Summary
In Shulman v. New York Board of Fire Underwriters, 15 A.D.2d 700, 223 N.Y.S.2d 312, the sole question presented was whether a child legally adopted by another man was entitled under the workmen's compensation law to benefits upon the death of her father subsequent to the adoption.
Summary of this case from Snook v. HerrmannOpinion
January 17, 1962
Appeal by the mother and natural guardian of an infant under the age of 18 years from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board which denied death benefits to the infant. The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Decedent, Michael R. Tracy, married Florence Lynch in December, 1951. A child, Valerie Jean, was born to them on September 28, 1952. This marriage was terminated by an Alabama decree of divorce on September 30, 1955. Florence married one Shulman on October 10, 1955. Thereafter in 1957 Shulman adopted Valerie Jean pursuant to a decree of the Surrogate's Court of Bronx County which also provided for a change of her name to that of the foster parent. In October, 1957 Michael married Eleanor M. Tracy. In February, 1958 he died as a result of an industrial accident leaving him surviving his widow and natural child. The board denied death benefits to the infant upon the ground that subdivision 2 of section 16 Work. Comp. of the Workmen's Compensation Law "presupposes a child of the deceased and one which the decedent was legally obligated to support, whereas prior to and at the time of the death, Valerie Jean was the adopted child of Burton Shulman, whose obligation it was to furnish her support." The sole question presented for determination is whether a child legally adopted by another is entitled under the Workmen's Compensation Law to benefits upon the death of her natural father. Subdivision 2 of section 16 provides for the payment of death benefits to a "surviving child * * * under the age of eighteen years" as to whom the question of dependency is immaterial. ( Matter of Crockett v. International Ry. Co., 176 App. Div. 45.) Subdivision 11 of section 2 defines "child" to "include a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee; and a step-child or acknowledged illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased." Section 115 Dom. Rel. of the Domestic Relations Law, re-enacted without change as section 117 pursuant to section 1 of chapter 147 of the Laws of 1961, effective September 1, 1961, related to the effect of adoption and, in part, provided: "The rights of a foster child to inheritance and succession from his natural parents remain unaffected by adoption." Subdivision 14 of section 83 of the Decedent Estate Law which governs descent and distribution in the case of intestacy reads: "The right of an adopted child to take a share of the estate * * * shall continue as provided in the domestic relations law." In the process of explaining the meaning of the word "child" as used in the Workmen's Compensation Law, the Legislature did not exclude the offspring of natural parents. It simply extended the meaning of the term to include certain parent-child relationships — natural and artificial — which, unless clarified, might be deemed not to be within the literal sense of the word. Had the purpose been to destroy the consanguineous connection between a father and his natural child adopted by another as the basis for an award of death benefits, the statutory definition certainly would have been so precisely written as to leave no doubt that such was its intent. Moreover, the care with which the Legislature preserved in related statutes the right of such a child to inherit from his natural parents is a reliable guide to the object sought to be accomplished by subdivision 2 of section 16. Neither logic nor reason dictates any real distinction between the statutory devolution of property in the case of intestacy and the succession to a right conferred by the Workmen's Compensation Law. Each has for its purpose the promotion of the economic good of the child. We think that the word "child" as used in the statute was intended to embrace one having the kindred and adoptive ties of the infant appellant. Betz v. Horr ( 276 N.Y. 83), heavily relied on by respondent Tracy, in which the term "father" or "parent" employed in the Domestic Relations Court Act of New York City, the Public Welfare Law and the Code of Criminal Procedure when read with the adoptive provisions of the Domestic Relations Law was construed to exempt the natural parent from legal liability for the support of an indigent adult adopted child is not determinative of the intent and purpose of the legislative enactment here construed. Decision reversed and the claim remitted to the Workmen's Compensation Board for further consideration not inconsistent herewith, with costs. Bergan, P.J., Coon, Gibson, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ., concur.