds in proving his cause of action, he would, of course, be entitled to reinstatement to his former status as a teacher suspended with pay while awaiting the disposition of pending charges.

  10. Matter of Pulver v. Board of Education

    80 A.D.2d 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)   Cited 5 times

    Judgment reversed, with $50 costs and disbursements, and matter remitted to Special Term for a determination on the merits. The notice of claim requirement in section 3813 Educ. of the Education Law does not apply to a proceeding in which the vindication of the public interest is sought in the enforcement of tenure rights (see Matter of Gross v. Board of Educ., 73 A.D.2d 949; Matter of Tadken v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 820, mot for lv to app den 46 N.Y.2d 711). The concept of tenure rights includes the reinstatement provisions of section 2510 Educ. of the Education Law (cf. Matter of Silver v. Board of Educ., 46 A.D.2d 427). Mangano, J.P., Cohalan, O'Connor and Weinstein, JJ., concur.